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
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TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

*U.S. Congress* HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENT OF  
BRIG. GEN. HENRY C. McCAIN

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JANUARY 14, 1916



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TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Wednesday, January 12, 1916.

The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that the Assistant Secretary of War desired to be heard this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY BRECKINRIDGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.

Mr. BECKINRIDGE. Mr. Chairman, there is no formal statement which I have to make. The Secretary of War thought that inasmuch as the other officials of the War Department were being called to the witness stand it might be well for me to appear before the committee to submit to such questioning as the members of the committee might desire to direct, along the line upon which they had been making an inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. If any members of the committee desire to ask the Assistant Secretary any questions they may proceed.

Mr. OLNEY. I would like to ask the Assistant Secretary a question in regard to the State militia, in connection with the report of the Massachusetts commission as to impressing upon the different States the need of compulsory drill in the various States of the Union. I would like to ask the Assistant Secretary if it does not seem as if we were going quite far enough in this matter under the terms of the bill as at present outlined. I would like to ask the Assistant Secretary in regard to any plans he might suggest along that line in reference to a compulsory military service in the schools in the various States.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think that any advice along such a line as that, Mr. Olney, would be thoroughly gratuitous from me. As the Secretary of War has pointed out, the Government has no jurisdiction over the school systems of the States, and as the program that he has put forward has been based entirely upon putting the control of the military forces of the Nation under the Nation, and excludes the idea of adequately being able either to persuade or coerce the State in building up the military forces of the United States, I do not think I could offer any sound advice or helpful advice to the States in working out a military policy when I think it must be worked out by the Nation.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Secretary, of course, you are thoroughly in accord with the Secretary of War in regard to the policy he has suggested to this committee.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. KAHN. I understand that the business men's and professional men's camps throughout the country were under your personal, direct supervision?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir; not that; I had something to do with them, but not entirely that. Everything that pertains to the training of citizens comes more directly within the jurisdiction of my office, and in that regard I did have something to do with it.

Mr. KAHN. Were those camps as thoroughly successful as you had anticipated?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I had no anticipation with respect to them. It was merely an experiment, and within the limitations of that experiment I think they were fairly successful as demonstrating that there is a body of men who will take intensive training under the supervision of the Federal Goverment.

Mr. KAHN. How many men, all told, were in those camps?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. At the two camps at Plattsburg there were about 1,800; at the camp at Chicago I think there were about 500, and then there were some men at the camp at San Francisco. There were 2,660 altogether at the business men's camps.

Mr. KAHN. That included the one at San Francisco?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir. Of course, it must be remembered that the men who attended those camps paid their own transportation, furnished all their own clothes, and paid for their own subsistence.

Mr. KAHN. How much notice did they have of the intention of the department to hold the camps?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That was different in different places. So far as the first Plattsburg camp was concerned I imagine Gen. Wood was working on that for the better part of a year preceding the opening of the camp. The Chicago camp was held on the spur of the moment, as you might say, with only three or four weeks' notice.

Mr. KAHN. How many men participated in the first Plattsburg camp?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I have not those figures at hand, but I will put them in the record.

Mr. KAHN. Your records would also show, would they not, the approximate ages of those who participated in the camps?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think they would.

Mr. KAHN. Will you put those figures in the record also?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I will do so.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Secretary, have you given the subject of short enlistments any serious study?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I have given it some study, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think the country would benefit materially in the way of better preparation for defense, if, instead of keeping the soldiers four years in the service, we would allow them to get an honorable discharge, say, at the end of two years?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That advantage would be in exact proportion to the size of your first line in the Regular Army through which they pass. Of course, it is an advantage to have trained men in the country, ordinarily, if they are liable for military service, and the proportion of advantage is in proportion to the numbers of those trained and those liable.

Mr. KAHN. Well, if many thousands of young men were turned out from the Army every year, do you not think that in case of hostilities a great many of those would return to the colors upon the first call of the President?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think so, within a reasonable time after having left the colors, but I think that the floating population that goes into the Regular Army become very quickly incapable of the best military service. I mean that a man of that kind, when he gets two or three years removed from active service, his physical and other conditions are very problematical, and his advantage for service is very problematical.

Mr. KAHN. Would not the drill he received in the Army, and the experience he gets in the matter of sanitation and athletics, be rather a help than a hindrance to him?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Would he not be apt to be better qualified than the men who had no experience at all?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. He would, sir.

Mr. KAHN. So that after all, the two years' service he would receive in the Army ought to make him a very valuable asset to his country in that time.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would. Personally, I think two years' training is enough for any soldier.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Mr. Secretary, the term of enlistment is now four years, is it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir; it is seven years, four years with the colors and three years in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. With the privilege of being put into the reserve, if he is accorded that privilege by his commanding officer?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. The Government now holds out inducements to soldiers to reenlist?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. At the expiration of their first enlistment?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. About what proportion do reenlist?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The Adjutant General is the expert on those matters. He can tell you accurately. He can put those figures in the record. He is the expert of the department on those matters.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Getting back to those camps which you had last season, would you recommend an appropriation by the Government in aid of those volunteer camps; that is, such camps as the ones we had at Plattsburgh?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Whether or not I would recommend governmental aid in behalf of that particular sort of intensive training, I would not say at this time, but fundamentally I would say that governmental aid should be given to any system of military training that is carried on under a democracy; that is, the availability of that training should be absolutely complete to every one who has the mental, the moral, and the physical capacity to take that training and benefit from it and serve the Nation in return for it; that is, no sort of military training should be erected into a system which either requires or connotes the payment of the attendant's own expenses by himself.

Mr. MCKENZIE. In those camps was general military training taken up or certain particular branches of training?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. All the elements of soldiering, as far as they could be diffused in a month, were taught.

Mr. MCKENZIE. What would you think of having camps of that sort and taking up the matter of instructing the men along the line of furnishing material; in other words, the business end of the Military Establishment?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not know whether I understand what you mean. Do you mean in reference to the technical departments and the supply department, and things like that?

Mr. MCKENZIE. Yes; the supply department.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. There, again, I would not speak as if I were advocating building upon the Plattsburgh camp idea a military system, but any system of intensive military instruction in support of a system of national defense, of course, should include every branch of the service, the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Engineer Corps, the Coast Artillery, the Quartermaster Corps; no particular division of the military art should be neglected.

Mr. MCKENZIE. The point I am trying to bring out, Mr. Secretary, is that in my judgment it would be impossible to drill a man in a short camp service, such as we had at Plattsburgh and Chicago and San Francisco last year, to make him an efficient, competent general, for example, or a colonel, but it might be possible to train him in such a way that he would be very serviceable to the Army in time of war in helping to assemble the equipment and furnishing the material, etc., that was necessary for the maintenance of the Army.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That might be desirable under certain conditions, but when, as is the case now, there is such an ignorance of the military art, and such a lack of proficiency in military training as there is in this country, I think the most desirable thing is to give all your attention to military training until you have compassed that enough to be thoroughly safe. In other words, a month's training can not make a soldier, but it is just that much better than no training at all.

Mr. MCKENZIE. For example, you take a bright, capable young man from one of the great mercantile establishments of Chicago, put him into one of those camps and drill him for a month or six weeks along the line of what I would term the business end of the Army, if he entered the Army, not as a man who carried a gun, but as a man who was trained in taking particular care of the furnishing of the necessary equipment and food, and things of that sort that are absolutely necessary to have at hand in order to properly maintain the Army, he would be a very valuable asset.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would subscribe to the general proposition that any system of training the citizen soldiers should include the training of those soldiers in every department of the art, and the supply and technical departments are among the various departments of that art.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the average age of the men who were at the Plattsburgh camp?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That has already been asked me, Mr. Chairman, and I will furnish those figures so far as we have them.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Secretary, I want to refer back to an answer you gave to Mr. McKenzie with regard to the men furnishing their own equipment at the camps.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That had to be done, because it was illegal to give it to them.

Mr. KAHN. I understood you to say you did not think it would be an advisable thing to ask men to do that generally, that it would not lead to any great success, if I understood your idea correctly.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Whether it would lead to any great success or not I did not say, but I would say I think it would not lead to any general success. What I say is that it is fundamentally wrong to base any part of a military system upon the military service of those who are ready and willing to pay their own way. That is not democracy; that is plutocracy, academically speaking.

Mr. KAHN. I had in mind the fact that a very considerable percentage of the German army do that very thing.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; the Jährige.

Mr. KAHN. The one-year men.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. They must pass an examination in some of the higher branches of study and must furnish all their own accoutrement, which, of course, they buy from the Government, so that it works out successfully in Germany.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is incident to a conscriptive system, where a man is able to escape some of the military burdens of the service by rendering some financial contribution to the Government.

Mr. GREENE. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, that in as much as one month is not likely to prepare a soldier very thoroughly for any part of his functions, that the greatest value of the student military instruction camps and the other volunteer instruction camps that have been held, is, perhaps, of a missionary character?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Well, it is pretty hard to say as to that. Of course, anything, from my standpoint, that diffuses among the mass of the American people some knowledge of military affairs and some appreciation of what is required to make a soldier fit to defend his country is a very beneficial thing, and that knowledge, per se, is very advantageous and very essential, no matter how far short of the ideal it may be in a nation which has no military knowledge.

Mr. GREENE. I understand; and I am not seeking to minimize the advantage that the individual derives even from four or six weeks' training. What I mean is, as far as its effect upon a policy is concerned, it practically amounts to sending home, out of each one of these camps, at the end of four weeks or six weeks a goodly company of missionaries who go back and tell the citizenry just what they have begun to find out it means to begin to try to learn to be a soldier.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it is of benefit, just as the study of any inherently essential art by any goodly number of people who return to their communities will diffuse and spread the result of that study.

Mr. GREENE. So that anybody attempting to estimate the value of these military camps by the degree of preparedness achieved by each individual recruit who attended the camp, overlooks, perhaps, the greater benefit still, which does lie in this diffusion of a better and more nearly proper understanding of the military problem that these young gentlemen carry back to their homes with them.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I believe that, just as I believe that the five or six million dollars we have spent upon the militia each year is returned to the body politic in the diffusion of those sanitary rules and regulations which are so thoroughly drilled into those men.

Mr. GREENE. I do, too. I desire to emphasize this for record purposes, perhaps, but some of the questions asked by people at home who have given little or no thought to the military problems, who suppose, because this is a country of great potential strength, that it is ready to meet any emergency—some of the questions asked by those people of the soldiers when they came back were like this: "What did you find out?" and their answer invariably was, "I found out it was a great deal more of a proposition than I had ever dreamed before I went," and I think that might be regarded as of some moral value.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it is of great moral value if you can demonstrate to the American people that a soldier can not be made entirely by patriotism or good intentions or willingness to serve, but that he must have adequate training.

Mr. GREENE. And one month will not do it?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. One month will not do it.

Mr. GREENE. If the Constitution of the United States did not reserve to the States their control of their militia, so that we have 48 separate independent militia commands, then the whole problem of a Continental Army would be solved, because it would lie exclusively in the national control over the militia, and would mean that we would only have to have one group of militia soldiers, rather than two, as proposed by the administration now?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. GREENE. Why does not the administration or the department propose that the Constitution be changed so that we should have the simple, direct, first-hand thing, instead of trying to get around the existing conditions by building up another experiment alongside of it? One of them will eat up the other, will it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." If you predicate your military system on the passage of a constitutional amendment, that will probably project it so far into the future that you might as well stand for no military system at all.

Mr. GREENE. Does that not mean that we shall always have to face it?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not if you adopt the continental army system.

Mr. GREENE. Would not that wipe out the National Guard, and so leave only the one you want?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; it would not wipe out the National Guard necessarily. It would provide what must be provided immediately without waiting for the cumbersome, problematical processes of a constitutional amendment, and we would have a force for the defense of the Nation absolutely under the control of the Nation, which, in the present development of military systems is absolutely the only force that can be depended upon the defense of the Nation.

Mr. GREENE. I agree, in general, with the proposal, but taking into consideration the theory that two bodies can not occupy the same space at the same time, how are you going to have two systems of Federal Volunteers, one recognized under the Constitution and the

other with a quasi implied understanding that a body of troops organized under another phase of the Constitution will themselves come into the field?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If you had to choose between the two, the militia would have to go.

Mr. GREENE. How can you attempt to do that with an experiment which is trying to get around the militia?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No experiment is trying to get around the militia.

Mr. GREENE. If this experiment is not trying to get around the militia, why does it seek to put into another field duties which the militia are endeavoring to perform in theirs?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. We think we ought to try to create a force to perform those functions for the Nation which, in theory, can be demonstrated, and by practice has been demonstrated are impossible of being fulfilled by the militia of the Constitution.

Mr. GREENE. Then, in effect if the militia does not serve the purpose, and we must have a better thing, and if we must have a better thing for that reason, then, as a result of the better thing taking its place the militia must go?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No. It is shown that we must have a better thing. If you come to me as the representative of a State and say that is true, or be it true as it may, the State as well as the Nation must have certain forces kept within its confines to insure domestic order, and that historically and practically those forces can be best maintained through the maintenance of a certain number of militia, then I say, so be it, so far as it can be used as an asset of the Nation.

Mr. GREENE. Exactly on that line, Mr. Secretary, is it not pretty well agreed that the State does not require a separate army for the maintenance of law and order within its territory; that it has a police force with ample power; and that under the Constitution of the United States the Federal Government is pledged to see that every State has a republican form of government? Which means, of course, that the governors can only call upon the Federal Government to maintain the dignity of their own State government, to keep law and order within their confines; so that the State militia would serve all the purposes now advocated as the reasons for being of the National Guard.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think part of your statement is fact and part is not fact. In the first place, without the militia or some other force it is not true that the State has or has had sufficient force within itself at all times to assert its authority or maintain the integrity of its laws.

For instance, many States of the Union, as a practical matter, we know, have endeavored to obtain a State constabulary; but for some practical reason they have not been able to do that, and they must have some force within our system, and therefore they call upon their State forces to perform the functions which the State constabulary does perform in Pennsylvania, and 90 times within our history—90 times or more—the States have been unable with all the forces at their command to suppress domestic insurrections and have called upon the Federal Government.

Mr. GREENE. That is just the point—that while they have maintained a State militia on the ancient assumption that they must keep

law and order within their own territory by their own means, there is always that abiding power in the Constitution to requisition Federal forces to do the same time.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is true.

Mr. GREENE. That is what I mean. In other words, this attempt to run the continental army alongside the National Guard—just so long as it must be the fact that the continental army has every power the National Guard has now means the weaker must go to the wall, because there would be no occasion for its use, from any Federal viewpoint.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If you do not do that, I think the only thing we can do is to abide by the consequences, because if you fail to build and maintain a force for the defense of the Nation solely under the control of the United States you jeopardize the safety of the Nation, and the inherent or sentimental associations or ties or demands of any institution that conflicts with that safety ought not to be allowed to stand as an obstacle.

Mr. GREENE. I think, so far as the general ideas you have advanced in that respect are concerned, I am more or less in accord with you, and I have no doubt, quite heartily; because I believe there should be but one centralized military command in any country or in any place.

Keeping that in mind, and also keeping in mind your own statement in regard to it, I do not see why the more direct means would not in the end be actually laying the foundation for a permanent military policy on the part of this Nation. If I understand it correctly, it is the general disposition of national guardsmen in all the 48 States, taking the averages of things, to desire to be under Federal direction and association.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Absolutely. I believe that 90 per cent of the people in the National Guard are in there for no other reason than to serve the Nation, and in so far as any representatives of them and of their attitude may seem to show the contrary, I think that representation is contrary to the existing fact.

Mr. GREENE. I do. Why not then go straight to the crux of the thing, and instead of attempting to build up an intermediary organization, which must eat up the National Guard—and the local State militia has all the advantage of territorial locations, with its field upon which to draw recruits, and a field to which to return the reservists, all localized and within reach—why not build up that, and in the interim get the Constitution changed so that you will have the control of that, instead of substituting any experiment in between the Regular Army and that?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. What is the use of doing by constitutional amendment what you can do without a constitutional amendment?

Mr. GREENE. You want the sentiment and the traditions?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would be very beneficial.

Mr. GREENE. You want the territorial organization?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. All organizations in any sort of a country, in order to be successful, must be territorial.

Mr. GREENE. In the continental army you get neither.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Oh, yes; you do. I beg your pardon. The whole system is territorial.

Mr. GREENE. Then you wipe out that which already occupies the territory, because no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not think that necessarily follows. As a general proposition it follows, but it does not apply any more than the allegation that a municipality can not have a militia and a police force at the same time. Just as the State and the Federal authorities exist side by side; but they do not occupy the same space, although they may occupy the same territory.

Mr. GREENE. But if the police force in the municipality was designed simply to execute the local ordinances or laws of the State, and the militia was designed, as you have said it was, for a national purpose, then, of course, the fields are different.

But the contention of the War Department, as I understand it, is that the continental army is *per se* a national militia force, and the National Guard at heart is, but constitutionally can not be.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. In the personnel of the National Guard 90 per cent of its constituency is, at heart. The system is not and can not be capable of being so. Furthermore, the continental army in its practical working out will not appeal entirely to the same sources that the militia appeals to. You know, as a practical matter, that there are about 900,000 youths coming of any given age at any one time in this country, and that 50 per cent, probably, of that number live upon farms, and that probably 70 per cent of that 50 per cent live so far from cities where militia companies are maintained, that it is physically impossible for them to belong to a militia company that drills one night a week in an armory.

There are 250,000 of a similar class of young men in the institutions of learning in the United States who will not go into militia companies. You also know that on account of the dislike for strike duty there are likely a large number of men who will not go into the militia. The continental army will and can appeal to all those people, without occupying a sphere that the militia now occupies, because the militia does not now and never has occupied that sphere and been able to appeal to and attract and reach those men.

If you are building up your system upon the volunteer principle you have to build it so that it will appeal to all those classes who are willing to serve. In formulating a military policy we are not concerned with political nor with sociological or economical questions, but from the military standpoint the militia can not be depended upon to make the most comprehensive appeal, because there are thousands of men who will not go into it on account of the strike duty.

So they would, perhaps, compete in some places but the continental army would appeal to a vast number of men that the militia would never appeal to.

Mr. GREENE. Then your continental army is to be composed of men who live so far away from the nearest town where a militia company is that they can not go to it, but they will go farther still, somewhere, to an indefinite place, and have somewhere, some place, a local organization?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Precisely, just as a man is willing, if his way is paid, to go to New York and stay one week at the finest place, when he would not go there five times at his own expense.

Mr. TILSON. Just a word, Mr. Secretary, in regard to the supplies of an Army with transportation, food, equipment, and so on. What would you suggest as a remedy for the lack of efficiency in transporting and supplying an army, that has always been shown to exist in emergencies in times past.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The training of an adequate first line, or reserve, of men for the quartermaster corps.

Mr. TILSON. How would you train men in supplying food and equipment, if there is no food or equipment to be supplied? In other words, experience as a rule, in those things, can be gained only by doing the thing itself.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is true.

Mr. TILSON. We have no large force; we have no large supply of Federal equipment to be furnished. What would you suggest as a means of training, in connection with that matter?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would suggest two means, a theoretical and a practical instruction, the practical means to be brought into being when the field training of the different troops you have is going on.

Mr. TILSON. You know, do you not, that there has been a very general lack in this direction, which is perfectly natural?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. In our past wars there has been.

Mr. TILSON. And even in maneuvers we have found difficulty.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is very true.

Mr. TILSON. One thing more in regard to the Plattsburgh and Chicago camps. About what expense did each man incur who went there?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not very much.

Mr. TILSON. I mean necessary expense.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Between \$65 and \$70.

Mr. TILSON. Were there any age limitations placed upon the men who could go to those camps?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. There were. I think in individual instances we have waived that. The general age limits were between 18 and 45 years. One man was there who was 60 years of age.

Mr. TILSON. Those men were taken largely for home-missionary purposes rather than for soldiering purposes, were they not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not know about that. They came of their own volition and were desirous of taking the training.

Mr. TILSON. I think they were good missionaries. We needed some missionaries at that time.

Now, in regard to the National Guard, you speak of it being historically and practically the best way to preserve law and order in the States.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Oh, no; I think it is the worst way. I believe in a State constabulary for the purpose, but as a practical matter, I think when they tried in New York State four or five years to establish a State constabulary they never succeeded.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not think it would be if you did not have a constabulary but called in the regulars or a volunteer force from some neighboring State, rather than call out a local force.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not. I think that every time any State fails to call upon the inherent reserve power necessary to maintain order in its own State and calls upon the Federal Government for this purpose it thereby weakens the strength of its own integrity.

Mr. TILSON. Your idea is that it would be a good thing to preserve the militia in the State for that duty where they have not a constabulary.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it would be an essential thing. I do not think it is a good thing; no, because I think it is so distasteful to the people who have to do it.

Mr. TILSON. Then you would not be willing to accept any force as practical that had it as part of their force?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Did you mean for national purposes?

Mr. TILSON. Yes.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not at all, because as long as you are relying upon the volunteer principle, that function being inherent in any force, or potential in any force, you keep from volunteering great classes of our citizenship,

Mr. TILSON. Then, while you would use the militia that had this duty cast upon it, at the same time you would consider it a distinct handicap?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would not use it. The State would use it. I should think it would be a great handicap to the building up of that force from the standpoint of military efficiency.

Mr. TILSON. You would use them in case of emergency by having them volunteer into the national service?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes. I would use any existing military asset in the country in military service.

Mr. TILSON. Following up Mr. Greene's question, it seems to me you leave one of two ways—that you either eliminate the National Guard, with all its history and traditions, and start afresh on one horn of the dilemma, with a continental army, or you have the other and utilize the National Guard, beginning with the training of the most efficient of the National Guard at present, as a minimum, and build up from that point?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think, sir, it is absolutely inconceivable that any adequate or soundly organized military system can be built upon the militia of the States. You have got to have, as the Secretary of War said, unity of authority and unity of control, and anybody that conceives meeting any military power of one of the centralized military systems of the world with a town meeting of 48 little armies, commanded by 48 absolutely independent sovereigns, not coming legally under the control of a central power until war is imminent, proposes what is utterly inconceivable from the standpoint of reason or sound military organization.

Mr. TILSON. Then, unless that multiplicity of control can be eliminated, you would depend entirely on your reliance upon the militia?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. For the main fundamental basis of your military system?

Mr. TILSON. Do you believe there would be a sufficient excuse for its existence to cause young men to go into it and to cause States to maintain it if the one real excuse for its existence was use for State purposes?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Personally, I would not go into it. I am in the militia now and have been for a good many years, but if the continental army was organized I would immediately leave the militia and go into the continental army, because I have no desire to go on strike duty.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not think that would be the course of a very large part of the National Guard?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do.

Mr. TILSON. In other words, that means that you would entirely disintegrate the National Guard?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That might be.

Mr. ANTHONY. Mr. Secretary, if you are a member of the militia, why would you not want to go on strike duty? Do you not think it is the duty of every citizen to assist in suppressing disorder?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would go if it was necessary. I do not say I ought not to go.

Mr. ANTHONY. If every citizen should refrain from going into the National Guard on that account, who would preserve peace and order within the States?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I say I would go if I had to go.

Mr. ANTHONY. If everybody assumed your attitude, we would have no guardians of the peace.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it is the business of the police to do that, and not a soldier's business. I dislike it every time the militia is called upon to be used in the performance of such a duty, and I do not think they should be required to do that.

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Secretary, if I understand the logical result of your plan, it would be the elimination of the National Guard, so far as depending upon it as a national force is concerned.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; I would depend upon it as far as it would be dependable, and no further than that.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not think that the result would be that men like yourself—and I suppose there would be many more like you who would go out of it at once—would not the inevitable result be the elimination of the militia?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Experience alone can tell that. Several things may happen. It may be that there is a very large residuum of men so bitten with the military bug who can not go out for three weeks or a month, who live in cities, who can drill one night a week, and who can go out for 8 or 10 days or 2 weeks in the summer, and that they will continue to go into the militia in considerable numbers. It may be that young men coming out from the continental army at the rate of 133,000 a year will desire to maintain such a continuity of military existence as could be maintained in the National Guard. It may be that it would form, therefore, a source of recruiting for the National Guard. Only experience can tell.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not think the men you first referred to might become connected with such organizations as the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, of Boston; the Old Guard, of New York; the Fencibles, of Philadelphia; or the Governor's Foot Guards; that is, those men whom you describe as being bitten with the military bug?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would depend on how seriously they are bitten?

Mr. KAHN. Those are very exclusive organizations, and membership in them is by election.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what information or experience has the War Department which would lead it to believe that it can enlist each year 133,000 men in the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. None, sir; except hope.

The CHAIRMAN. From the experience that the department has had with the enlistments in the Regular Army, is it reasonable to expect that they would get 183,000 men a year in the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think there is no correlation whatever between the two. I think they have an entirely different appeal and would appeal to entirely different classes of men in the community.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand the plan of the continental army, it is for men to enlist for a term of six years?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Three years with the colors and three years in reserve?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are to serve two months a year, supposing that length of time is adopted?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think that will have to be cut to one month.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that will have to be cut to one month?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do. I do not think by voluntary enlistment you can get adequate numbers who will serve two months a year.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you would have men trained one month a year for three years?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would have those men trained for only three months?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they would be paid at the rate at which you pay the men in the Regular Army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that pay is for the privates \$16 a month?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; about 50 cents a day.

The CHAIRMAN. The present rate is \$15.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Plus clothing, transportation, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, they will be equipped with clothing, etc.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, what reason have you to hope that the young men of this country, the class of young men you would expect, or any class of men, would enlist for six years, receiving therefor \$16 a month, being required to leave their occupations, and take chances of getting back their positions when they get through, with only one month's service a year?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No more and no less hope, Mr. Chairman, than anyone who believes that an adequate military system in this country can be based upon the voluntary principle.

This system, first proposed by the Secretary of War and the President of the United States, gives you for service every conceivable class of men in the community who are willing to serve, and unless that opportunity is given them the volunteer principle is not tested. If it is tested and fails, it is not the fault of the system, but the fault of the people or whatever plan under which they live.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that; but what I want to get at is whether or not we can get practical results. What we want to do is to get some system that will bring practical results.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if the continental army will bring practical results, if we have had any experience in this country, or if the department has any information that will show that we will get practical results in that way, I would like to have you tell us what that is.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The only experience we have is with the students' summer camps and the Plattsburg camp, which were on such a limited scale that I do not think anything can be drawn from them.

Mr. TILSON. So far as a fair test of the volunteer system is concerned, it would be as fair a test to give a man \$15 a year for three years and have a string tied to him for six years.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That depends on whether he is serving his country for patriotism or for \$15.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not think we had better cut out the \$15, so that we would be sure the people would know he was serving for patriotism and not for the \$15?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I should say the same thing would apply to Assistant Secretaries of War and to Congressmen.

Mr. TILSON. Not at all. They receive a little more than \$15 a year.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, the idea of the continental army program is to pay the men only when they are in service?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is true, how many men do you believe you could get in one year to enlist—because everything is predicate upon the volunteer principle?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In my judgment the country is not yet ready to go to compulsory military service and anything we do must be predicated upon the volunteer system.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, from your own experience as a member of the National Guard and Assistant Secretary of War, how many men do you believe we could get in one year in the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would not make any prophecy at all, Mr. Chairman, because whatever I might say would be purely a guess, but I think you could get with a vigorous recruitment a considerable body of young men.

I was told casually by a gentleman the other day—and I do not know how true it is—that there are 2,500 men in the city of Boston alone who have signified their willingness to join such an army.

The CHAIRMAN. You say with a vigorous recruitment?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean they would not be serving because of their patriotism, but because they were being appealed to and asked to do so?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not see any objection to appealing to one's patriotism.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not, either. Your idea seemed to be that the patriotism of the young men of the country was such as to induce them at once to volunteer in this continental army.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If they will volunteer in anything.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are going to put a continental army into service, what is the use of continuing appropriations for the Organ-

ized Militia of the States of any character, when it must be more or less evident that that force is to be eliminated?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would let experience teach us that, sir. I say, again, I should not like to prophesy. This force is in the field; it has a sphere; it is an asset as long as it is conserved up to the limit. If there is no place for the continental army, the continental army will not succeed and the militia will grow. If the continental army is going to be a success and the militia is going to dry up, experience is going to show that. I would like experience to dictate that, sir.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Who was it that evolved this plan of the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Thomas Jefferson, except that he provided compulsory military service with it.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Where can we find that?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. In 1805 Thomas Jefferson drew with his own hand a bill and sent it to Gen. Dearborn, the Secretary of War, who sent it to Congress. The bill provided for universal compulsory military service entirely under the control of the Federal Government, taking the control of the militia of the country entirely without the State. He had that bill introduced in Congress and pressed it to the utmost of his capacity, and in writing to a friend a year later he spoke of the perplexing situation in New Orleans, and said that never would have happened if Congress had passed the measure I have just referred to, but Congress would not pass it.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Did he recommend it in a message to Congress?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not know whether he did or not, but he drafted that bill with his own hand. I can not say whether it was referred to in a message to Congress or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, his plan was based on compulsory military service?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It was.

The CHAIRMAN. And the plan of the War Department is based on volunteer service?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It is; but the War Department would be very glad if the Congress thought that the compulsory principle could be applied to-day.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the War Department is in favor of compulsory military service, but I do not understand that the President is in favor of compulsory military service.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not, either.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand he is not.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I imagine that is true, although I could not speak for him in regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I can speak for him on that matter.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you say it is impossible to have any results from the National Guard as a national force?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No adequate result.

The CHAIRMAN. No adequate result. Can you not conceive of a law that could be enacted by which the National Guard could be made a force that in time of war would be as good as the continental

army, in which the men are only trained for three months in three years?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir; I can not.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not the Constitution of the United States confer upon Congress the power to discipline the Organized State Militia?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It does not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg to differ with you on that.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The Constitution says that Congress shall have the power to prescribe the organization and discipline of the militia, and that the authority for giving that discipline, governing the militia, shall be within the State. Congress may prescribe the medicine and the patient may take it if he desires.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg leave to differ with you. I beg leave to say that under the Constitution of the United States the Congress has the right to prescribe the organization and discipline of the State militia, and if the National Guard does not carry out the law of Congress, then, of course, the National Guard ceases to be a part of the Organized Militia. Did not the Secretary of War disband the Organized Militia, or practically disband the Organized Militia of the State of South Carolina?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not at all. He withdrew the Federal funds from them, but the governor of the State disbanded them, and they went out of business.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Secretary of War withdrew the funds?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. That was practically disbanding them, because they did not have any money from the Federal Government with which to get along, and if they did not have that they ceased to exist.

Now, if Congress appropriates money to pay, to equip, and to put on a first-class military status the Organized Militia, can it not prescribe the discipline and the organization in such a way as to make the militia a military asset as good, at least, as men who are trained for only three months in three years?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. They could not do the latter, although they might obtain by some extra legal bribery a certain jurisdiction that the Constitution does not give them by law.

The CHAIRMAN. You can call it bribery if you choose when Congress appropriates money for the State militia, but to say that when Congress does that it is bribing it to do something, I think is a pretty broad statement.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; I think if they try to go beyond the jurisdiction given them and secure that jurisdiction by purchase they are trying to purchase jurisdiction the Constitution does not give them.

The CHAIRMAN. We can not purchase jurisdiction. We can only have jurisdiction which is conferred by the Constitution.

Mr. MCKELLAR. The courts would intervene to prevent anything of that kind.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Whenever that came to a legal test that would break down.

The CHAIRMAN. Since Congress has been appropriating more or less money—I believe the amount is now six or seven million dollars—for the National Guard has not that force improved very materially?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** It has improved, sir.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Has it not improved very materially?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** It has improved very materially.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Is it not a much better military asset to the Government now than it was before the Government extended any aid to it?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** It is; but it is perfectly inadequate.

**The CHAIRMAN.** Can you not conceive of the Congress taking steps to make it adequate?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** I think not, sir.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** I would like to have a little more accurate and definite information as to who was the author of the present plan of the continental army, leaving Mr. Jefferson out. I am willing to subscribe to anything Mr. Jefferson had to say, but as I understand it this is not like Mr. Jefferson's plan, according to your statement and according to my recollection, and I want to know who is the author of the present plan.

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** The next gentleman to Thomas Jefferson who embodied in his writings the fundamental idea of the continental army, which is putting the control of the forces of the Nation for national defense under the Nation, is Gen. Emory Upton, who is the greatest military philosopher who has ever written in this country.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** I am talking about the present bill we are considering for the continental army, which has been recommended by the Secretary of War at this time. Who planned the present bill?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** The Secretary of War and those working in cooperation with him.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** Did the Secretary of War prepare it himself; was it his initial act?

**Mr. BRECKINRIDGE.** I will tell you exactly what happened. Last March the Secretary of War started in on the consideration of the formulation of a military policy at some date which I can not remember just now. He addressed a memorandum to the War College Division of the General Staff, directing that body to formulate their recommendations for a military policy. At the same time he proceeded with a series of conferences himself, which conferences included the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Judge Advocate General of the Army, and from time to time various other officers of the War Department and various committees of the War College Division of the General Staff. From time to time, as the discussion went on, these conferences continued several times a week from 6 o'clock until midnight, and there was an exchange of views not only between members of those conferences, but between the members of the conferences and committees from the War College Division of the General Staff.

That went on over a series of months. Out of that came two reports, one of them the report of the War College Division of the General Staff, reached independently, upon their own study, giving their own conclusions, and the Secretary's policy. Who contributed what idea, and when, and how, and where, and why, the determination of each question in the formulation of that policy took place, I

can not say, but the result from it was almost exactly what Gen Upton recommended as his military policy for the Nation.

Mr. MCKELLAR. I thought this was practically the same plan that was proposed by Capt. Mitchell of the Army in a magazine article several years ago?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not know about that. I never read that article.

Mr. MCKELLAR. He put forward practically the same plan of establishing a military system.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes. Gen. Carter put forward practically the same plan in his book. Almost everybody who has thought on the subject for a considerable length of time has come to the same conclusion.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Secretary, the fact is that this plan is recommended by the Army men because they can not get a standing army, is it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not know, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Do you not know that the Army officers themselves think that the ideal system is a regular standing army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not go behind the returns. I take the report at its face value. I say that everybody would say that from a purely technical, ideal military standpoint the regular standing army would be the most efficient, but when you have said that you have just started the discussion.

Mr. GORDON. This plan is proposed as the next best thing, because Congress would not indorse anything like a regular standing army as the military policy of the United States?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I can not tell what led to their recommendations. I can tell what would lead to mine.

Mr. GORDON. Now, Mr. Secretary, you said something about Thomas Jefferson. He, in his first inaugural address, said to the Congress of the United States that our best protection in time of peace and during the first months of war would always be a well-disciplined militia?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. You say he changed his mind?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; but he said that the militia should be Federal later.

Mr. GORDON. He said in his message it should be a State militia, prescribed by the Constitution.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I can not say as to that.

Mr. GORDON. I have a clear recollection about what he said on that subject. Of course, he referred to the militia that is provided for now in the Federal Constitution.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it is interesting, however, Mr. Gordon, to follow the line of mental evolution of Thomas Jefferson. I think he was quite a strong decentralizationist; he was an extreme anti-militarist and antiaristocrat, but by the lesson of the convulsion of the Napoleonic era, he was led, much against his will, and much against his intuitions, to an absolute conviction that the only reliable system of national defense must vest the control of the Nation's forces in the Nation.

Mr. GORDON. He never took Congress into his confidence in that matter.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. He drew a bill with his own hand and sent it to Congress.

Mr. GORDON. Not to Congress.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It was sent to Congress.

Mr. GORDON. Will you cite the message of Jefferson recommending anything like that?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I can not, but I can cite his letter to Gen. Dearborn, who was Secretary of War at that time.

Mr. GORDON. He had a custom of taking Congress into his confidence upon public matters he desired to have adopted. Of course, as a matter of fact, during Jefferson's term the country was subject to the same pressure that it is being subjected to now, with a great world's war and the necessity for adequate defense. That pressed the matter upon the attention of Congress. That is true as a historical fact, is it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think it is, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Jefferson endeavored, through Madison, to have an express prohibition inserted in the Federal Constitution against a standing army.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. You say he changed his mind on that proposition?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. He changed his mind to the extent of writing this bill I have referred to, and I think that was a very remarkable evolution.

Mr. GORDON. This bill we have is not the exact bill he drew?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No. This bill leaves out universal military service.

Mr. CRAGO. Mr. Secretary, you said in your opinion it is not possible to have such legislation as would have the National Guard available for purposes of national defense?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; available for all purposes of national defense.

Mr. CRAGO. Are you basing that opinion on any facts which have occurred within the last generation, or is it just theory?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I am basing it on this: It has been said very many times that it is inconceivable to build an adequate military system upon anything else than unity of responsibility and unity of control, and that the bringing under the National Government the militia forces at the outbreak of war is not enough, that they must be put under the control of the Government of the Nation in time of peace for the purpose of the appointment of officers and the training of the forces.

Mr. CRAGO. Well, you have not really answered the question I am asking. I am asking if you have any facts on which you base your conclusion. I mean facts which have occurred within the present generation?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. What facts do you mean? Do you mean the present condition of the militia of the country?

Mr. CRAGO. Yes; or any refusal on the part of the militia to perform any function which they should have performed or any failure on the part of the militia, for instance, in the Spanish-American War or the Philippine insurrection, or failure of the National Guard organizations to do whatever was required of them?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The only thing that I could cite since the Spanish War would be the fact that Gov. Bleasance put his militia out of business. The personnel of the militia—and I am talking about the rank and file; I am not talking about some of their representatives, or some people who pretend to be their representatives—the personnel of the National Guard in my lifetime has never shown anything but the very utmost of consecration and willingness to do all they could do under the system that exists, and the vices inherent in our militia system are vices inherent in a fundamental legal situation.

Mr. CRAGO. Referring to the instance you have given us of the one State where by the withdrawal of the Federal appropriation the governor was shortsighted enough, in my opinion, to disband the National Guard of that State, could not that be covered by an express provision where you are applying this Government aid to the National Guard—that wherever the National Guard should cease to exist, or to fall below the minimum or the prescribed effectiveness of the organization, that in that event the Federal Government should organize in that particular State that State's proportionate part of the Federal force, and that wherever the National Guard did conform to the requirement it could be made a Federal force.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think that would be very impracticable.

Mr. CRAGO. You think so?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do think so.

Mr. CRAGO. Are you basing that on facts or on theory?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Just deductions from experience and facts.

Mr. CRAGO. I want to say very frankly if the War Department were here asking for a Regular Army of a quarter of a million or a half million men I would be for it.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You could not do that by voluntary enlistments.

Mr. CRAGO. If they could do that, I would be for it with both hands up. But what I do want to find out is whether there is not a way by which the main object you have in view can be attained by means of a National Guard?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would love to attain that, and for five or six solid months that proposition was wrangled over and searched through thoroughly, but it was the opinion of everybody that it could not be done.

Mr. CRAGO. You were speaking of the National Guard to-day, and saying that the personnel is there for the Federal service.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Absolutely.

Mr. CRAGO. Are you aware of the fact that in the Spanish-American War while most of those organizations were enlisted for two years, to serve during the War with Spain, unless peace should be declared sooner, the National Guard organizations from California, Nebraska, Kansas, Montana, Colorado, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and Pennsylvania did something that no volunteer troops ever did in the history of the country?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You mean in regard to the Philippines?

Mr. CRAGO. Yes; remaining after their term of service had expired, remaining voluntarily, something that no organization of the Regular Army ever did.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That was splendid, but I also know that in the Spanish-American War we only got about 33 per cent of the militia.

Mr. CRAGO. Was that not on account of the age limit and physical disability limitations imposed by the War Department?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I could not analyze that. Gen. Mills is the expert of the War Department on that.

Mr. CRAGO. I have one other question. In the report of the Secretary of War for this year, the subject of manufacturing nitrogen by hydroelectric energy is taken up. Could you tell me and tell the committee whether any steps have been taken by the War Department to confer with any other departments of the Government as to the means of manufacturing or producing that product economically.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The Secretary of War has that under consideration now, and during the last two days he has been in conference with his own officers, endeavoring to come to his own determination as to what ought to be done. As soon as he determines in his own mind what ought to be done, he will take up the subject.

Mr. CRAGO. I think that is a very important subject in connection with the matter of preparedness.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes. We are absolutely dependent upon Chile for nitrates.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Secretary, do you know how many boys and young men in the United States receive some form of military training at schools, academies, and colleges?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I can give you the exact figure in regard to that for the record. I think in the land-grant institutions there are about 30,000. How many there are in the other private military schools and other schools and academies and colleges I can not tell off hand. I will give you those figures accurately in the record.

Mr. QUIN. I would like to have you put those figures in the record.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I will do that.

Mr. QUIN. I mean the figures for all schools, academies, and colleges.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I will give you those figures.

Mr. QUIN. I would like to have the figures for all kinds of educational institutions. There is a little college in my own district which trains young men in that subject. There are 1,200 or 1,500 young men there, and I suppose the same thing is true in schools and colleges all over the country?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Secretary, to follow up Mr. Quin's suggestion, you say there are about 30,000 students in the educational institutions in land-grant States?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes. I will insert the exact figures.

Mr. KAHN. Of course that does not include those in all the classes?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. KAHN. So that the number who enter every year would be considerably under your estimate?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is then entire attendance.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection I will state that The Adjutant General has furnished me information, so far as he has been able to get it, that 5,000 young men graduate from schools every year. There are about 173 of those schools, and about 29,000 of them go through each year. They do not all graduate, but there are 29,000 who go through.

Mr. KAHN. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you put that letter in the record as a part of the proceedings of this hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I will do that.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I have a statement that was compiled in the office of the Chief of Staff showing that the number receiving military instruction in 1915 was 32,313.

Mr. KAHN. You were speaking about the letter which Thomas Jefferson wrote to Gen. Dearborn; is that letter in the archives of the War Department at the present time?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It is in the standard editions of Jefferson's works. I do not know whether it is in the archives of the War Department or not.

Mr. KAHN. Could you furnish a copy of that letter for the record, put it into the hearing?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; I will do that.

Mr. KAHN. Now, you say that the continental army is largely in the nature of an experiment?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; largely; as any new military system must be.

Mr. KAHN. What do you consider will be the expense of this experiment—how much is it going to cost to experiment in that regard?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. When the system is in normal working order, about \$40,000,000 a year. The cost the first year will be about \$15,000,000, the second year \$30,000,000, the third year \$45,000,000.

Mr. KAHN. If it should not work out as you anticipate, there will practically be a waste of that amount of money, will there not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir; there will not be a waste. You would have a good many more men who had had some military instruction than you have at the present time.

Mr. KAHN. A good portion of it would be wasted, would it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If any money in this country at the present time that is spent for military instruction can be called wasted, it would be.

Mr. KAHN. Personally, I believe that it pays the country to expend money for military training. I have always believed that, and I believe it now.

Mr. MCKELLAR. You want it especially for schools, if you can get it, do you not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think military education should begin in the schools; yes.

Mr. MCKELLAR. I agree with you thoroughly.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Secretary, I want to get your opinion on this: In case we can find a way to increase the efficiency of the National Guard, rather than to have a continental army—I do not know that there is a way—would you not prefer to have a man who has drilled every week in the year and had 10 days in camp in the summer under the supervision of an officer than a man who had had only two months in the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You mean one night a week armory instruction?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No, sir; I think thirty days' training under expert instructors in the summer, working eight hours a day, would

give you practically the military return that you get from a single enlistment in the National Guard at the present time.

Mr. NICHOLS. You have been in the National Guard yourself, I believe.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLS. Have you ever been to any of these encampments held by the different States under the supervision of Army officers?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Wouldn't the training of the continental army, under the method you speak of, be virtually the same that the militia gets there?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If you had some more officers. The trouble has been in getting Army officers to do the instructing. Of course you can't make soldiers out of militia without instructors. If you spend more money to get more instructors, you will get better results, but my opinion is that when you get the best you can get you have not an impossible military system.

Mr. NICHOLS. These encampments are very beneficial to the National Guard, are they not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. The eight days they spend in camp are more beneficial than all the rest put together. This thing of the Militia attending their drills once a week through the winter is just a figment of the imagination. They just don't do it. If you figure up the attendance of the Militia at drills at the present time for the whole country you will find that there is not more than 50 per cent of the attendance kept up.

Mr. NICHOLS. The captain of each company is required to make a report showing the attendance, showing how many men he has had at drill, is he not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think he is.

Mr. NICHOLS. If he doesn't have an average of a certain number the company is disbanded, is it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not necessarily. It comes in for investigation.

Mr. NICHOLS. I will ask you this, then: If a plan could be formulated whereby a man gets 52 nights a year drill, and then gets the month that you anticipate in addition to that in the continental army, wouldn't you have a better system than if you did not have the 52 nights a year?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You would not have a better system; no.

Mr. NICHOLS. You would have a better body of troops, would you not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; you would not.

Mr. NICHOLS. Then you think this training is thrown away, do you?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; not at all. My idea is this: In a military force it is very questionable which is the most useless, a mob of trained men or an organization of untrained men; that is, you can not separate in your discussion and in your reasoning organization and training, and in order to have an adequate decent system you have got to have correct organization as well as proper training.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Doesn't our history rather militate against you, however? The Militia under Gen. Jackson at New Orleans gave a fairly good account of themselves, did they not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. They did, indeed.

Mr. MCKELLAR. Now, have we got any reason to suppose that our National Guard will not be as effective on another occasion of a similar kind?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Some gentleman says comparisons are "odorous."

Mr. MCKELLAR. I think a comparison with Gen. Jackson and his men at New Orleans would not be "odorous."

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If we are going to start citing history, you can cite some very interesting and unpleasant history on the other side; some of it, I am sorry to say, from my own State, even.

The CHAIRMAN. The bill of the War Department proposes to add 786 organization officers, does it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. About half of these officers are to be used to train the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if those officers were to be assigned to train the Organized Militia of the States, would that help the training of those troops very much?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Anything you do in the way of spending money to get more instructors for the Organized Militia is for the benefit of the Organized Militia, but I think you are building on a foundation of sand.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you mean to imply that the only training the National Guard gets is the training at night and 8 or 10 days in the field?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If I were going to generalize I would say that was true.

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have target practice?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; they do sometimes at the eight-day camps; sometimes they do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there not a great many ranges used by the Organized Militia throughout the States for target practice?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir. About 40 per cent of their number qualify as marksmen in the lowest grade.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of them have qualified pretty high, haven't they?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Some of them are the best shots in the world. There is no doubt of that.

The CHAIRMAN. If they could have more of that training it would be better for them, and if they were paid adequately wouldn't they be able to get more training, field training, trench digging, and all that sort of thing?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir; the more they got the better they would be.

The CHAIRMAN. And if they got as much training as the continental army is to get under the proposed plan, would they not be as good troops as the men in the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Individually, yes; but by organization, no.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by organization?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. What I mean is this, sir, that it is inconceivable to my mind to build a military system upon the preproblematical

state of mind of any class of men. It should be built upon ascertained principles and upon a proper, positive law. Now, if you wish to fight a power in defense of your insular possessions, or in the prosecution of anything else that takes you out of the country, you have got to count upon the problematical state of mind of every man who belongs to the militia.

The CHAIRMAN. Why no; you have not.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; you have, under the Constitution; because they have got to volunteer before you can take them out of the country.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that Congress has the right to confer upon the President the power to draft?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if Congress should confer upon the President the power to draft, every man in the National Guard who accepts pay from the Government of the United States, wouldn't they be sent in at once as organizations, if the President saw fit?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If that can be done, and the best legal authority says it can be done. The Secretary of War says you can draft all the red-headed men if you want to. I don't think you can. I think the draft has to operate equally, and unless it does operate equally it is an unequal operation of law.

The CHAIRMAN. You can pick out the National Guard, or you can pick out anybody to be drafted. Congress has the right to confer upon the President the power to draft, and if Congress in the passage of this legislation sees fit to confer that power upon the President so that he will have the right to draft members of the National Guard into the service of the United States upon the declaration of war, then these National Guard troops which we are proposing to train and proposing to spend money on, will have to go whether they want to go or not, won't they?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; but assuming that is so, I do not think you could use them to advantage unless you gave the Federal Government in time of peace authority for the appointment of officers and training.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that brings up the question of whether or not the system of electing the officers that now obtains in the National Guard is better than the one of having them appointed by the President. That is another question, but aren't National Guard officers as a body a very good class of men?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think they are a very good class of men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not perhaps, in your continental army plan, expect to take officers from the National Guard to train the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; whosoever will may come.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if they are fit to train a continental army, they are fit to command troops in the field, are they not, as captains, majors, and colonels?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Well, they will have to be more fit than they are now before any exigency calls upon them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it would be a very good idea for the Government to prescribe means by which National Guard officers shall have facilities and opportunity of being educated in the service schools?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It is prescribed now, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, but do you not think it would be a good plan to make it worth while for these officers to go, and fix it so they would go and get the training?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would be very good, if they would come, but they can not spend the time now.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Can you not arrange it so that a term in those schools would be a requirement?

The CHAIRMAN. It could be arranged.

Mr. TILSON. What would you say, Mr. Secretary, of the evolution of Jefferson's mind on this subject? You say that later Jefferson said that the militia should be federalized, or words to that effect?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. After he prepared this bill?

Mr. TILSON. I mean, in the early part of Jefferson's career he was anticentralization and all the rest, and that later on his mind evolved at least sufficiently to recommend federalization of the militia.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. TILSON. Now, don't you think that was a pretty good suggestion of Jefferson's, that might be carried out even now?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; I would like to see his bill made law right now.

Mr. TILSON. But he spoke of federalizing the militia.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. No; he did not speak of it; he drew a bill and said, "That's what I stand for," and that bill was to build up a force of citizen soldiers entirely under the control of the Nation, and having absolutely no connection with the authorities of the States.

Mr. TILSON. Don't you think that the National Guard itself is in favor of being federalized?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Absolutely; yes, sir.

Mr. TILSON. Well, then don't you think it would be a better system to do that than to train men and then draft them?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Entirely. Jefferson said that the continental army is the best thing.

Mr. TILSON. Don't you think it would be best to work out some system by which by dual contract they could be formed into a truly national force?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I do not, sir. I do not believe you can be fish, flesh, fowl, and good red herring all at the same time.

Mr. TILSON. You think the very fact that they are under State control, although that State control may be entirely dominated by the Federal authority, nevertheless the fact that they were to some extent under State control makes it impractical?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. They could only be dominated by purchase, and I believe that is entirely ineffective.

Mr. TILSON. Can it be done by enlistment afterwards?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think not, sir. I think you have got to be either State militiaman or Federal soldier; you can not be both at the same time.

Mr. TILSON. You spoke of 33 per cent of the militia volunteering at the time of the Spanish War. How do you get your percentage?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I can not tell you. Gen. Mills is the expert on that, and any information that I have as to that phase of history I probably got from him.

Mr. TILSON. You do not mean to say that in any organization that was accepted only 33 per cent of the men of that militia organization volunteered?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That is exactly what I mean to say.

Mr. TILSON. Are you speaking of any particular organization?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would rather not particularize, but there were organizations of which a large per cent of the personnel when they were called out got other people to take their places and then came to Washington and presented themselves.

Mr. TILSON. Of course, if you take the entire number of militiamen in this country, the number accepted, I do not think that is fair.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think you could single out an organization and find that that is true.

Mr. TILSON. In some cases the militiamen were not called, were not permitted to go in the Spanish War at all.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; that is true.

Mr. TILSON. My own regiment was one. The other regiments of the State were permitted to go, but my own regiment was not, so I had to go outside of the State and volunteer.

Mr. ANTHONY. It seems your first objection to using the State militia arises from the fact that the War Department is not able to furnish a sufficient number of officers for the militia regiments.

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not at all, sir. My objection to the militia system is this, as I have said many times, that if you are going to have a military force that you contemplate using, it is inconceivable to contemplate meeting the military dangers that confront us or that would confront us if we were to be assailed by one of the highly centralized military systems existing in the world now, by any force, no matter what may be its training—an organization that is not at all times, in peace and war, absolutely under the control of the Nation, absolutely free from the control of the State in any respect.

Mr. ANTHONY. At the time of the semiannual encampment and maneuvers, the general maneuvers of the Regular Army and the National Guard, doesn't the War Department have the same opportunity for training the National Guard at those times as it would at the annual training period you propose for the continental army?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. It would; yes; if they would come out, but we can not make them come out, and sometimes they do not take part in the maneuvers at all.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you not think that if sufficient money was appropriated for such participation in such maneuvers the National Guard would participate?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Very largely.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then why would not that training, training of that kind, be just as proficient in results as the one you propose under the continental army plan?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If you had enough of it, yes; but there again you run up against the element of organization, and you can not get away from that in any military discussion. You can not have military organization and disposition by the town-meeting method.

Mr. ANTHONY. At these meetings, these annual meetings, the National Guard maneuvers under the command of military officers?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You have to have, however, a preliminary conference with State officials, and sometimes they go and sometimes they do not go.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you not think you could have regulations under which these troops would report every six months? Have you any reason to think they would not report?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think some of them would.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would it not be better to try that plan without disorganizing the National Guard?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; if you can do that and at the same time unify military control. I do not want to disorganize the National Guard, but if you rest mainly on the National Guard and the hope that they will do certain things under certain exigency, I say you can not build a military plan on that basis.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not true that ordinarily the regimental officers of the National Guard are fairly proficient?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. You can not generalize at all on that. Some regimental officers are very efficient, some are absolutely inefficient, and some are mediocre. Many of the general officers are very efficient, and some are not efficient.

Mr. ANTHONY. I want to state that I have been in touch with the Army all my life—

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE (interposing). Yes; I know that.

Mr. ANTHONY (continuing). And this summer I saw about 50 or 60 officers of the National Guard of Kansas in the school of instruction at Fort Leavenworth, and it was very difficult to tell the Regular officer from the National Guard officer from observation. They seemed to be spick and span from a military standpoint, and were there earnestly striving for advancement in their profession, and certainly were the class of men that the War Department would want to get into the continental army to command its troops.

Now, enlarging a little on the suggestion made that these corps officers be given an opportunity for training in the service schools, would you advise enlargement of the service schools so as to permit a course of instruction to National Guard officers?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. If necessary.

Mr. ANTHONY. Why wouldn't it be a good plan to give an opportunity for 15 or 20 officers each year to have instruction at the service schools?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I would give them all the instruction they would take. Under the present plan they do not come, because they can not afford to spend the time.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it would be wise for this committee to make an appropriation so that these officers could receive such instruction?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think that might be wise, but that would mean pay of the officers while they are at the school, pay and allowances of their grade in the militia.

Mr. ANTHONY. We should at least make it possible from a military standpoint, so that they could take training and instruction?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. I think that might be wise.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would that not result in bringing these officers up to a grade practically equal to our regular officers?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Not at all. They would not actually have any very great depth or bottom to them from that training.

Mr. ANTHONY. But suppose they should actually have a year's instruction?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. That would help very materially, but it would not make them the equal of the Regular Army officer any more than studying law a year would make a man the equal of a lawyer who had been practicing all his life.


Mr. ANTHONY. But there are a number of these National Guard officers who have devoted all their lives to military work, and a year's course in the higher branches, such as they would get in the service school, ought to make them equal to the regular officers. Isn't one man's brain equal to another's?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Yes; but they have not devoted their lives to military work. They have devoted themselves to it as an avocation but not as a profession, just as a man might pursue a hobby of any kind.

Mr. ANTHONY. Well, it would bring up the service, anyway, would it not?

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Oh, very greatly.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Secretary.



TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENT OF

MAJ. GEN. HUGH C. SCOTT

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JANUARY 10, 1916




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## TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Monday, January 10, 1916.

The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We will hear Gen. Scott this morning.

### STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HUGH C. SCOTT, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you are Chief of Staff of the Army?

Gen. Scott. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be glad to hear any statement you may desire to make in connection with this matter.

Gen. Scott. Mr. Chairman, I did not come here this morning prepared to make any formal statement. I came prepared to answer such questions as might be asked me by the chairman and members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. General, taking up first the matter of the organization of the Army, I call your attention, in the first place, to the question of the war strength of the organizations in time of peace. I will ask you what is your opinion as to what the strength of the organizations of the Army—and by that I mean the Infantry, the Cavalry, and the Field Artillery—what should be the strength of the different organizations in time of peace? In other words, what, in your opinion, should be the strength of the Regular Army—the Infantry, the Cavalry, the Field Artillery—in time of peace—the strength of each organization?

Gen. Scott. Will you kindly ask that question again?

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to get at is your opinion as to whether or not the Army should be kept at full strength in time of peace in its organization. Take up first the Infantry, if you please, and state whether or not, in your opinion, we should have what are known as skeleton regiments or whether we should have Infantry regiments at full war strength?

Gen. Scott. It is always advantageous to have the organization kept at full war strength. But if it is a question between that and having more organizations, with the same amount of money, I would prefer to have the greater number of organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I understand you to say that it is the best thing, from the point of view of having the organizations in such con-

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#### 4 TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

dition as to meet any emergency that may arise, to have them kept at full war strength?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I supposed, of course, that would be your answer, because I hold in my hand the report of the General Staff on organization, for 1912, which emphasizes the importance of having the organizations at full strength.

Gen. SCOTT. It is an advantage to have all our organizations at full strength.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you dilate on that and state why we should have them at full strength?

Gen. SCOTT. Because then they are always ready for any emergency which may arise. In addition to that they are more easily trained when you have them at their full strength. But if we have the extra organizations which we ask for we consider that we may get enough of a reserve, which passes through the Regular Army, trained men, to make up at the beginning of a war full-strength regiments, and that the training of those men can be done in time of peace by putting two organizations together. That is done in the French Army. For instance, if there are two organizations in one post training together at peace strength in the French Army, one captain drills both companies in one organization to-day, and the other captain drills both companies to-morrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, as I understand you, then you prefer to have the skeleton organization in time of peace?

Gen. SCOTT. Provided we get the extra organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. Provided you get the extra organizations?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. That is, it is a question of whether we would rather have the full strength or whether we would rather have the extra organizations. What we would really like to have is the extra organizations at full strength.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the proposition of the War Department is to have about 134,000 enlisted men, which includes the Coast Artillery. Is that correct?

Gen. SCOTT. About 141,000.

The CHAIRMAN. That is including the officers?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the enlisted men.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That number, 14,000, includes the Coast Artillery?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you take from that 184,000 men the men in the Coast Artillery, about 85,000, and the Philippine Scouts——

Gen. SCOTT (interposing). Five thousand men.

The CHAIRMAN. About 5,000 men; you would have 104,000 in the mobile Army?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you can get that enlisted strength without the overhead charges of the extra organizations, would you not then get the strength you desire?

Gen. SCOTT. No. I think that we can not get too many officers.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But you are asking for 786 extra officers, outside of the officers of the organizations?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In regard to these officers of the 10 regiments of Infantry, for example, are they going to stay with their organizations or are they to be detailed for duties elsewhere?

Gen. SCOTT. They are to be kept with their organizations as much as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You say as much as possible. I want to know whether it is the idea to keep those officers with their organizations or to use them somewhere else.

Gen. SCOTT. The idea is to keep them with their organizations; but we have not been able to do that so far in the history of our country.

The CHAIRMAN. If you have 786 extra officers, you are going to use those officers for purposes of training, and for details to colleges, and the details to the Organized Militia, and for other purposes of that sort, are you not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And these officers, with the additional organizations, are to be used with those organizations?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, would it not be more economical to fill those organizations that you already have without adding additional officers?

Gen. SCOTT. It might be more economical; yes; but not more satisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say that you think, in time of peace, the organizations ought to be at their full strength?

Gen. SCOTT. I think they ought to be at their full strength in peace or in war.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you have at present in an Infantry company 65 enlisted men?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The war strength of that company is 150?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where in time of war would you get the men to fill that company up to 150?

Gen. SCOTT. What we would hope to do would be to get it out of a reserve of men who have served in the Regular Army and gone out of it to fill that organization up to war strength in time of war.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had your organization at war strength when war broke out, would not these reserves you are talking about be needed almost at once, if you were engaged in battle, in order to offset any vacancies that might occur on account of casualties?

Gen. SCOTT. We hope to get out of that reserve a sufficient number to supply what we would call the wastage.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not get a sufficient number to supply that wastage and to fill up these skeletons, could you?

Gen. SCOTT. To fill the skeletons to war strength and to supply the wastage. We have not in our discussions considered that we would get enough of a reserve to make any new organization.

The CHAIRMAN. If the country was to go to war, would it not be better for the Army to have full-strength regiments, ready to go at once, than to stop to fill them up with the reserves?

Gen. SCOTT. Surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you given any thought to the organization of the Field Artillery? I suppose you have, of course.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen the proposition which I have proposed—to have 108 batteries and to leave to the President the discretion to say whether they should be organized as battalions or as regiments.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think of that?

Gen. SCOTT. I think it is a very good proposition. (This question was not fully understood.)

Mr. QUIN. General, your report shows the exact number of enlisted men at the present time, does it not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. QUIN. That will be printed in the hearings, I suppose.

Gen. SCOTT. It does not show the number of enlisted men now; that report was made as of the 30th of June.

Mr. QUIN. Since that time what number have been added?

Gen. SCOTT. It fluctuates, according to the number of men that enlist from time to time, within very small limits.

Mr. QUIN. The number is about the same now.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; practically the same.

Mr. QUIN. General, you spoke of wanting more officers. Do you know the number of retired officers now that are capable men who could be assigned to some of the work you speak of?

Gen. SCOTT. There are very few. Congress passed a law recently allowing all officers who were capable of coming back to be returned to the Regular Army as extra officers, after examination. I believe about 25 of those officers came up for examination, and only 1 of that number was found capable of performing his duties in accordance with the provisions of that act.

Mr. QUIN. Do you think this continental army scheme is a practicable one, General?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; I do. I think the younger men will enlist in the continental army.

Mr. QUIN. Do you not think the National Guard would make a better force than that if you could take them in?

Gen. SCOTT. When we started out to discuss this matter last spring I had the idea that the National Guard should be made, with the Regular Army, the first line. But as the study progressed and various questions arose I came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to use the National Guard for such purposes, although I think every member of the conference, so far as I could see, was anxious that this should be done. But on account of the constitutional limitations which surround the National Guard I did not think it would be a practicable thing, and therefore it was abandoned.

Mr. QUIN. With that view, then, General, if the continental army plan were to prove a failure and the men of the country were not to enlist in it as it is thought they might, what would you favor then?

Gen. SCOTT. What I favor now; that is, I believe all soldiers who have given this matter any thought believe that there should be universal service.

Mr. QUIN. What do you mean by universal service?

Gen. SCOTT. I mean that every man of suitable age should be available for training for the defense of his country.

Mr. QUIN. Do you mean there should be compulsory military service?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. QUIN. What age would you require for that?

Gen. SCOTT. About from 18 to 21 years.

Mr. QUIN. General, is it not the idea, then, of the General Staff and the War Department, in fact, to bring about what you call universal military service?

Gen. SCOTT. Do you mean, has an effort been made to that end?

Mr. QUIN. No. Is not that the idea, the plan that you want to be brought about in time of peace?

Gen. SCOTT. I can only speak for myself.

Mr. QUIN. Yes; I understand, you can only speak for yourself.

Gen. SCOTT. I feel that the armies of all civilized countries of great size, or countries that are in danger of being invaded, have been obliged to come to that, and I see that while England stood out until now, she is coming to it now, although they are late about it.

Mr. QUIN. But England did not come to that until after she was engaged in war, did she?

Gen. SCOTT. She had much better have come to it before the war began.

Mr. QUIN. That is a matter of opinion, General. I am speaking of this country in time of peace. Do you favor compulsory military service in time of peace?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; at this moment.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. General, in your statement to the chairman awhile ago, I believe you stated that in your opinion we could not have too many officers?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. You did not mean by that you ought to have more officers than men, of course?

Gen. SCOTT. Well, I think this, that in case of any serious war the United States is going to need from 30,000 to 40,000 officers.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. And how many men under arms?

Gen. SCOTT. One or two million.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. Do you think the United States should have such an army as that, should organize such an army as that in time of peace?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not think it will, no; but if this country is ever at war it will have it to do sooner or later or accept disaster.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. General, have you seen the book written by one J. Bernard Walker, which has been, I presume, sent to members of this committee?

Gen. SCOTT. What is the name of the book?

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. It is entitled "America Fallen."

Gen. SCOTT. I have never read that book. I know what it is.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. Do you know the author?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. You have not read the book?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. You have no idea where he got the information upon which he wrote the book?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know what his information is, where he got it, or anything about it. I do not know him.

Mr. GORDON. General, have you given consideration to that provision of the Federal Constitution which authorizes Congress to prescribe the discipline for the State Militia?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Do you not think that confers upon Congress power sufficient to prescribe and require sufficient discipline for members of the State militia to qualify them for service in time of war?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GORDON. You do not think so?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GORDON. That is a pretty broad power, is it not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir. You can prescribe that discipline, but you have no power to carry it out—no power of compelling the carrying out.

Mr. GORDON. Then it is your judgment that Congress has amply sufficient power to prescribe the necessary discipline to make soldiers out of the members of the State militia, but that Congress could not enforce it?

Gen. SCOTT. No; it could not. It has not the power of enforcement.

Mr. GORDON. If Congress did exercise its power and determined that that power should be enforced, then what would be your answer?

Gen. SCOTT. As to what question?

Mr. GORDON. As to the question of whether or not it would make soldiers ready for business?

Gen. SCOTT. It would not give national power and control over the two forces that would be sufficient for our needs. Suppose, for instance, as has happened in the past, that some section of this country was out of sympathy with the projects of the National Government, and war became imminent. What would prevent any governor from mustering out his guard altogether?

Mr. GORDON. I suppose that could be done. It was done, in fact, in the War of 1812, when some of the New England States refused to furnish men or money.

Gen. SCOTT. Can the United States then rely for the protection of its honor and safety upon something which it can not control?

Mr. GORDON. But so far as the mere matter of discipline is concerned you think Congress would have sufficient power to prescribe the necessary discipline, do you not?

Gen. SCOTT. To prescribe, but not to enforce it.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. General, in the matter of the enlistment of the companies to full strength, or carrying them as skeleton organizations, in the Spanish-American War, which was our last effort along that line, was the Regular Army able to rapidly fill the skeleton companies to war strength?

Gen. SCOTT. No; not with trained men.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Not with trained men, but with men who were fighting men, who made very good soldiers in a short time. What I wanted to get at, General, was this: Was the experience in that war such as to warrant us carrying out that same practice in the future?

Gen. SCOTT. The experience has been always that we want to have our organizations full at all times.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. We can understand that, but as to the actual result, was the result satisfactory to the Army, in a general way? I can understand if all of your organizations were at full strength, and the men trained as you would wish, that would be an ideal situation; but was the condition then, and as is contemplated at present, when the actual peace strength is something like 65 men in a company, a fair exhibition of about what might occur again? I mean to ask was that result fairly satisfactory to the Army at that time?

Gen. SCOTT. No; the Army has always desired to have its organization at full strength.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. In the fighting armies of Europe, now, what was the policy of those nations, in general, in regard to this matter? Did they have their regiments enlisted at full strength or did they fill them as they went into the war?

Gen. SCOTT. They kept them at full strength.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Was that the case with the French Army?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I understand that the French during the time when war was not imminent kept their infantry below the full strength, but they had sufficient reserves to fill organizations at once.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The battles in Europe at the present time are being fought largely by reserves, and that is so because the men of the first line are gone, is it not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; the first-line men are gone by this time.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And those reserves had as much training, did they not, as the men in our Regular Army?

Gen. SCOTT. They had between two and three years.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How long each year?

Gen. SCOTT. Practically every day. The French tried to keep their men to two years' service, but when Germany increased her strength in her Regular Army the French changed to three years.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The point I was trying to get at, for my own information and for the information of the other Members of the committee, was about what we can expect from young men who are in the vigor of manhood, who would make first-class fighting material if they had the training they ought to have in the Regular Army, what we could expect from those men coming rapidly into the service to fill these vacancies in the Regular Army; how long would it take to make good fighting men out of that sort of material?

Gen. SCOTT. You mean at the outbreak of war?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Yes.

Gen. SCOTT. I would expect them to be of value in six months, if they are intensively trained.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How many men constitute a battery of Field Artillery when it is at full war strength?

Gen. SCOTT. One hundred and seventy.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I did not compute just how many enlisted men you contemplated, Mr. Hay, in your provision for 108 batteries. How many men would you figure would be needed to give the proper number of men to 108 Field Artillery batteries? I understood that was the number you suggested? How many men would that take?

The CHAIRMAN. It would take about 16,000 or 17,000 men.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How does that compare in numbers with what has been suggested in this continental army plan?

The CHAIRMAN. It is about the same, about the same number of men with each organization. Instead of having a regimental organization you would have an organization made up of 108 batteries. At the present time you can make the Field Artillery into any organization you choose—battalions or regiments or anything else.

Gen. SCOTT. I have some figures here, if you care to have them.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I think we have the figures fairly accurate now. One of the things we are considering here is this: It is contemplated to have an expenditure of something like \$40,000,000 annually for the support of the continental army. Is that correct?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How would you view, in comparison with that, a proposition to spend that amount of money upon additional skeleton organizations in the Regular Army, as constituted at the present time?

Gen. SCOTT. It would not be satisfactory. You would not get enough.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You would not get enough men?

Gen. SCOTT. You have to have at least 500,000 men whom you can put your hands on at once.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You want to be able to put your hands on the men?

Gen. SCOTT. At once.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The fact that these regiments would be at least half made up of thoroughly trained men, officered by thoroughly trained officers, would not compensate for the lack of numbers?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How many additional regimental organizations, for instance, could we expect to add for \$40,000,000 a year, and have them at the proper strength during peace times? How many additional regiments of these skeleton organizations could you add with \$40,000,000 a year to the Regular Army?

Gen. SCOTT. You could figure that out by estimating that each enlisted man would cost from \$800 to \$1,000.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the peace strength proposed would not be one-half of the full strength?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you think our military force at present compares favorably with the military forces of other nations as to its efficiency?

Gen. SCOTT. The militia force of some States does, and of other States does not.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I mean the military force of our Nation. Does it compare favorably with the military force of other nations, aside from the matter of numbers?

Gen. SCOTT. You mean in quality?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Yes; and in the general efficiency of our Army?

Gen. SCOTT. I think the quality of the Regular Army of the United States can be favorably compared with that of any other nation.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You do not agree with some of these gentlemen who are writing us and saying that our system is very faulty, and a failure, etc.?

Gen. SCOTT. Our organizations, as far as they go, will compare favorably with any.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you have available, General, the figures showing what the maintenance of the Army has cost the country for the last 10 years?

Gen. SCOTT. We can submit a table showing that.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. In a general way, it has cost us very much the same, about as some of the nations of Europe, which maintain very much greater armies than we do. Is that not generally true?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; but their men are scarcely paid anything at all.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. They serve for very small pay?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes. The United States goes into the market—

Mr. SHALLENBERGER (interposing). And bids for the men?

Gen. SCOTT (continuing). As any other employer of labor does.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The matter of a very large increase of the Army is coupled all the time with the matter of expense. In a compulsory military service, such as you say would be ideal, the equity or the justice of that would be that every man owes his Nation the duty of service?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And he should not serve at all for pay?

Gen. SCOTT. No. He is given his clothing and subsistence, and a very small amount of money for his wash and a few things like that.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Would you recommend, in case that was attempted to be applied to this country, that we should carry out that idea by giving very little pay for military service, making the service largely a matter of civic duty, and thereby reducing immensely the cost to the United States?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; for the same amount of money you could get an adequate army.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You do not agree then that you always get pay commensurate with the service you render the country? In other words, service is oftentimes given for other reasons than because of the pay. It is the doctrine that a good deal is heard of in this country, that you do not get a thing unless you pay for it, and that the more you pay the better the service you get, etc. I should like to get your idea of that as applied to the Army, whether, if we were to enforce military service, and thereby be confronted with the proposition of the enormous cost that would be required to maintain an Army, whether we could not fairly and justly ask of the people that they serve the Nation with very little pay because it would be a duty they would owe to the country?

Gen. SCOTT. You could, if you laid the burden on everybody.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. That is what I mean.

Gen. SCOTT. You could not expect one small class of people to do that?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I understand that. Of course, I ask you that because I have heard a good many people say in regard to this proposed preparedness at the present time that almost everyone is in favor of it, but nobody wants to pay for it, and therefore we might get around the matter of pay with—

Gen. SCOTT (interposing). Compulsory service.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And thereby base it upon the matter of duty to the country.

Gen. SCOTT. It would be more just and more equitable, and would be fundamentally for the benefit of the United States in time of peace as well as in time of war, economically as well as other ways.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Something was said here Saturday about the lack of men to arm the guns of the Coast Artillery, and that we did not have enough men to arm the guns. I have also seen statements that we did not have enough ammunition to keep all the guns of the Coast Artillery firing except for a short time. We would not want to fire all the guns of the Coast Artillery at one time, would we, General; but to use the guns at some particular point where an attempt was being made to land troops?

Gen. SCOTT. We do not know where and when we will have to fire them. If we lost command of the sea and a hostile fleet were to start toward the United States with the idea of invading the United States, we could not tell whether they proposed to land troops on the coast of Maine or on the coast of Florida.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The experience has rather been that they do not land where these fortifications are, anyway; that is, that an invading force very rarely makes a landing at that particular place?

Gen. SCOTT. I think it would be dangerous to attempt to land them at any of our defended harbors.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I have heard some Members of Congress advocate the idea that we could abandon any increase for the Army largely because the Navy, if it were to be sufficiently strengthened, would prevent the landing of hostile troops. But the experience has been, do you not think, General, that a mobile force upon land is very essential for the protection of the coast?

Gen. SCOTT. Absolutely.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. That really they have proved to be the most dependable of all for fighting?

Gen. SCOTT. If you lose a battle at sea, it gives the enemy an opportunity to land. Without a mobile army you are then defenseless.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Even with a well-equipped modern mobile army, if they land where we have no fortifications, as was done recently in Italy, and in other places where the armies in Europe have landed, a well-strengthened mobile force can prevent their landing, and protect the coast?

Gen. SCOTT. If they are in sufficient numbers.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Therefore you do not advocate the idea that we should not strengthen the Army, although we should very materially strengthen the Navy?

Gen. SCOTT. Not at all.

Mr. WISE. General, I understood you to say that you thought the young men of the country would join the continental army?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. WISE. On what do you base that opinion?

Gen. SCOTT. Because there is a great deal of enthusiasm throughout the country now among the young men. Many pay their own expenses in order to get military training.

Mr. WISE. If that is true, do you not think it would be a hard matter to get any number of men together at one time who would

have the time and opportunity to get away from their business and engage in work of that kind?

Gen. SCOTT. My idea is that men who had not yet assumed the responsibilities of life would be the ones to enlist.

Mr. WISE. At what age?

Gen. SCOTT. From 18 to 21 years of age.

Mr. WISE. Do you not think that most young men now from 18 to 21 years of age are either in school somewhere or else engaged in the business of making a living?

Gen. SCOTT. Those men who are in school would have their summers to themselves. Many got a month's training at Plattsburg last summer at their own expense.

Mr. WISE. That is what I want to get at. Have you ever investigated or looked into the question of how many young men, say, between 16 and 21 years of age are in school?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know how many there are.

Mr. WISE. Young men of that age who would like to join the Army?

Gen. SCOTT. No; but I think there are great numbers who are now in the schools that would join.

Mr. WISE. Then would it not be better, in your judgment, if that should be true, that practically all of the young men of the country who could enlist in the continental army are in schools that now give military training, or that would give it, would it not be better to train them in the schools than to undertake to train them in a continental army?

Gen. SCOTT. I think it would be good to do both. But you can not control the schools.

Mr. WISE. Taking that for granted, if the schools themselves and the young men in the schools would enlist, and the schools would be glad to secure the services of Army officers to give instruction, would that not be the better way?

Gen. SCOTT. We have not always found the schools willing to do that.

Mr. WISE. I understand that; but do you not think the chances there would be better than to undertake, all over the country, to select a man here and there to join the continental army and give him one or two months' training?

Gen. SCOTT. I think it would be to our advantage to utilize the schools to the limit, but it should be done in the way the Secretary of War has put forward here, and put them into the continental army or into the officers' reserve corps.

Mr. WISE. Would it not be better if they had that training in school and then, say, during the vacations they could come from the different schools and receive a month or two months' training together at some central point?

Gen. SCOTT. The main trouble with that is that we have not any control over them when we want them.

Mr. WISE. I am assuming that they will enlist in the continental army, and if they do enlist in the continental army you will have control over them.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; if we actually have control over them and they will enlist.

Mr. WISE. In other words, I assume they will enlist just as readily, although they are in school, as if they were out of school.

Gen. SCOTT. That may very possibly be true.

Mr. WISE. Do you not think they would be more likely to enlist, the young men who are in school?

Gen. SCOTT. The idea has been to have units of the reserve corps in each one of the universities that will accept that. We think Yale and Harvard will accept that, for the reason that Yale now is enlisting four batteries in the National Guard, and Harvard has an infantry regiment; so has Cornell.

Mr. WISE. Suppose there should be a school in each of the different congressional districts, which would have, say, 100 young men who would enlist, and that you were to send an officer there to train them an hour or two hours a day, under rules and regulations prescribed by the War Department, give them that training while they are in school, and then during the vacations call the different young men from those schools together at some central place and give them a month's training. Do you not think you would get more men in that way, and better trained men?

Gen. SCOTT. I would not want to leave out the man who was sufficiently educated to take up training, and yet who was not a student in any one of those schools.

Mr. WISE. I did not mean to shut them out, but I was simply referring to the young men who are in the schools.

Gen. SCOTT. We are planning to take them from the schools.

Mr. WISE. Do you not think we would get more men in the way I have suggested?

Gen. SCOTT. I have nothing to guide me on that point.

Mr. WISE. Suppose it was found practicable, and could be done, that in case of any conflict of authority, the State troops could enlist as volunteers of the Army, subject to the call of the officer in charge, just like any other volunteers, or like the men in the continental army would be, and could, at the same time, retain their standing in the State militia.

Gen. SCOTT. It would not do us any good.

Mr. WISE. Why?

Gen. SCOTT. How would we know whether the governor of that State would or would not produce them?

Mr. WISE. Suppose the governor should abolish them as State troops, and they were enlisted as volunteers in the Army, would they not be subject to your call, just like any other men in the community?

Gen. SCOTT. If they were under the National Guard?

Mr. WISE. Suppose they had enlisted as volunteers in the continental army, and you had their names, and they were subject to your command, and suppose the governor of the State did disband them, would you not have a right to call them just as you would have the right to call any other volunteers in the Army?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know whether he has a dual relationship there, and I am not satisfied that you can compel him to serve.

Mr. WISE. Would he not be as likely to respond to your call as any other man in the same community, if he was enlisted? What would be the difference?

If he is under obligation to you as a soldier, although he belonged to another organization which had been disbanded, if he is any kind of a man, would he not respond to your call?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know whether he would or not.

Mr. WISE. Why would there be any difference between this man and any other men in the same State?

Gen. SCOTT. Because he has a dual relationship, and he may consider that his relationship to the governor would be paramount.

Mr. WISE. But that would not be the situation after the governor had disbanded the organization, would it?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know.

Mr. WISE. If you got these men, and if you could use that force, if the men would respond, would you not get better men in that way than if you carried out the other idea?

Gen. SCOTT. My idea would be to take everyone of those men who would come in, and not to restrict it to the men in the schools.

Mr. WISE. What restrictions would you put on a man who joined the continental army? Whom would you say would be eligible to join?

Gen. SCOTT. Men of sufficient intelligence and physical capacity, able to give the time that would be required of them.

The CHAIRMAN. I call your attention to the fact that the proposition in regard to the continental army is that a man shall enlist for six years, during three years of which he is to serve with the colors and during the other three years to be held in reserve. When he enlists he makes a contract just as a soldier does who enlists in the Regular Army, and he is subject during the entire period of enlistment to be called upon, and he can not get out of it. If he attempted to do that he would be a deserter. That would hold him in the continental army, and I take it they would not be confined to any age. I take it that any man who wanted to enlist in the continental army who was under 35 years of age would be received.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; whether he belonged in a school or did not.

Mr. OLNEY. I would like to ask you, General, if you think it necessary and incumbent upon this Government to erect one or two more national academies like West Point, say one in the Middle West and perhaps one on the Pacific coast, to provide a sufficient number of officers for the future?

Gen. SCOTT. I think we could get a sufficient number of the quality of officers we require without doing that.

Mr. OLNEY. You think you have sufficient means of providing all the officers necessary, in spite of the fact that the European conflict shows that a great number of officers are needed?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLLS. General, is there anything, as the matter now stands, to prevent a man who is a member of the National Guard enlisting in the Regular Army?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not believe a man can serve two masters?

Mr. NICHOLLS. Do not a great many members of the National Guard enlist in the Regular Army?

Gen. SCOTT. I have no means of knowing that; if they have so enlisted they have concealed the fact.

Secretary GARRISON. There is a regulation against it. There is a regulation of the department providing that the recruiting officer shall ask the recruit, at the time he proposes to enlist, whether or not he is a member of the National Guard, and if he says he is we do not take him into the Regular Army until he has obtained his discharge from the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. A man can not belong to the National Guard and the Regular Army at the same time.

Secretary GARRISON. Not by our regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor by law.

Secretary GARRISON. I did not want to go into the question of the law on the subject, because we have regulations covering that.

Mr. NICHOLLS. I have had men in my own company in the National Guard who have enlisted in the Regular Army.

Gen. SCOTT. They have probably concealed the fact that they were members of the National Guard.

Mr. NICHOLLS. That may have been true. Which do you think preferable, General, to train a soldier who would serve in the National Guard, and attend drills 52 times a year for two or three hours each evening, or that he serve from three weeks to two months in the continental army during the summer.

Gen. SCOTT. I think it is better for him to serve in the continental army, and to keep him continuously at work with the intensive training he would get. I think that we would get more value from his service in that way than if we were to spread it through the armory training that a man in the National Guard would get during the year.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You think a man who had the training in the continental army during a short time would be a better soldier than a man in the National Guard who had two or three hours training one evening a week during the entire year?

Gen. SCOTT. He is better prepared.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Suppose we add to the National Guard training that a man would get throughout the year two weeks work in an encampment, under the supervision of Regular Army officers?

Gen. SCOTT. That would help, of course.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Do you think that, under those circumstances, he would be as good a man, as well trained a soldier as the soldier in the continental army?

Gen. SCOTT. No.

Mr. NICHOLLS. How long do you contemplate keeping a continental army soldier engaged in intensive drill during the summer-time?

Gen. SCOTT. Just as long as it is possible to get the men there.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You have set the time at two months, I believe, or you have said you would like to have them that long?

Gen. SCOTT. I would like to have them for three years.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You can not get that.

Gen. SCOTT. Then I will take them for one year, and if I can not get them for one year I will take them for six months, and if I can not get them for six months I will take them for two months or four months, for whatever time I can get them.

The CHAIRMAN. If Congress appropriates sufficient money you can keep them for three years, just as you do in the Regular Army, can you not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; if Congress appropriates the money and makes the law so that we could keep them for that length of time.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in the service during the whole time, and it would only be a question as to whether you could get the necessary amount of money appropriated to pay the men.

Gen. SCOTT. And sufficient authority.

The CHAIRMAN. If they give you the authority to enlist the men and give you the means to pay them, you can keep them in training as long as you want. In other words, they would be a part of the Regular Army.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLLS. What I am trying to get at, General, is this: How long do you think you can keep these men in this intensive training with the amount of money you are asking for?

Gen. SCOTT. We figured on two months a year.

Mr. NICHOLLS. You think with the amount you ask for you can keep them in intensive training for two months in a year, and you would rather have the men in the continental army for two months in a year than to have the men in the National Guard, as a whole, under the existing conditions?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes. There is another point that has not been brought out here. From the trend of the questions which have been asked me, I see there is the thought running in the minds of the members of the committee that it would be better to take the National Guard.

Mr. NICHOLLS. That is what I was driving at, whether it would be better, if the constitutional objection were removed, to take the National Guard men.

Gen. SCOTT. No; I would rather have it the other way. I would take the continental army in preference to the National Guard.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Do you not think if the continental army was formed, it would practically mean death of the National Guard?

Gen. SCOTT. No. That is a point which escaped my mind a moment ago. I think the National Guard appeals to a different class of men.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Do you not think the continental army would be filled up from the ranks of the National Guard?

Gen. SCOTT. Largely, but not in toto, for there are a number of men who will go into the National Guard who will not go into the continental army. I think there is room for both of them.

Mr. KAHN. General, you are not anticipating war in any direction, are you?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; not immediately.

Mr. KAHN. This proposed legislation is simply a measure of self-defense?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. You said something about compulsory military service. How long a time would you compel a young man to go into the military service?

Gen. SCOTT. For so long as would be necessary for him to get the greatest advantage from his training.

Mr. KAHN. How long would that be?

Gen. SCOTT. I notice that in Germany they keep a man in the Army for three years.

Mr. KAHN. Has not Germany cut down her intensive training to two years?

Gen. SCOTT. France went three.

Mr. KAHN. Was not that due to this fact, that because of the enormous increase in Germany's population she can put into the field as many men with two years' training as France can put in the field with three years' training.

Gen. SCOTT. She wants to keep her army to the larger size.

Mr. KAHN. It was on account of that increased force that France increased her enlistment period to three years, was it not?

Gen. SCOTT. It had a great deal to do with it.

Mr. KAHN. There are a great many men in the German army who have been trained for only one year?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Those who can pass a satisfactory examination at the end of one year?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. The men who are in the service now, fighting in Germany, have, to a large extent, been two-year men, have they not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. How long would you expect to train the American youth, if we had compulsory service.

Gen. SCOTT. Two years.

Mr. KAHN. Why then would it not be a good plan to have short-term enlistments, and train men for two years in the Army, and then let them go out into the body of the citizenship as a sort of reserve?

Gen. SCOTT. You mean in the Regular Army?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Gen. SCOTT. I would do so with a certain number of them, but I would keep what I would call a professional army.

Mr. KAHN. You would have to keep a great many of them along there to act as noncommissioned officers?

Gen. SCOTT. In addition to that you would have enough to make a dependable force, if they were called upon suddenly.

Mr. KAHN. Yes. When the present war commenced in Europe, none of the countries had in the first line men who had had more than a three-years training?

Gen. SCOTT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. England had?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. She had only 100,000 men of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. She had 225,000 men, I think.

Mr. KAHN. She was only able to send 100,000 men to France at the beginning of the war.

Gen. SCOTT. I think if you are going to keep a small number of men of that kind you should keep them up in a high state of efficiency.

Mr. KAHN. Opinions vary on that proposition in regard to the number of those troops which England had, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be that neither one of us knows how many there were.

**Mr. KAHN.** I know England has been criticized because she sent only 5,000 men from her ships into Belgium, all told, at the beginning of the war.

**The CHAIRMAN.** I was talking about the expeditionary force.

**Mr. KAHN.** She sent only 5,000 men to protect Belgium.

**Secretary GARRISON.** Those were marines, so Mr. Churchill said in his speech in Parliament.

**Mr. KAHN.** Going back to the proposition in regard to the fighting men, I understood you to say that none of the countries engaged in the European war had had men with more than three years' service; that is, men in the first line.

**Gen. SCOTT.** No.

**Mr. KAHN.** Do you not think that a thorough military training for two years in the United States Army would equip our men to get ready for anything that might come along, just as well as the Germans were ready?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Yes; I do.

**Mr. KAHN.** Then do you not think it would be a good plan to reduce the enlistment period to two years and turn out a number of trained men every two years?

**Gen. SCOTT.** No; you might catch the Army in such a position that the men were only half trained. I am speaking now of an expeditionary force of our Regular Army as now constituted under present laws.

**Mr. KAHN.** You mean, of course, that you would dismiss half the Army every year and take on a new force of men every year?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Yes; and you might be in difficulty just as you were taking on the new men.

**Mr. KAHN.** If you had need of more men, and the President issued a call for volunteers, do you not think the men who had had the experience with the colors would respond pretty readily—the men who had just been let out?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Some would and some would not.

**Mr. KAHN.** Mr. Wise asked you in regard to the schools. As a matter of fact, in Europe they begin to drill the children when they reach about the age of 13 or 14 or 15 years. They start their military training about that time, do they not?

**Gen. SCOTT.** In some countries they do.

**Mr. KAHN.** In practically every country except England, do they not?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Yes.

**Mr. KAHN.** Do you not think we might make some advance in this country through the cooperation of the various States?

**Gen. SCOTT.** But the National Government has no control over the municipal schools.

**Mr. KAHN.** That is true, but do you not think an effort ought to be made to try to induce the various States to take that question up?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Yes; if you can get them to do it.

**Mr. KAHN.** Is it not worth while to make the effort?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Yes; but we can not depend upon them as to whether they will or not. We do not know how many of them would do that.

**Mr. KAHN.** Do you think you could get the trained officers to drill the pupils in those schools if the States would agree to do that?

**Gen. SCOTT.** Not with 785 extra officers.

Mr. KAHN. Your very purpose on continuing the skeleton organizations is to give you a great number of organizations?

Gen. SCOTT. A greater number of organizations; yes.

Mr. KAHN. After all, General, you need officers in time of war, do you not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; you need from 30,000 to 40,000 officers.

Mr. KAHN. They are a very important factor in any war.

Gen. SCOTT. They are indispensable. You might just as well attempt to teach a school without any school-teacher, as to have an efficient army without the requisite number of officers.

Mr. KAHN. Therefore, if you continue your organizations in intelligent form, it will at least give you a considerable addition to the number of officers that you will have?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. In the matter of the Coast Artillery, if you were simply to increase the enlisted force in the Coast Artillery, would that be sufficient? Would you not require additional officers with every additional battery you would have?

Gen. SCOTT. Surely.

Mr. KAHN. Simply filling up the enlisted force, if the Coast Artillery was without officers, would not do?

Gen. SCOTT. No.

Mr. KAHN. Under what conditions was the formation of the Field Artillery changed from the battery system to the regimental system?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not understand your question, exactly.

Mr. KAHN. At the present time the Field Artillery organizations are in regiments?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Formerly they were in batteries, were they not?

Gen. SCOTT. Formerly they were in regiments.

Mr. KAHN. Always in regiments?

Gen. SCOTT. The Coast Artillery and the Field Artillery were in one corps of organized regiments.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think it would be a good plan to break up the regimental formation and put them into battery formation and have every battery a distinct organization?

Gen. SCOTT. That has been recommended by some people, but I am not able to give you my views on that at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say, General, you thought the provision I made for 108 batteries to be formed into battalions or into any other organizations which the President might choose, was a good thing?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I did not understand your question, if that was what you meant.

Mr. KAHN. I made a memorandum of the question and your answer at the time, and that is the very thing I had in mind.

Gen. SCOTT. I did not understand the question, then. Some of the officers of the Field Artillery are for it and others are against it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the Artillery officers would be better able to give you an idea in regard to that?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. Gen. Bliss is a Field Artilleryman.

Mr. KAHN. Something has been said here in regard to economy. I believe in economy myself, but, after all, General, is it not all im-

portant to have efficiency; and would it not be more economical to spend a little additional money in time of peace in order to have an efficient Army than to spend an enormous sum at the outbreak of war to make up for the lack of preparedness during the time of peace?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. That is what is happening in Europe to-day, is it not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes. If you do not get efficiency, your money is thrown away.

Mr. KAHN. Exactly so; and no matter what you expend, it is not economy if you do not get efficiency.

Gen. SCOTT. No.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, speaking of the maintenance of companies at peace and war strength, that is optional with the War Department now, is it not?

Gen. SCOTT. There is a certain limit put upon the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. It is optional so far as the number of men authorized by law is concerned?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have 100,000 authorized by law?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And those 100,000 will not fill up to the full strength?

Gen. SCOTT. We can shift them to one organization or the other, but they do not fill up all the organizations to full strength.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not a fact that even when you have had sufficient authorization you have not been maintaining the companies at full war strength in recent years? In other words, was it not a fact that at the time when the expedition left Galveston for Vera Cruz they were short in some of the Infantry companies as many as 45 men?

Gen. SCOTT. I was not in a position to know the circumstances. I was on the border at that time, in a different section of the country, and I did not know what was going on in the War Department.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is true, that in most of the regiments that went to Vera Cruz there were a number of companies that were short.

Gen. SCOTT. I did not know anything about that. I was not in a position to know what was going on at the War Department.

Mr. ANTHONY. I have been informed that that was the case.

Gen. SCOTT. I was not at the War Department at that time, and was not in a position to know.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would it not have been better if the companies had been at full strength?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. I want to ask you about conditions on the border. In your opinion, is it any longer necessary to maintain a large number of men stationed along the border?

Gen. SCOTT. That question has been asked of the Secretary of State, and he has not replied as yet.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not costing us a great deal of extra money to maintain men down there? Has it not cost us more money to keep them there in recent years than it would have cost to have kept them in the States where they belonged?

Gen. SCOTT. It has cost a little additional money for some of the cantonments. It has not cost any more for the subsistence or munitions or clothing or for any of those things.

Mr. ANTHONY. Have you the figures to show how much it has cost the Government in the tentage that has been destroyed and rotted through use?

Gen. SCOTT. It is a very expensive way to house.

Mr. ANTHONY. It runs to nearly a million dollars or more, does it not?

Gen. SCOTT. I never have seen it computed.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it true, General, that from the time the troops were first sent from southern Texas to the border that some of the organizations became disorganized through dissatisfaction of the men with the service?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I have not seen a single instance of that kind.

Mr. ANTHONY. Was it not a fact that a number of men refused to reenlist because of their dissatisfaction with the service there?

Gen. SCOTT. Some refuse to reenlist at all times.

Mr. ANTHONY. But more on account of the unsatisfactory conditions in the border service?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know why they do not reenlist. There is nothing in the records to show us why a man does not reenlist.

Mr. ANTHONY. How are the companies maintained on the border; are they maintained at their war or at their peace strength?

Gen. SCOTT. At their peace strength.

Mr. ANTHONY. Are they at their full strength now abroad?

Gen. SCOTT. They are practically at their full strength, except two at Panama, where quarters are not yet sufficient.

Mr. ANTHONY. Have you any means of informing the committee just what the surplus cost has been for maintaining the troops on the border?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I have not; but I could get it for you, I suppose.

Mr. ANTHONY. I would like to have it furnished, if you can do so.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose Gen. Aleshire can give us that.

Gen. SCOTT. It is not a question with us as to whether it costs more or less for maintaining the men there, but of the necessity there for troops. We have to keep them there to prevent the United States from being invaded, no matter what it costs.

Mr. ANTHONY. Was it thought that there was any danger of an invasion of the United States at that time?

Gen. SCOTT. It has been invaded somewhat at Brownsville and in that vicinity.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has it been invaded to such an extent that a sheriff's posse could not have driven the invaders back?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; it has; and it would have been invaded in many places if troops had not been there to prevent.

Mr. ANTHONY. Where?

Gen. SCOTT. On the lower Rio Grande, and all along the border.

Secretary GARRISON. I wish you would try to convince the people of Texas that they were not in any danger.

Mr. ANTHONY. It has been rumored that it was because of some local instances of trouble that troops have been maintained there.

Gen. SCOTT. No; there has been a very serious situation on the lower Rio Grande and all along the border.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, in speaking about what has been called compulsory service, you used the term universal service, which, I think, is a much better term. How many young men between the ages of 18 and 21 years—I think those were the ages you used—are there in the country who would be eligible for that compulsory military service, or universal service?

Gen. SCOTT. There are over 700,000 young men who come to the age of 18 years every year.

Mr. ANTHONY. I made inquiry last year of the Census Office, and I think they told me that there were 4,000,000 young men between the ages of 18 and 21 years in the country. What would you think of the idea of a system that would compel the Government to train every young man between the ages of 18 and 21 years at least six months at some time between those years, and then allow him to go back into the body politic?

Gen. SCOTT. That would be an admirable system.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would it not be possible to give the men enough military training in six months to make them fairly good soldiers afterwards?

Gen. SCOTT. I would rather have them for two years.

Mr. ANTHONY. That would be a manifest impossibility, because then you would have an army of 2,000,000 men, and you would not want that.

Gen. SCOTT. That would not frighten me. Of course, that number would not be under arms all the time or at any one time.

Mr. ANTHONY. What possible use could you make of that number?

Gen. SCOTT. If we were invaded, we could use them to advantage.

Mr. ANTHONY. What foreign country could bring 2,000,000 men to our shores?

Gen. SCOTT. I think if Germany or any of the other foreign governments determined to invade us, we would need the men.

Mr. ANTHONY. That predicated on the loss of control of the sea by our fleet?

Gen. SCOTT. Certainly.

Mr. ANTHONY. Even if we should lose the control of the sea, is it not a fact that with all the ships at Germany's command she could not carry 250,000 men 3,000 miles across the water, with their baggage, their equipment, and everything they would have to bring along?

Gen. SCOTT. I think she could. I do not know what she can do now.

Mr. ANTHONY. I have seen figures that it would be impossible to transport an expeditionary army like that for that distance.

Gen. SCOTT. She could hire any quantity of vessels from other nations.

Mr. ANTHONY. That might be possible. Is it not a fact that on the Pacific side it would be much more difficult for any nation on that side to land an army of that number of men?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes. There is no nation within such close proximity to us as there is on the Atlantic side.

Mr. ANTHONY. As a matter fact, is it not a physical impossibility for any nation to ever land on our shores at one time an army in excess of 500,000 men?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I think they could keep on coming.

Mr. ANTHONY. I am speaking of landing them at one time.

Gen. SCOTT. The Assistant Secretary of War has handed me a table here showing the ability of the great powers for carrying on over-sea expeditions.

Mr. ANTHONY. What does that table show as the maximum force any one power could transport in one expedition and land on our shores?

Gen. SCOTT. Austria-Hungary could, with the available ships they have, land on our shores a first expedition of 72,000 men and 16,000 animals. On the second expedition, 100,000 men.

Mr. ANTHONY. What would happen to those 72,000 men, in your opinion, from a military standpoint during the 30 or 60 days that would elapse before a second force would come in?

Gen. SCOTT. It would depend on the situation.

Mr. ANTHONY. On our resources—

Gen. SCOTT (interposing). If the Austro-Hungarians got on shore and established a suitable position with their heavy guns, it would be difficult for us to dislodge them.

Mr. ANTHONY. How many heavy guns would it be possible for the nation you mention to transport with such an expedition?

Gen. SCOTT. Sufficient—

Mr. ANTHONY (interposing). Does it state in that table how many they would bring on the first expedition?

Gen. SCOTT. No.

Mr. ANTHONY. Of course, General, as I understand it, it is a matter of ships, and if this Nation had not the ships, why—

Gen. SCOTT. These are ships that are already in her own possession, but there is nothing to prevent her from hiring ships of other nations.

Mr. ANTHONY. It does not specify, then, the number of guns and amount of ammunition that would come on the first expedition?

Gen. SCOTT. It gives the tonnage and number of men and animals.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not true that it takes a vastly greater number of ships to transport guns, ammunition, and supplies than it does men?

Gen. SCOTT. Well, all those transports bring in their holds all the guns and supplies that they need with them.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would it not be an impossible proposition to load one of those large 42-centimeter guns on a transport—on shipboard.

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Could it be landed on our shores?

Gen. SCOTT. We send our large guns on ships to the Philippines on transports.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it possible to land such a gun without having adequate dock facilities.

Gen. SCOTT. No; of course not. There are many docks on our coasts.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is what I thought. Well, let us move on to the next nation.

Gen. SCOTT. The next is France. The strength of the army is 5,000,000 men. Its tonnage is 1,705,931. They could land 160,913 on the first expedition.

Mr. ANTHONY. How long would it take such an expedition to cross the water?

Gen. SCOTT. Possibly not more than 10 days.

Mr. ANTHONY. Ten days?

Gen SCOTT. Yes, sir. Yes; it states France could come within 15 days.

Mr. ANTHONY. How long, General, in that connection, did it take Great Britain to take 33,000 men from Canada to England, having control of the seas and with all available ships she needed?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know; no outsider knows.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not a fact it took her 60 days?

Gen. SCOTT. Sixty days?

Mr. ANTHONY. Before they all got there.

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know; those facts are not published.

Mr. ANTHONY. Thirty-five days, I understand, is the exact figure.

Gen. SCOTT. She might not have applied her full tonnage. She might have put a small number of her ships at such work.

Mr. ANTHONY. Well, the idea of this line of questions of mine was to show—

Gen. SCOTT (interrupting). Germany could put 387,000 men and 81,000 horses on her first trip and 440,000 on her second trip.

Mr. ANTHONY. In what time?

Gen. SCOTT. Fifteen days.

Mr. KAHN. General, is it not always apprehended nowadays that there may be a combination of nations that would attack this country?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir; they might attack us on both coasts.

Mr. ANTHONY. I want to express a serious doubt as to the length of time mentioned in that report. I do not believe it would be possible to land such an army and such an equipment and transport it from Germany to this country in 15 days. That does not sound reasonable.

Gen. SCOTT. These figures might have contemplated that the transports were already loaded.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then you mean the actual time on the water?

Gen. SCOTT. No; these figures, I find, cover the time of loading and crossing for the first expedition in question.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not a fact that before such an expedition could be prepared and transported across the water and landed in this country that practically 60 days would elapse at least; that is, we would have at least 60 days' knowledge of that.

Gen. SCOTT. Here is the study of the War College.

Chairman HAY. It is a matter of opinion, is it not, General?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has there ever, in history, an army of such size been transported in such short time?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know of any.

Mr. ANTHONY. Not even in the present war?

Gen. SCOTT. In this present war, however, they sent from England to Turkey an expedition of 200,000 men.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has it not been shown, even in this war, the extreme difficulty of transporting a force overseas from England, I believe, to Gallipoli—I believe that is what they call it—and to maintain their communications, and has it not been demonstrated they were practically ineffective in their campaign?

Gen. SCOTT. They have been unable to take Turkey, but there might have been many different circumstances involved. For instance, I think they took the wrong place to make the effort.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would not any nation take a terrible military risk to transport a force from their country to a strong, powerful country like this; is it not a military risk which is extremely hazardous?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not believe Germany and those people over there figure it is much of a risk to send an army to the United States.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I would like to ask you if it is your opinion that, with our military preparations and the strength of our Nation, we could not have done as well as Turkey in this matter?

Gen. SCOTT. I think Turkey has more trained men than we have.

Mr. ANTHONY. How long did it take that expedition to go from England to the Dardanelles—how great a length of time was consumed in landing that expedition?

Gen. SCOTT. No one knows when they started, therefore it is impossible to answer that question.

Mr. ANTHONY. Have we observers—did we have observers with the forces in the Dardanelles?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; not with the forces in the Dardanelles, except we have Capt. Williams at Constantinople, but none with the allies.

Mr. ANTHONY. Have we military observers now on the field of the larger operations over there?

Gen. SCOTT. There is no nation that has allowed our men to stay continuously. We had some five men in Germany, but brought them back.

Mr. ANTHONY. Have you any reports so far that are considered valuable?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir; confidential reports.

Mr. ANTHONY. Are there any of those which would cover some of the questions that I have asked about the length of time involved in transporting this expedition.

Gen. SCOTT. No; I have not seen any refer to that.

Mr. ANTHONY. Another point, General. A recommendation has been made by the department for an increase in the Coast Artillery. Where is that to be used? What is the idea? Is it the idea to fortify every possible harbor we have?

Gen. SCOTT. No; not by any means. We have many harbors which we are not fortifying at all.

Mr. ANTHONY. To place higher power guns in place of those considered obsolete?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; the idea in asking for an increase in Coast Artillery is to replace those Congress has already given us, which have gone to foreign stations.

Mr. ANTHONY. Now, in regard to an increase in the number of men in the Coast Artillery, where do you propose to use them?

Gen. SCOTT. Just in the place, practically, they were before we were obliged to deplete the garrisons in the United States, to send them abroad, to Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines. We have just asked for the exact number we had before.

Mr. ANTHONY. You are asking for about 5,600 men.

Gen. SCOTT. Fifty-two companies.

Mr. ANTHONY. And that is the number of men you sent to Hawaii, Panama, and the Philippines?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; Congress considered we should have a certain number of companies in the United States. Since that time we have depleted them 52 companies to send abroad. We ask to have them replaced.

Mr. ANTHONY. In the handling of these big guns it requires, of course, a corps of highly trained technical men, does it not?

Gen. SCOTT. A certain number of them; yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. The noncommissioned officers are usually the men who handle the guns. The coast artilleryman himself does not require any technical training for the handling of the big guns?

Gen. SCOTT. The coast artilleryman—

Mr. ANTHONY. In other words, would it not be possible, if necessary, to recruit your Coast Artillery with men from other services at points where needed, say, at a threatened point?

Gen. SCOTT. I think there could be some of those men added.

Mr. ANTHONY. In other words, would it not be more advantageous to the War Department to have an increase in the mobile Army?

Gen. SCOTT. I think so.

Mr. ANTHONY (continuing). Rather than an increase in the Coast Artillery, which is stuck away in little odd places on the coast which might not be threatened.

Gen. SCOTT. That is not probable, but possible.

Mr. KAHN. As a matter of fact, you are training those in the Coast Artillery in Infantry tactics in most every part of the country, are you not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; that is true.

Mr. ANTHONY. But the probabilities are they would not be so utilized.

Gen. SCOTT. They have been so utilized.

Mr. ANTHONY. The Coast Artillery is not considered a mobile force, is it?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; if necessary; we have had four or five regiments of Coast Artillery at Galveston, armed as Infantry, ready to go to Mexico.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then, if any increase is made in the rate of establishment, it would be better to increase the mobile Army, would it not?

Gen. SCOTT. I think it would be better to increase both.

Mr. ANTHONY. Well, in case you could not get both, which would you prefer?

Gen. SCOTT. The mobile Army.

Mr. ANTHONY. In regard to this number of 760 officers for which the department asks, how did you arrive at that exact number—760?

Gen. SCOTT. That is practically the number we have out now.

Mr. ANTHONY. I should have said 876.

Gen. SCOTT. We need about a thousand men.

Mr. ANTHONY. You really need a thousand?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. Now, the idea would be to utilize those officers practically by putting them in companies that are now deficient in officers?

Gen. SCOTT. Many of those men would be utilized in State schools, just where they are now.

Mr. ANTHONY. Are the companies of the mobile Army now fully officered?

Gen. SCOTT. No; not by any means.

Mr. ANTHONY. About how many men are needed to fill out the complement of officers that should be with the troops?

Gen. SCOTT. I think about 780. I can give the exact number if you need them.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is near enough, General. I want to refer to a question asked by Mr. Quin, of Mississippi, who asked you if it was not possible to return to service such as recruiting and military instruction schools, many of the officers now on the retired list.

Gen. SCOTT. We utilize a great number of them. We utilize all that are willing and able.

Mr. ANTHONY. You have no way of compelling officers to go back to that duty if you think they are physically able.

Gen. SCOTT. The law compels us to ask them.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it would be an advantage to you if you had the power to arbitrarily order an officer on retired list to such duty as you think he is capable of performing?

Gen. SCOTT. We have no means of knowing what he can perform. Unless he is willing, we can not tell.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not a fact there are a great many officers applying to go on the retired list, and going on the retired list, for minor physical defects who are really capable of doing this service for the Government—instruction, recruiting, etc.

Gen. SCOTT. There are some men who can do sedentary work.

Mr. GREENE. Do you think these men who go on the retired list before the expiration of the 30 years' service, the legal length of service—do you think because of the fact we allow them such high retired pay it operates as an incentive to them to seek to go on the retired list?

Gen. SCOTT. There might be a very few cases of that. For instance, a man who is able to get temporary employment in the large munition factories might be affected in that way. They are given high pay, but as to the majority of them I should say no.

Mr. ANTHONY. Those men, many of them, have resigned, have they not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. But some men on the retired list are receiving high pay, are they not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; for instance, those men allowed to retire with an extra grade, who served in Panama. That is covered by the present law. But a majority of the officers—the officers with whom I am acquainted, want to stay in the service.

Mr. ANTHONY. Those men who are allowed to retire on account of service in Panama, are really receiving this extra pay through an error in the legislation?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know what the intention of the act was.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not a fact that the department interpreted that law, passed at the last session, rather widely?

Gen. SCOTT. No; I think the law as it is, provides no escape from that. It is mandatory, I think.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** When it came before the committee, it was our idea to allow Gen. Goethals and Gorgas to have the benefit of it, but I do not think it was the intention to have it cover such a wide field.

Gen. SCOTT. It said "Any man who has served three years or over."

**Mr. ANTHONY.** That covers too wide a latitude, does it not, in your opinion, General?

Gen. SCOTT. I think so.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Then, I want to put this question: Do you think if we reduced the retired pay from three-fourths to one-half for officers who voluntarily seek retirement, that it might prevent a large number of the officers from voluntarily seeking to go on the retired list?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not know anybody who voluntarily asked to go on the retired list, or who wants to go on the retired list, under 30 years of service, except those who served in Panama, covered by this law.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Then, of course, the converse would be true if they could get full pay instead of half pay—they would be more anxious to come back to work, would they not?

The CHAIRMAN. General, in your opinion, would it be a good thing to enact a law that whenever a man on the retired list is physically fit to perform recruiting duty or duty with schools, that the Secretary of War should have the authority to detail him to duty of that character.

Gen. SCOTT. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, would it be good policy to take away what the retired officer now has—the right to serve or not?

Gen. SCOTT. I do not think so. If you force him, against his will, to perform this duty, you will find he is not of much value to you.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean he would not do his duty.

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; many would not.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Col. Nicholls, of South Carolina, asked a few questions in regard to the present efficiency of the National Guard. I want to ask your opinion as to whether the National Guard has not greatly increased in efficiency in recent years?

Gen. SCOTT. Undoubtedly.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** And it is more nearly an efficient body of soldiers than ever before?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Would it not be advisable, then, to continue that development rather than to retard it by legislation which would disorganize the National Guard?

Gen. SCOTT. I think we ought to foster the National Guard.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** You feel it should be still further fostered?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; I think it should be maintained for the class of people who want to go into it, for such uses as can be made of it under the Constitution.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Is it not true, for its size our Army, both for commissioned officers and enlisted men, is about as efficient as any Army there is?

Gen. SCOTT. It has that reputation.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Is it not true that the majority of officers, from the time they are graduated from West Point or the time they enter

the service, through the system of service schools which you inaugurated, are kept practically up to date with all the developments of military science and progress?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; those who can take their courses.

Mr. ANTHONY. What percentage of the commissioned officers have the opportunity of going through the service schools?

Gen. SCOTT. A very large percentage.

Mr. ANTHONY. And you have found the service schools are doing most excellent work.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; they are doing most excellent work.

Mr. ANTHONY. What would you think, General, of giving an opportunity to the National Guard officers to have the same opportunities for technical education at the service schools?

Gen. SCOTT. We endeavor to give that opportunity to all that we have room for.

Mr. ANTHONY. As it is now, I believe you do detail one from each State, upon application, do you not?

Gen. SCOTT. All that we can take care of with our facilities.

Mr. ANTHONY. How many take advantage of that?

Gen. SCOTT. Comparatively few.

Mr. ANTHONY. Why don't they avail themselves of this opportunity?

Gen. SCOTT. Probably their business does not permit them.

Mr. ANTHONY. I think that is all, General.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I want to say, General, before asking my questions, knowing you to be a practical soldier of long years of experience, that in advocating an increase in the military force of our country you have not been influenced by any fear of immediate attacks by any enemy, but that it is your judgment that we ought to have a larger military force in this country to be maintained in time of peace. I was glad to hear you say that. Now, then, getting down to practical business, it is up to this committee to make some recommendation to Congress, and it is proposed to increase the military force of our country by adding a few regiments or units or filling up those we now have in the Regular Army by encouraging the Organized Militia of the country, by appropriating a certain amount of money to the Organized Militia, and by organizing the continental army. The increase in the Regular Army, of course, depends upon the enlistment of the men. The increase in the Organized Militia depends practically upon the same thing, and that is also true of the continental army.

Now, I want to ask you, as a soldier, is it not a fact that this whole scheme, at its best, is far short of insuring the American people an efficient and effective military organization?

Gen. SCOTT. I think you will never get a satisfactory military organization until you come to the compulsory system.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not a fact that, at the best, the whole proposition is a gamble?

Gen. SCOTT. I think we should come to the conscription system as soon as we can come to it.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not also a fact that it would appear to men who have given it careful thought, that it is an attempt on the part of those in control, in our country, including perhaps the Members of Congress, to sidestep, if I may be permitted to use that

expression, the one great proposition of giving us a definite, fixed, and continuous military policy in our country and, in a measure, to quiet the cry that is now going up over the country for immediate preparedness? What is your judgment about that?

Gen. SCOTT. I think that every soldier that I have had any conversation with will concede that you must come to a conscriptive system sooner or later.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I agree with you on that proposition, and I want to ask one or two questions about that. In the case of the universal military service, does it necessarily follow that all young men in the country must take the military training.

Gen. SCOTT. Not by any means.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not a fact that any compulsory or universal military service which may be adopted, leaves it up to the Government to fix the number which should be included in the standing Army?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. And then it is the duty of the Government to each year take a sufficient number of the young men of the country, without regard to whom they might be, and place them in training and keep this Army up to that standing.

Gen. SCOTT. There would be, of course, certain exemptions.

Mr. MCKENZIE. A great many; undoubtedly.

Gen. SCOTT. I mean exempted by law—men, for instance, with widowed mothers to support, etc.

Mr. KAHN. And men exempted for physical defects?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir; and those prevented by religious scruples, like the Quakers.

Mr. MCKENZIE. One other question: We now have a law providing for a reserve in the Regular Army, do we not?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. How many men are there in the Reserve Corps now?

Gen. SCOTT. That has just begun to take effect. It took effect about the 1st of November, last. It has not yet had an opportunity to show its value.

Mr. MCKENZIE. How many men, do you estimate, will go into that reserve from year to year?

Gen. SCOTT. I can not estimate. There are no grounds upon which to make an estimate.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I want to ask you if you can conceive of any objection to the members of the Organized Militia who have served three years in the Organized Militia, becoming members of this reserve army.

Gen. SCOTT. I do not understand what reserve army you mean.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Well, the reserve provided for by law now; the men who have served in the Regular Army and after the expiration of the time of service, he can pass out into the reserve and is subject to call by the Government in time of need.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Now, then, the question I am asking you is whether the National Guard can not be used as a reserve; whether there is any objection to the members of the National Guard who may so

desire, after serving their time in the Organized Militia, passing out into this reserve and becoming members thereof.

Gen. SCOTT. That will have to be pretty largely a matter of examination. A great many of the men in the National Guard have not had any real training at all. Some of the States, for instance, have almost nothing. You must not form your ideas of the National Guard on what you see from the National Guard of the States like New York and Pennsylvania and some other States. Some of the State guards do not measure up to them.

Mr. MCKENZIE. In your judgment would not such men compare favorably with the men of the proposed continental army?

Gen. SCOTT. Some men would; yes, and some not.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Of course, I do not know whether it would be practicable. I am just asking the question for my own information. To my mind it seems to me that is a good way to increase the reserve.

Gen. SCOTT. In certain States, yes; and certain States, no; some men of some States, but not others.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Just one other question and I am through: In the organization of the Army, in view of the experience in the European war, as to the length of time it takes to drill and make an efficient field artilleryman, do you not think it would be well to have our Army what we might say "top heavy" in Field Artillery?

Gen. SCOTT. Top heavy in Field Artillery and Cavalry.

Mr. MCKENZIE. What about the necessity of cavalrymen when you take into consideration the country and its area and the advancements in the flying machines?

Gen. SCOTT. I think we need cavalry more than any nation. Our movements on the border recently—

Mr. MCKENZIE (interrupting). In your judgment has not the flying machine taken the place of the Cavalry in some respects?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; it has been of assistance, but not all. We have a border on the south 2,000 miles, and the most of the work done on that border has been done by the Cavalry, outside of the cities.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You do not anticipate any great danger from the south, however, do you, General?

Gen. SCOTT. Well, I do not know what direction it will come from.

Mr. GREENE. General, of course it is obvious that the present constitutional limits are the first and primal factor in rendering it impossible to have absolute dependence on the use of the National Guard as the first line of defense.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. Apart from that, in the attempts that are being made, under the policy of the War Department, with the public approval, to harmonize as much as possible the State militia with the Federal national defense scheme, do you not find from year to year this very same element of 48 different kinds and degrees of local administrations of the 48 separate commands in the National Guard is complicated also by what might be called a political element; that is to say, as has been suggested by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Gordon], the Federal Government can lay down the discipline, yet if the State Legislatures do not appropriate money for the support of the National Guard in those States the discipline is a mere book.

Gen. SCOTT. There is no guard.

Mr. GREENE. Yes; there is no guard. If the local atmosphere and public sentiment in the State are not particularly disposed toward encouraging enlistment or stimulating young men to perform some part of the military service for the benefit of the Nation and State—

Gen. SCOTT (interrupting). Then there is no guard.

Gen. GREENE. So, when we come, in a time of emergency, to summon to the Federal colors all these 48 local organizations you find some disorder and—

Gen. SCOTT. You do not know what you are going to get.

Mr. GREENE. No matter what theoretical Federal control there may be inherent in the right to prescribe discipline there is no control in the end.

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GREENE. Now, I want to ask this question: Another factor that enters into that is in relying upon volunteer troops, either Organized Militia or out-and-out volunteers from civil life, is it not true that experience has shown that it is much easier to get Infantry—in fact, it is Infantry altogether, comparatively, rather than the higher specialized arms, such as Field Artillery and Cavalry.

Gen. SCOTT. Field Artillery and Cavalry are more expensive and they are not really necessary for the purposes of the various States.

Mr. GREENE. That is it. That brings us back to the fact, again, in relying upon the National Guard of the 48 States for the great part of any large volunteer force you can not determine beforehand in what proportions, relative to the various arms of the service, they will be maintained in times of peace.

Gen. SCOTT. You can not say whether they will have any—one man or more.

Mr. GREENE. So, then, to generalize that, they will probably all be infantry, as far as any effective purposes are concerned.

Gen. SCOTT. Certain States have been more patriotic than others and have Cavalry and Field Artillery, such, for instance, as New York and Pennsylvania and other States, but they are in excess of what their States' needs are.

Mr. GREENE. So, taking the National Guard as a whole, the relative proportions of these specialized arms bear no relation whatever to what you military men consider proper factors?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GREENE. And you have to take them as they are and readjust them in an emergency and the hurry of a sudden call?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. That comes also from having the control lodged in the 48 different States?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. Now, I have just two other things I just wanted to touch on for a moment. They are more suggestive, perhaps, than informing, at least, as far as I am concerned. The first is, is it not a fact that one of the great factors in plans for so-called coast defense is that while you are practically secure, and the experience of history teaches that our harbor defenses are well-nigh impregnable from attack by sea, your anxiety consists in not knowing in time of war where between the harbor defenses they are likely to land; and then

the preparation of means whereby not only troops may be transported to that place without congestion, but of equipment and impedimenta; and what is more, how you are going to be enabled to bring to bear sufficiently heavy ordnance by land outside of the harbor defenses?

Gen. SCOTT. That is absolutely true.

Mr. GREENE. And is there at present any plan, or have you the material whereby you can undertake to respond to fire from aboard ship clearing the way for a landing force?

Gen. SCOTT. We have estimates for six such guns that can be carried by railways or by automobile transportation.

Mr. GREENE. But there is nothing in existence?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir; nothing of large enough caliber.

Mr. GREENE. Then, as I understand it, the accepted strategy of such landing is they would clear the way by heavy fire so that no land resistance would be available, and under the cover of that fire the force would be landed.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; under cover of the ship's guns.

Mr. GREENE. And we have no field ordnance to respond to such a fire?

Gen. SCOTT. Nothing except against landing boats and destroyers.

Mr. GREENE. And that would be done at the risk of a superior fire from the sea?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. That, of course, opens up a great deal of detail, but the time of the committee would not permit of such detailed discussion. Now, in regard to repelling invasions at points in between harbor defenses, I only want to bring out by this question this fact: Is it not a fact that there are no large guns in harbor defenses but that are in emplacements and can not, therefore, be used to repel an attack except from the sea?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; but we propose to give them the ability to point toward the land also.

Mr. GREENE. It is only within a restricted area—the restricted area of the harbor defenses—that they are available. They are not transportable.

Gen. SCOTT. Only within the range of the harbor guns.

Mr. GREENE. I only wanted to dispel the popular notion that, having harbor defenses, we have also coast defenses.

Gen. SCOTT. They are not the same thing at all.

Mr. GREENE. Is it not possible to organize during times of peace the potential commercial, industrial, and transportation facilities of the country so that, on instant call in time of war, or the maintenance of war, from the War Department, the various manufacturing and transportation companies, owners or proprietors of land vehicles suitable for field transportation, etc., might know exactly what they had to do and where to bring this material?

Gen. SCOTT. We have such a proposition under advisement.

Mr. GREENE. Another thing: Would it be advisable or practicable to submit to certain recognized industrial concerns models and specifications of emergency equipment—munitions and ordnance, or whatever it may be—and have such a tentative agreement with them so that, on telegraphic notice to them, they could begin instantly to

turn out exactly what you wanted instead of having to wait to have specifications submitted?

Gen. SCOTT. We have a proposition of that sort under advisement also.

Mr. GREENE. Does it require any law to effect that?

Gen. SCOTT. It requires money to make these models.

Mr. GREENE. Of course it would; but does it require any authorization by law for you to enter into such a tentative agreement or set of agreements?

Gen. SCOTT. Not with these manufacturing companies; no, sir; but it requires money to make the models to give to these people.

Mr. GREENE. That is all.

Mr. TILSON. Carrying this matter just a step farther, in addition to models and plans to be made, would it not be economy for the Government to invest in tools, etc., which would be required in the manufacture of this material?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; or I think, better than that, we should make arrangements with the munitions companies which are now manufacturing munitions for foreign countries to keep their plants—not in operation but in being—until needed.

Mr. TILSON. Not only that, but to prepare the tools and fixtures that would be necessary for the actual manufacture, so in case of need the tools could be put on any standard machine now being used for other purposes and begin to turn out the war material.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; I think there should be a certain amount of that. I think that all of the resources of England, France, Russia, and, I believe, Italy and Japan have been utilized now to make that sort of material that you speak of, and they have not got enough yet after more than a year of war.

Mr. TILSON. Simply because they have been taking a large part of the time in producing those particular things I mentioned?

Gen. SCOTT. I understand some of the munitions companies in the United States that have been in operation a year have not yet begun deliveries.

Mr. TILSON. Mostly due to the lack of these very things of which I have spoken?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. TILSON. Now, going back to the organization, you spoke of extra officers, that it was desirable to have as many officers as possible, and although you did not believe that the ideal organization is to have skeleton-form regiments, yet, in order to get the larger number of officers, you advocate skeleton-form regiments?

Gen. SCOTT. There is another reason—we want to make up our divisional organization.

Mr. TILSON. I was going to ask about these units.

Gen. SCOTT. What the Secretary is asking is practically three Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division. The additional organization which he asked for is to round out that division.

Mr. TILSON. Then you think the organizations themselves would be useful in addition to the extra officers required.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. TILSON. In other words, instead of having 700 or 800 extra officers, if we would give 2,000 officers it would not take the same place as these organizations?

Gen. SCOTT. No; it would not round out our divisional organization.

Mr. TILSON. Now, going back to the question we have touched upon so often in regard to the utilization of the National Guard in any national force, I understood you very clearly, that that is not your ideal—that the continental force proposed is not your ideal—and what would be best would be a universal service. But assuming we shall not be able to get just what we think we ought to have, and assuming that the majority of the people would not care to have an ideal force, and coming down within the range of what you think is probably what we will get, do you see any inherent difficulties in taking the National Guard, as brought out by the questions of Mr. Wise, and making that, in addition to its being a State force, a national force, and beginning with the training now given to the most efficient of the National Guards in the United States—say such organizations as New York and Pennsylvania and those of the East with which I happen to be more acquainted—beginning with that as a limit, would it not be possible to build up a national force with sufficient training from this, what is now a State force?

Gen. SCOTT. If the 48 different States would agree to it—

Mr. TILSON. Removing them from State control and assuming we should bring them under Federal control—federalize them, as this Massachusetts document, which has been presented, speaks of—if we bring them under the Federal control, either by separate enlistment or by any other means—

Gen. SCOTT. With a dual—

Mr. TILSON. Yes; it would be actually dual. They would be members of the State guards, but, as far as you are concerned, they would be Federal volunteers. They might be members of the State guards or might be chiropodists or anything while at home, but as far as you are concerned they would be Federal volunteers.

Gen. SCOTT. I do not see how one man can serve two masters.

Mr. TILSON. If it came to a show-down, would not the Federal authority be paramount, and has not that fact been absolutely accepted since the Civil War?

Gen. SCOTT. I have never known a legal decision which would show it.

Mr. TILSON. Was there not a decision, decided by the arbitrament of arms from 1861 to 1865, that the Federal power is paramount?

Gen. SCOTT. Not in the matter of contracts.

Mr. TILSON. As far as the National Guard or so-called Organized Militia is concerned, it is agreed there is quite a doubt as to whether the State militia, as such, could be used with unlimited control by the Federal authorities, but I do not believe that there is any doubt but what, if the national guardsmen should enlist in this volunteer force, that they would be subject to the power of the United States, and the fact that he still continued to be a State militiaman would not in any way vitiate his contract with the National Government.

Gen. SCOTT. Even if he could, we would not know what we have in our hand.

Mr. TILSON. I do not know why you would not if you enlisted him.

Gen. SCOTT. We would not have them in an organization.

Chairman HAY. I suggest that all forces, the continental army, etc., are only to be used in time of war; that they are not to be used in time of peace.

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Chairman HAY. I thought you were going to call them out in time of peace.

Gen. SCOTT. We have authority to call the National Guard out in war, but we have no authority to train them, etc.

Chairman HAY. You have no authority to call them out of the country now.

Mr. TILSON. I am talking about the time of peace. Have you no authority to control them?

Secretary GARRISON. General, he thinks you are still talking about federalizing the National Guard and leaving them under State control.

Mr. TILSON. I mean these men who now happen to be in the National Guard, so-called, and who happen to be now the Organized Militia. They become the Federal volunteers or your continental army or whatever you wish to call it without stepping out of their position as State militia. That is my point.

Gen. SCOTT. I do not think it is possible. You do not come into the service of the United States unless you take an oath.

Mr. TILSON. Certainly not.

Gen. SCOTT. You do not go into the service of the National Guard unless you take an oath to obey the governor.

Mr. TILSON. But you take an oath in the National Guard—the first oath you take is to support the Constitution of the United States.

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; to support the Constitution of the United States, but you are not going to do it by yourself, but the way you are told to do it. You can not go out individually to support the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. TILSON. Even in the State militia papers you swear to support the Constitution of the United States.

Gen. SCOTT. But that does not tell you to obey the order of the President of the United States.

Mr. TILSON. But if you had an enlistment paper drawn up at the War Department and signed by United States Army officers and administered to recruits, I think they would be pretty well bound under the control of the United States, and it would not make any matter if he happened also to be a member of the State militia.

Mr. GREENE. May I ask you a question, Col. Tilson?

Mr. TILSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. What would, in the meantime, maintain the State organization of which he was a member if he sought to exercise his individual right in the continental army? He could not go over into the continental army as an individual. The idea is to have organized units, and if the dependence was upon the State maintaining that unit, then the individual enlistment would accomplish nothing if the State did not maintain that unit.

Mr. TILSON. Why not the United States maintain it?

Mr. GREENE. Then you do not want the dual responsibility?

Chairman HAY. I suggest we thrash these matters out later. We want to get through this hearing if possible.

Mr. ANTHONY. As I gather it, you do not give your approval to this continental army, General?

Gen. SCOTT. I give it my approval provided we can not get conscription.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has the General Staff as a whole passed upon this plan and given its approval?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. It has not?

Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. What portion of the General Staff has passed upon it?

Gen. SCOTT. The War College Division.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is there any duty, by law, devolved upon the General Staff to pass upon military plans?

Gen. SCOTT. It is the duty, by law, of the General Staff to pass on such matters as the Secretary of War gives it.

Mr. ANTHONY. Why has not the General Staff passed upon these plans?

Gen. SCOTT. Because the General Staff was scattered all over the country and only one small body is able to get together and discuss all together the plans that are before it.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has all of the General Staff now in Washington been called upon to pass upon the plans?

Gen. SCOTT. Yes; the members of the General Staff who are in the War Department who are separate from the War College Division have passed upon them.


Mr. ANTHONY. But as a body the General Staff has not been called upon to pass on these plans?


Gen. SCOTT. No, sir.

Chairman HAY. We are very much obliged to you, Gen. Scott.

The committee will adjourn until Wednesday morning at 10 o'clock; and, Gen. Bliss, we shall be very glad to hear from you at that time.

(Whereupon at 12.50 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Wednesday morning, January 12, 1916, at 10 o'clock.)





TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

*13th* CONGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENT OF

MAJ. GEN. T. H. BLISS  
*Assistant Chief of Staff, U. S. Army*

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JANUARY 12, 1916



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**TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.**

**COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Wednesday, January 12, 1916.**

The committee this day met, Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. T. H. BLISS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY.**

The CHAIRMAN. General, we will be glad to have you make any statement you desire to make before the committee.

Gen. BLISS. Mr. Chairman, I think I can possibly save a little time in one direction, even if I take a little more in another direction, by making a preliminary statement, the substance of which has been suggested by the hearings that I have attended, and with your permission I shall do so.

I shall begin what I have to say with a reference to one of the fundamental principles of the draft of bill which I understand is before this committee, but the details of which have not yet come under discussion. I assume that I may be asked the question which has been asked of others, as to whether I think that the general efficiency of the Army would be increased by raising all of its organizations to the full statutory or so-called war strength. To such a question I should, unreservedly and unqualifiedly answer "Yes"; this with the distinct understanding that there is no other factor involved for consideration except the efficiency of the Regular Army in and by itself, and that the organizations thus increased constituted a reasonably well-balanced force.

In the first place, it is obvious that a material increase in strength is gained without any additional so-called overhead charges. This increase in strength is more manifest in the Infantry than in the other branches of the line, or the mobile army, due to the fact that from the beginning of our history it has been found practicable to more thoroughly skeletonize that arm than any of the others, especially the Field Artillery. In the Field Artillery it has always been thought advantageous, both by military men and Congress, to keep on hand as much of the expensive material as possible, and train as many men as possible in the use of it. The waste of one shot by an untrained infantryman costs perhaps 1 cent; the waste of one round of artillery ammunition costs a good many dollars. Therefore in skeletonizing a battery of artillery the last thing that is done is to reduce the number of guns. As long as this number of guns is retained, the number of

men allowed must be sufficient to operate them, and thus is fixed an irreducible minimum in the number of such men. Therefore, while the provision of the tentative draft of bill before the committee will increase materially the strength of all organizations of the mobile Army, a greater proportionate increase will be in the Infantry. It is manifest that in increasing the strength of an Infantry regiment from nine hundred and odd men to one thousand nine hundred and odd men, without having to add an additional officer, gives somewhat more than double the effective force of men with the rifle without adding a dollar to the overhead charges for any increase in officers.

Again, it is obvious that an increase in strength of organizations to that to which every effort would be made to raise them in time of war will increase efficiency in instruction. The smaller the organization which is being instructed the more nearly that instruction ceases to be practical and becomes theoretical; that is to say, in such instruction each officer and man must constantly try to imagine that to the right and left of him are a greater or less number of purely imaginary beings, and they carry out the evolutions trying to imagine that an actual front of 500 yards is in reality 1,500 yards. That is to say, instead of receiving a practical lesson they have to imagine that they have received it. No men can be very successful in doing this and, consequently, the training of men in depleted organizations gives them false ideas and makes them think that in war they can do that which costly experience will teach them they can not do.

Having all this in mind, the first idea of the War Department in formulating a plan to suggest to this committee was to study for a long time to see how it could show that its general plan could be carried out and at the same time retain this most desirable feature of all organizations at full strength. It was the unanimous opinion of everyone, in all of the varying plans that were submitted for consideration, that speedy steps should be taken for providing in our extra continental garrisons the full force that was recommended in the plan submitted to Congress in, I think, the month of January, 1913, and which plan was presumably tacitly accepted by Congress in view of the fact that all appropriations since then have been made on that basis. Some have urgently advocated a material increase in the garrisons provided in that plan; but the War Department took the view that as the plan of 1913 has not been completely carried into effect, and as the carrying of it into effect would be in the direction of any subsequent increase that might be found necessary, it would, for the present, confine itself to the execution of that original plan. It was further the unanimous opinion of everyone in every plan submitted for the purpose of carrying out a well-considered and general policy of defense that the organizations in the extra continental garrisons should all be at full strength. This was for the reason that when a war comes, even if we agree that the coming of it is problematical, the first blow will of a certainty be very sudden and like a bolt out of the sky. These outlying garrisons would in all probability be the ones to bear the first brunt of the attack, and the time that would have to elapse before their peace strength garrisons could be increased, even if the conditions of the war make it practicable to increase them at all, might easily spell the difference between success and disaster. So much, therefore, was agreed upon by all; the

extra continental garrisons should be increased to the minimum called for by the plan of 1913, and these garrisons should be at statutory strength as respects their organizations.

The next question to be settled was what should be recommended as the strength and composition of that number of the Army remaining within our continental limits and what should be the strength of its organizations. As I have stated before, if no other factor entered into consideration than the question of the efficiency of the organizations composing the Regular Army, everything pointed to an increase of them as far as possible to statutory strength. But an increase of the efficiency of the component minor organizations, while intimately connected with it, is not the same thing as the efficiency of an army made up of those minor units. An army made up of a heterogeneous collection of regiments of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, each one of those organizations being trained to its maximum efficiency—such an army made up of these units may be utterly inefficient for the purpose for which it exists. If you put that army under the command of a general officer and told him that his problem was with that army to meet an enemy who was in any respect properly organized, he would immediately say:

"If this is the total strength in numbers of men of the force at my disposition, I have got too much of one element and not enough of the others. The efficiency of my army depends upon the efficiency of the army units—that is, of the division. This division, by common consent, should have 9 regiments of Infantry at full strength, 2 of Field Artillery, and 1 of Cavalry, besides certain auxiliary troops, such as Engineers and Signal Corps troops. The troops left in the United States which you have placed at my disposal consist of 17½ regiments of peace-strength Infantry, 12½ regiments of Cavalry, and 2 regiments of Field Artillery. These regiments enable me to organize one complete division and leaves a surplus of about 8 regiments of Infantry, 12 regiments of Cavalry, but no Artillery at all. In fact, if I were to give the proportion of Field Artillery which recent experience abroad indicates as necessary I would not have enough Field Artillery for even the one division. However, on the basis of our present organization I could organize a second Infantry division out of these remaining regiments, which would have its full complement of Cavalry, would be short 1 regiment of Infantry, and would have no Field Artillery. If I wish to organize a third division I would have its complement of Cavalry, but no Infantry and no Field Artillery. If this were all done, I would still have left the proportion of Cavalry to make the independent Cavalry division which accompanies a field Army of three Infantry divisions. As it is scarcely possible that if I have to meet any enemy at all worthy of the name I can do anything with assurance of success with less than one complete grand army unit of three or four Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division, I request that my force be completed to that extent."

This is undoubtedly what any such commanding general would say, and he would give very good reasons for it. In other words, he would say that you have given him thoroughly well-trained regimental units, but in such proportion that they can not form properly balanced army units and that the different component arms do not

properly support each other and work efficiently for the general result. The experience of war shows that although it is the infantry as a rule which must decide a battle, it can do little or nothing under present conditions until the way has been prepared for it by the artillery. The same experience shows that both of these arms are gravely handicapped if they are not protected by a sufficient force that can move with the greatest rapidity far out on either flank to meet a corresponding attack by an enemy properly equipped with such a rapidly moving force. An aeroplane scout may inform the commanding general that a force of the enemy's cavalry is rapidly moving around one or the other of his flanks, and in doing this the aeroplane scout will be performing the duties which, until very recent times, would have been done by small bodies of cavalry scouts; but, although the aeroplane scout may give this information much quicker than old-time cavalry scouts would give it, the information will do the commanding general of that side no good unless he has a body of troops that can move rapidly enough to meet the impending attack, of which he is thus informed. For such reasons the normal army organization should be a properly balanced one.

Therefore the War Department sought by the most careful study to find a way by which it could—having in view its other requests involving the expenditure of money—ask for the necessary complete units to form a field army of three or four Infantry divisions, with the corresponding Cavalry division. Here entered one of the factors which, I have already suggested by implication, must be taken into consideration in answering the question as to the relative advantages and disadvantages of increasing the existing number of organizations to their statutory strength. When you ask that question in the abstract—about an army in general—without considering the particular circumstances affecting a particular army, the answer will be “Yes”; but when due weight is given to the circumstances affecting the particular army under consideration the answer may be “No.”

The War Department plan, as well as the plan outlined in the tentative draft before this committee, and the War College division plan, all agree in this one thing; all the elements of those plans revolve about one large central element, as the spokes of a wheel about the hub. They all assume as minor elements a Regular Army and the Organized Militia, but they are none of them well balanced and none of them defensible except on the assumption that the main reliance for a Federal defense must be in a trained body of Federal volunteers, call them continental army, citizen reserve army, or what you please, and none of them means anything except a useless expenditure of money unless the element of the Regular Army provided in it is sufficient to train this as yet untrained citizen or Federal volunteer force. I go further than that and say that so long as the assumption is that the main reliance is on a Federal volunteer force any increase of the Regular Army at home beyond the necessities for the training of such a force, assuming that it is also strong enough to perform the duties mentioned by the Secretary of War in his statement to the committee, is an unjustifiable expenditure.

The main reliance in the training of this volunteer force must be, in addition to such extra officers as may be available for it, on organizations of the Regular Army. If, under normal conditions,

the 50,000 mobile army men contemplated to be in the United States should be available to guide this training I have no personal doubt that they could give satisfactory training to four times their own number in the first year. This allows a good deal of leeway for abnormal conditions which in any given year might divert a part of the Regular Army from this training work. This training of the first annual contingent being given the training of the second will be much facilitated, because the training of raw men is made much easier by their association with other organizations, even if as yet only partially trained. And this condition improves still more in the third year. Thus, I have no doubt of the ability of the Regular Army, if going at the work zealously and in good faith as it doubtless will, to effectively train the contemplated force of Federal volunteers if the latter should be raised; but this is, in my opinion, entirely contingent on the existence of a suitable number of Regular Army organizations.

The War Department calculated that the number of organizations provided in three Infantry divisions, plus one Cavalry division, if they should be authorized by Congress, would provide a sufficient number of company, battalion, and regimental organizations in the United States for the purpose in view. It still adhered to the basic idea that it would be better if these organizations should be at statutory strength, but the War Department could not ignore, under all existing conditions, the question of cost. In adjusting the various elements of its plan it had to trim here and pare there so as to maintain a due proportion of elements and at the same time keep within such limits as gave ground to hope that the entire plan would not have to be rejected on the ground of cost alone. It would have preferred the constituent elements of the three Infantry divisions and the Cavalry division as proposed by it to be at statutory strength, but as it could not do that within its assumed limits of cost, and as it could not abandon a sufficient number of organizations without dealing a fatal blow to the all-essential part of its and other plans—to-wit, the training of a Federal volunteer force—it asked for the full number of the organizations in the above-mentioned number of divisions at the present strength. In other words, it consciously and intentionally accepted one disadvantage rather than to incur a greater and a really fatal one.

There are one or two other particular features in the draft of the bill before the committee that I would like to speak of before the consideration of minor details is taken up. As, I think, is already understood, the War Department has had no intention or desire to present to this committee a draft of a measure cut and dried in all of its details for the purpose of carrying out its recommended policy, but only to submit that recommended policy itself. The War Department realizes that no detailed measure can be worked upon until this question of policy is first of all definitely settled. The policy recommended may be either accepted or accepted with modifications, or rejected and some other policy substituted therefor. Whatever be the policy that is ultimately adopted, the mere fact of its being fixed and determined will conclude pretty much all except minor details of any measure that is drafted to carry it into effect. Therefore, the War Department submitted to the chairman of this committee, and as

I understand, at his suggestion, a tentative draft for such use as might be desired to be made of it in the formulation of any committee measure. This draft suggested the means which, at the time, the War Department considered might well be taken for carrying its policy—should the latter be adopted—into effect, but mainly and essentially it was intended to make clear just what that policy is. As has been already carefully explained, that policy hinges upon the assumption that in the event of the emergency of war the Federal Government may require a trained force of not less than 500,000 men upon which it can rely for its first and important defense without the intervention of any other agency or authority. For the reasons that have already been given to you, it is not believed with sufficient assurance that this force can be obtained either in the form of a regular army or of an organized militia, or of these two forces combined. It is believed to be beyond the pale of consideration that the country will provide a Regular Army of that strength or anything approximating it.

The elements of a military policy must be such as are susceptible of being converted into facts, when the emergency comes, with such a reasonable certainty that military plans can be based thereon. A policy which contemplates the existence, ready for service, at the outbreak of war of a fixed number of men must produce that number of men with reasonable certainty or it is no policy at all. If, therefore, we assume 500,000 men to be the number aimed at, if we further assume that at the outbreak of war there could be made available in the United States approximately 100,000 men by raising to statutory strength the Regular Army, and if we then depended as a part of our definite policy upon the Organized Militia furnishing the remainder of the 500,000, then that Organized Militia must provide 271,000 officers and men in addition to the 129,000 which make up its present strength. It may be that with such aid as the Government may give them the States will raise and maintain and instruct this additional force. I do not know. I have heard nothing but opinions on this subject, and it is a case where one man's opinion is as good as another's, but it is this undoubted and admitted element of uncertainty which makes me reject this force as an essential part of a policy which is intended to provide a number of trained men which shall be definitely known in advance. It may be that other plans will fail and that the people of the United States will find no other recourse left to them but to make their first line for national defense of the the Regular Army and the Organized Militia called into the United States service, but even in that event I see no reason for apprehension that the Organized Militia will in any way be injured or any less able to perform its part should that solution be forced upon us as the only possible one.

Meanwhile the policy of the War Department gives its part, and an important one, to the Organized Militia. I should be surprised if there is not lurking in the back of the mind of everyone here the idea that should war ever come we will need every man now in contemplation, including the National Guard, not only as it is but of whatever strength it may ultimately attain. Either the War Department plan or that outlined in the draft before the committee makes more liberal provision by the Federal Government for the Organized Militia than ever before. I am one of those who hope

and believe that with this support the Organized Militia will not disintegrate under the influence of a Federal volunteer force but that it will be strengthened and improved. In the event of war that Organized Militia will become a part of the volunteer force, will respond to the call like the other volunteers, and the entire force will become one.

The foregoing are the essential elements of the War Department plan as embodied in the tentative draft already referred to as submitted to the chairman of this committee to do with as seemed to him best. One of the details of this measure relates to recommended increases in the Coast Artillery. The Secretary of War has already explained what led him to ask for the particular increase mentioned by him. The personnel of the Coast Artillery which actually mans the guns is divided into companies approximating 105 each in strength with 3 officers. Congress originally fixed the strength of this corps at 170 such companies at a time when the needs of extra continental defenses received little or no consideration, and that number, in fact, was fixed upon as the minimum number then necessary to only partly man the guns in our continental defenses. In carrying out the plan of 1913, already referred to, 52 and possibly even more of these companies man the guns of the extra continental defenses. It seemed right and justifiable, therefore, at this time to ask for the additional 52 companies to replace, as far as practicable, those necessarily sent abroad. In asking for these companies the War Department project asked for the proportionate number of officers to go with them. While the draft which was subsequently submitted to the chairman of this committee was in course of preparation the authorities of the Coast Artillery urged the incorporation in that draft of an idea upon which officers of the Coast Artillery have been practically in accord. This idea was to introduce a principle of elasticity, the desirability of which is recognized in the measure now before you in respect to the Field Artillery and which is even more necessary in the Coast Artillery. But the introduction of this principle of elasticity no more in the one case affects the relative proportion of officers than it does in the other.

I think I can make this plain by asking you to exercise your imagination for a moment and picture to yourselves the actual physical collocation of gun batteries and their emplacements in any one of our harbor defenses, such as San Francisco or Puget Sound or the mouth of the Mississippi River, New York, Boston, Charleston, etc. If you do this you will see in your mind's eye groups of guns of varying calibers, and of mortars, and of varying numbers in these groups and in different locations. Each of these groups has its own different task. Perhaps out on an island there are one or two 16-inch guns. In another place and performing a different function there may be one or more 14-inch guns, elsewhere 12-inch guns, elsewhere mortars, while in every harbor there will be varying groups of small rapid firing guns to sweep the mine fields and prevent interference with this all-important element of the defense. Thus, under the present organization, at one place there may be a third of one of the present companies and at another place the remaining two-thirds of it. One group may require a company,

another a company and a half, another two companies, and so on. The total number of companies in a particular group of harbor defenses remains the same, although the companies may be permanently split up, from the necessities of the case, into lesser parts, but the number of men and officers necessary to operate the guns remains as before. Any coast artilleryman can give you many illustrations of the disadvantages resulting from being tied to a company organization of fixed strength, but I think I have said enough to make the matter clear. The War Department, therefore, desires to introduce the principle of elasticity and make the strength of the organization depend upon the strength of the manning detail for the particular tactical unit or group of guns. This requires the same number of officers and enlisted men in a gun group of harbor defenses as before, but permits of varying the tactical organization to meet the requirements of each case. Both the War Department plan and the one in the draft before the committee increases the privates of the Coast Artillery Corps from nearly 14,000 to nearly 18,000, and both plans provide the proportionate increase in non-commissioned officers and rated men, such as engineers, firemen, electricians, etc. The War Department plan gives also the proportionate number of officers, while the draft before you does not. The increase proposed by the War Department can be immediately utilized in manning guns already in position for which no men are provided. The increase in the draft before you could not be utilized without the necessary number of highly trained scientific officers to direct them in the management of the complicated engines and electrical apparatus, range-finding instruments, and in making the necessary ballastic computations necessary to prevent the costly ammunition, the very cheapest round of which costs hundreds of dollars, from being literally thrown away.

Passing from the consideration of the proper composition, there may be some who give little consideration to the question of the proper proportion of officers and enlisted men in the total increase which is recommended for the Coast Artillery, both by the War Department plan and by that which is before the committee, because their mind is concentrated on the question of whether there should be any increase at all. The first and most obvious warrant for asking the increase is this: The approximate total number of officers and men to furnish one relief of a manning detail for the very costly armament now mounted in the harbor defenses of the United States proper is about 46,000 officers and men. The War Department has never asked you nor proposes to ask the maintenance of this force as a part of the permanent military establishment in time of peace. Some years ago the department entered into negotiations with the seaboard States with a view to getting them to agree to devote such proportion of their Organized Militia for the purpose as would ultimately provide 50 per cent of this one relief of a manning detail for the seacoast guns. This plan was long in various reports communicated to Congress in the hope that ultimately the Government would see its way to providing the other half of this relief of one manning detail. One-half of this manning detail for the guns mounted in the United States calls for, in round numbers, 23,000 men. The total number now authorized is approxi-

mately 13,500. The recommended increase, both in the War Department plan and in the one before the committee, increases this force to approximately 18,000 men—still leaving it about 6,000 short of one-half of one relief of a manning detail. The seaboard States have set apart not more than 50 per cent of their half of this manning detail. Furthermore, you will understand that these seaboard States, whether they provide their one-half of this manning detail or only one-half of that half, provide it in time of peace only for the purpose of a few days' annual instruction at the guns. During all the remainder of the year these guns and emplacements, very expensive in themselves, together with the costly appliances connected with their service, remain under the charge and care of the regular force of about 25 per cent of the number necessary to serve the guns, without relief, for a short time in one action. These guns and their appliances are mounted with the delicacy of instruments of precision. They have cost a great sum of money. Their installation has been a useless expense if they are not to be kept in perfect condition for the emergency for which they have been emplaced. Ordinary sound business principles require that enough men be provided to guarantee that this costly apparatus for defense shall be in condition for active use when required.

This question of a reasonable increase in the force required to man our harbor defenses in time of war—which at no time is expected by the War Department to be maintained at any more than slight Federal expense in time of peace to a greater extent than 50 per cent of one manning detail—is tied up with the general question of the necessarily composite system of coast defense. As you very well know, any coast-defense system comprises three elements—a naval defense, a land coast defense by guns in position, and a mobile defense for the stretches of coast along which it is useless and unnecessary to construct permanent works, unless it should be decided to build a Chinese wall around the entire country. In a small country like Great Britain, with enormous concentrated wealth and a concentrated population, with a comparatively short coast line to be defended, and where for other special reasons an enormous development of naval power has been believed to be necessary, the coast defenses on land become of relatively less importance. Even there the entrances to the vitals of the country, such as the mouth of the Thames River, Portsmouth, and some other places, are so fortified as to enable their naval strength to cut loose from them without apprehension of danger to them and concentrate for operations where that naval strength may be most effective.

Of these three elements that enter into the problem of coast defense, either of the first two, it is conceivable, by the expenditure of unlimited money might be made sufficient without the aid of the other. We may have a navy so strong at all times and at all places that no port or harbor could be entered by an opposing navy nor a landing be effected on any part of the coast under the protection of that foreign navy. Obviously this would require a naval strength of our own at each of many places strong enough to beat off the attack of that concentrated foreign navy. This is impossible and unthinkable. All of the naval power of England, if scattered for the defense of local ports and harbors, would not guarantee her safety against a power of far less strength.

Thus the problem of coast defense is exactly the same as that which confronts a general who has to defend a battle front of 100 miles. He says to himself, "What are the points which, if I do not make special preparations for their defense, are the ones that the enemy is most likely to attack and which, if he gains possession of them, are most likely to be of advantage to him and of disadvantage to me?" Having carefully determined such points, he proceeds to strengthen them as elaborately as his time and means will permit so that he may guarantee, as far as humanly possible, their possession with a relatively small force against a relatively large one. He thus leaves the largest possible part of his force mobile and free to move to any part of his line which may be attacked, but where the attack is impossible to be long foreseen. So in the defense of the coasts we select for permanent defenses those places the possession of which we know in advance will be of the most advantage to an enemy and the loss of which will be the greatest disadvantage to us. These places are the centers of great populations; the centers of our shipping industries, on which the importing and exporting life of the Nation depends; the terminals of great railway systems which bring the exported and imported wealth of the country to and from the seacoast—those places, in short, the possession of which by an enemy will throttle a large part of the life of the Nation and give him quickest access to the vitals of the rest of it. The Navy demands that these places be amply fortified on land, because they know that otherwise the popular clamor for naval defense will be so great that their strength will be frittered away in the impossible task of defending them. On the other hand, being defended with reasonable security by land fortifications, the Navy will be free to concentrate and ward off any threatened attack upon those parts of our coast which can not be defended at any cost by permanent land fortifications. The people most immediately threatened by any possible foreign enemy have a right to demand reasonable protection until they are guaranteed that no such attack is possible. They know that they are not reasonably defended, even by the most elaborate fortifications and guns, which are liable to be noneffective from the lack of even the minimum number of men to care for them in peace and only half in war. They will be justified, then, in demanding through you yourselves the protection, although inadequate, of the naval forces; and even, although the attempt to give such protection leaves open wide stretches of coast for an attack which otherwise could have been easily defended, it is almost certain that the average Government will, under the pressure of popular clamor, yield to such demands and thus nullify the defensive value of its navy, maintained for other legitimate use at great expense. It is for this reason and because the presence of a relatively small force of trained men at these defenses will have an enormous military value in quieting popular apprehension at the first outbreak of possible war that the request for the small increase now asked for is justified.

The War Department project calls for an increase of four regiments in the present number of Field Artillery. It is recognized that this increase is very small, especially in view of the great increase in importance that has been demonstrated abroad in recent months for this arm. The War Department project calls for the accumulation

of the matériel in the way of guns, howitzers, including those of increased caliber, caissons, etc., to completely equip the entire force contemplated should its recommended policy be adopted and carried into effect. But in the way of organizations to be maintained in time of peace it was considered wise to ask for only the number which would complete the organization of one model field army of three divisions and one Cavalry division. Nevertheless, this arm has become so vitally important that any increase that the country is willing to provide beyond the absolute tactical requirements of the peace organization of other arms is exceedingly desirable. Even the number carried in the tentative draft before you is very small from this point of view. It will be none too many for the peace training of citizen reserves, with which I believe training in this arm will become most popular. If the larger part of the number of men contemplated for the so-called continental army could be trained in this branch of the service, it would be most valuable for the country should it ever be confronted with war. The essential difference in section 3 of the tentative draft of a bill before the committee differs from the corresponding proposition of the War Department, aside from the increase by two regiments in the former over the latter, only in the omission in the former of the regimental organization. There is a slight error in both of them, due to a typewriter's error in the last draft of the War Department proposition, which it is not necessary to touch upon until the committee reaches the consideration of details. It is in regard to the regimental organization that I now desire to speak, and I wish to point out how the manifest advantages of the organization contemplated in the draft before you can be retained and at the same time a regimental organization be provided.

The present organization of the Field Artillery is in regiments of two battalions each, with three batteries to the battalion. At the time that organization was adopted the typical gun—which still remains, even with the experience of the war now going on in Europe, the typical gun in all armies for field operations—was the 3-inch gun. This gun, by reason of its mobility, could accompany all troops in the field in all weathers and under all conditions of roads or lack of roads. The heavier pieces of the siege type, such as 4.7-inch and the 6-inch guns and howitzers, which require larger and heavier teams and more carriages, were also provided, but normally would accompany an army in its rear ready to be brought up to meet special and unusual cases requiring heavier projectiles and heavier explosive charges. In the light of recent experience, however, it is proposed to have a certain proportion of these guns immediately accompany the divisions of an army in all of its operations. The three-battery battalion for these guns and howitzers of larger caliber is an unwieldy organization. The War Department plan, therefore, proposed that a certain number of regiments of these heavier guns should be divided into two-battery battalions, still retaining six batteries as the total number for a regiment. I assume that in the preparation of section 3 in the draft of the measure before you this fact was noted and the necessity for it accepted. When, therefore, it was proposed to make 12 regiments of Field Artillery instead of 10, as proposed by the War Department, there may have been uncertainty as to what proportion

of these regiments should be of heavy guns and therefore of two-battery battalions and what proportion should be of the lighter guns and therefore of three-battery battalions. I assume that it is possible that this is the reason why the draft before you provides for the personnel of 12 regiments, but omits any reference to a regimental organization, leaving the President to form two-battery battalions and three-battery battalions, or of other strength, as he may from time to time direct. Whatever be the reason that led to this I believe that the principle of elasticity thus introduced into the Field Artillery organization is a wise one. Nevertheless, it is believed that it will be still wiser if this principle can be retained, together with a regimental organization.

As a result of long study and experience and of the history of warfare, the regimental organization for Field Artillery has been adopted by all countries except England.

In time of peace this organization is necessary for efficient and uniform instruction and for the administration of discipline, supply, and recruitment. The regimental organization also secures the cohesion and morale which are necessary for efficiency in war.

In time of war the regiment continues to be the administrative unit through which the personnel, equipment, supply, and the medical attendance of the batteries are maintained. For tactical purposes the regimental commander receives the division commander's plans and instructions and executes them through proper orders to his battalion commanders. All tactical studies contemplate the use of combatant troops composed of regiments. Superior commanders and their staffs calculate upon the dispositions of regiments of known strength. A departure from this system of Field Artillery would add useless confusion to its administration and employment.

Field Artillery operates with Infantry and Cavalry, and the three arms must constitute a homogeneous force. The requirements for a regimental organization therefore apply to all alike.

Temporary or provisional regiments; that is to say, a more or less haphazard aggregation of batteries, lack the cohesion, morale, co-ordination and efficiency which can only result from the individual responsibility and leadership that pertain to permanency of position in a commander and his staff. A corps organization might easily result in a lot of dispersed battalions in time of peace without any adequate head for their training and their combined action in war.

The organization proposed in the draft before you, while providing all the necessary officers, noncommissioned officers, and other enlisted men necessary to organize regiments, and while apparently contemplating that such an organization may exist, does not safeguard the efficiency of the arm by making the regimental organization mandatory. I therefore recommend that the following be added, after line 4 of page 5, in the draft before the committee:

All the foregoing shall be organized by the President into 12 regiments of Field Artillery, including bands, headquarters companies, and supply companies, and each such regiment shall comprise such number of battalions and batteries as the President may from time to time designate.

These are all the comments that occur to me to make on the general subject matter of the draft before the committee until such time as the committee desires to enter upon the subject of details of organiza-

ion and other such things. But there is a point upon which, with your permission, I desire to speak, because I judge from one or two questions that I have heard asked here some further light upon it may be desirable. I have heard the question asked, "whether the plan proposed by the Secretary of War had been passed upon by the General Staff." It is possible that the mere fact that such a question has been asked may imply a belief that projects submitted by the War Department on certain subjects to Congress must first be considered by it in the light of whether they have been passed upon by the General Staff as a body, and only as a secondary consideration be reviewed here on their merits. I think that a fair judicial attitude of mind requires the conclusion that, while a measure may receive great strength from the indorsement and formal approval of the General Staff body, the fact that such approval may not have been given is not to be regarded as an inherent, essential, or vital defect in such project. It can not be assumed that all of the intelligence of the Army is embodied in the General Staff. It would be a small package to contain a large amount of goods.

The General Staff was created by law to perform certain duties as a part of a larger and more widely embracing establishment, to wit, the War Department. It can not for a moment be assumed that in the performance of the duties assigned to it the General Staff performs them to the exclusion of other and higher controlling authority. It can not be assumed that on various all-important subjects this body was created to take the place of the Secretary of War, and of the President and of Congress. Yet that conclusion is irresistible, unless it be assumed that it is a subordinate body, and that its conclusions, while receiving great weight from its approval, are not mandatory and self-executing, but themselves require the approval of the higher authorities created for that very purpose in any country other than a military autocracy. In fact, we know that even in a military autocracy in which the very type and exemplar of a general staff originated its plans have to be modified to coordinate them with the other interests of government with which a general staff concerns itself but little, and not least of all by the legislature which has to carry those plans into effect. There is no war plan that can be prepared by men whose one sole consideration is what they believe to be military efficiency and to which they therefore sacrifice every other consideration—no such plan can be prepared that does not call for the expenditure of great sums of money. Can anyone maintain that in an orderly government no authority exists, or if it had existed that it has been swept away by the creation of a general staff, which authority shall decide what shall be recommended to the President, leaving him with still further discretion in deciding to what extent he will recommend the plan to Congress? And what part, then, does Congress play in the matter? The terms and spirit of the law show that the General Staff was created as an advisory body to assist the Secretary of War and the President, and only through them as an advisory body to Congress. If you sweep away the power of the Secretary of War and the President to accept or reject or modify the views which they receive from the General Staff, it means nothing but a mandate that they shall accept them without comment and

transmit them to Congress for its action, which, as I have said before, is an unthinkable process even in a military autocracy. What more, in reason, can be expected than to have a Secretary of War do, as in this very case has been done, i. e., to submit to Congress two plans with a very clear and logical and, to my mind, convincing statement as to the respective merits of the two and then leave Congress to do as its wisdom dictates?

Finally, there is one other matter on which I do not think too much light can be thrown—it is a blind subject at the best—with a view to clearing the approaches to the determination of the question, as far as they can be cleared, of what constitutes adequacy in any policy or plan that may be proposed to you. The question has already been asked in this committee, "Do you believe that this or that plan is adequate?" I do not know of any more difficult question to accurately answer. It is not susceptible of mathematical demonstration. It is a matter of opinion, and the most that can be said in advance of the event is that that opinion is probably the soundest which is supported by apparently the soundest reasons. Every day in the war now going on in Europe the lives and limbs of thousands of men are staked, as though on the throw of the dice, on this question. Every day at some place or another the commander of some force, large or small, advances to an attack in the execution of a plan which he must be supposed to believe to be adequate for his ultimate purpose. He determines as accurately as he can the number of his opponents, the strength of their position, the power of their artillery and other adjuncts of the defense, the probable amount of their ammunition, the courage and tenacity of their men as previously demonstrated in his own experience or in that of others communicated to him. With all of these assumptions in mind he gathers what he believes to be the necessary force of his own; he brings up his reserves; he perhaps borrows artillery and reserve ammunition from troops on his right and left. Meanwhile the commander of the defense, with more or less knowledge of what his opponent is contemplating, makes his own assumptions and his corresponding plans. The commanders are of equal intelligence. They are assisted by equally intelligent staffs. Each knows that the lives of his men, his own reputation, possibly the very life of his nation, depends upon the adequacy of his plans. Every human available agency has been employed to guarantee that adequacy. You and I, with the complete foreknowledge of these plans and of the means for executing them, may be unable to pick a flaw in either of them; each plan is apparently perfect. Yet it is a foregone conclusion that the event can not be a draw. Either the attack or the defense must win. And a few hours after the execution of the two plans has begun the event, with its terrible loss to both sides, will prove that one plan was adequate and the other was inadequate.

Whenever, at the present time, you hear a group of men hotly discussing the question as to whether a certain proposed plan for national defense is adequate or inadequate, you will find latent in the mind of each one a different idea as to what the plan is intended to accomplish. Perhaps the plan calls for 500,000 trained men to be available at the end of three years. Another attacks it, and you will

find perhaps that his underlying reason is that he does not believe we can afford to wait three years for such a force. Another who attacks it on the ground of inadequacy does so because he believes a force of 350,000 or 400,000 fully equipped enemy troops may be landed at some point on either of our coasts within 15 days from an unknown initial point of time, and that therefore our proposed force can not be assembled for resistance in time. The one who proposes the plan assumes that such a force would not attempt to leave the enemy's country until our naval force was driven from the seas and that this, even if possible, would require a minimum of six months. One man attacks the plan because he assumes that the enemy can not be held off long enough to permit us to raise and train the great citizen army which he assumes to be necessary for final success; another man defends it because he believes that the enemy, which he assumes, could be held off for a sufficient time for that purpose. One man proposes a plan and maintains its adequacy because he assumes that we will be attacked by only one certain enemy; another attacks it for its inadequacy because he assumes a coalition against us of several powers. One man assumes an attack by a great naval power with a small army, and another assumes an attack by a great military power with a small navy. One man makes a plan believed to be adequate for the defense of an important outlying possession on the assumption that our Navy will arrive within six weeks to drive away the attacking naval force; another assumes that our Navy can not arrive till the lapse of six months and declares the plan inadequate. The best that any nation can do and the most nearly it can come to guaranteeing the adequacy of its plans for defense would be to be prepared to the extent of its ability for any contingency. Nothing but the most rare physical combination of circumstances, as shown in the geographical relation of such a nation to not only its possible but its probable and even almost certain enemies on all sides of it, would justify such a course. Nothing would justify it except the certainty that its very life depends upon it and that it must take its choice between that course or voluntary suicide. As for us, I think that we are justified in accepting the adequacy of any plan, to be carried out in time of peace, which gives reasonable hope that it will hold off whatever enemy we assume as probable and as the most probable long enough for us to organize the resources of the country, after war threatens, to such a degree as will reasonably assure our ultimate success. In other words, it is a plan which confines, as far as possible, the burden of war to the time of war. In such a plan the Regular Army and the Organized Militia and the trained-citizen army will have well, and equally well, performed their part if they loyally work together to bring about this result.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I will ask you to come back to-morrow morning at 10.30, when we will hear you further.

(Whereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until to-morrow, January 13, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.)

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Thursday, January 13, 1916.*

The committee this day met, Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. TASKER H. BLISS, ASSISTANT CHIEF  
OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY—Resumed.**

The CHAIRMAN. General, is there anything else you wish to add to the statement you made on yesterday?

Gen. BLISS. I have nothing to add, Mr. Chairman, except as it may be in reply to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say that the War Department did not recommend an increase of the Field Artillery of more than four regiments because it was thought that four regiments were sufficient to make up a tactical division?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; on the basis of the present table of organization.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you not think it is more important to have men who can fight than to have a tactical organization of the Army? In other words, is it not more important to have a large force of Field Artillery? The history of the present war in Europe has demonstrated that it is absolutely necessary to have the Field Artillery rather than to cut it down, because it does not accord with some tactical organization.

Gen. BLISS. That is true; and that is the reason why I approved that feature of this printed draft, which provides an addition to that of the War Department. The War Department feels that what they have asked for will accomplish the perfection of the tactical divisions, but it is most desirable that we have a reserve, in addition, to meet the very necessity you speak of.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any place in the United States where you can keep the tactical division?

Gen. BLISS. Not as a body, unless we put them in cantonments; that is, in buildings of cheap frame construction.

The CHAIRMAN. If you desire a maneuver division, the department has full authority to order the different arms of the service to any place where such maneuvers could take place, has it not?

Gen. BLISS. Provided the appropriation for transportation is sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. You have the authority if you have the money?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you ordered a division to Texas City you had no trouble in making up the division, did you?

Gen. BLISS. I think I can say, in a general way, no; but I do not know the details exactly, for I did not serve there.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the border?

Gen. BLISS. Every effort was made to complete the tactical units of the division. I think it was accomplished slowly, but eventually, I think, it was done.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in your statement yesterday you gave a very graphic description of the inefficiency of the skeleton commands where you stated the men were drilling with the skeleton commands by imagination, and that you thought it was a very inefficient way.

Now, I understand from that that you believe the best military policy is to have these regiments of the Infantry and of the Cavalry and the Field Artillery at full war strength?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir. The efficiency of the organization very materially depends upon that. I also tried to make clear that the efficiency of the larger organizations depended upon their being grouped properly together, because you might have an army made up of a heterogeneous collection of the most magnificent regiments in the world; nevertheless, that army might be inefficient, although each regiment in itself might be absolutely perfect.

The CHAIRMAN. In the event of war, would not the United States, from a military standpoint, be much better off at the beginning, the inception, of the war with its organizations at full strength than it would be if they were skeletonized?

Gen. BLISS. In so far as those organization went, yes, sir; undoubtedly. I mean, provided you are thinking solely of the efficiency of the regiment and not of that of the division which they compose.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you want men to do the work, instead of having a lot of skeletonized organizations which are inefficient?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir. But when you have to have three men to do a certain amount of work, and the absence of one of them means the death of the other two, I think you ought to have all three, if it is practicable, to do that. If you do not, and you put your Infantry in a critical situation, where it has not a proper force of Artillery to support them, you simply murder them.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. In the event of war, could not the National Guard, if it is trained, as it is proposed to train it, or the continental army, if that is finally to be accepted—would not the organization of those two forces fill up your tactical division?

Gen. BLISS. If they are in sufficient numbers, properly trained.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the purpose you are advocating in the continental army plan?

Gen. BLISS. No, sir; it has not been my purpose to advocate the continental army to fill up either the Regular Army or the Organized Militia when called into the service of the United States. Each of those forces ought to be organized in complete tactical divisions.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about filling up the Organized Militia, I am talking about the organization of those forces filling up the tactical unit.

Gen. BLISS. If we have a sufficient number of regiments in the continental army or militia they could be used to complete the organization of a regular division if it had to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it not be possible, and is it not more desirable that the reserve which may be built up from the Regular Army should be kept to fill vacancies caused by casualties which would occur at the beginning of the war than to have these skeletonized organizations to be filled up by the reserve?

Gen. BLISS. I think so; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. General, a great deal has been said in newspapers and magazines in regard to useless Army posts now in the country. I wish you would state how many Army posts there are for the mobile Army.

Gen. BLISS. I have not the figures here, Mr. Chairman; but I can give you those.

The CHAIRMAN. There are about 69, are there not?

Gen. BLISS. I think about that number.

In answer to this question the following list of mobile army posts in the United States is given. It does not include Coast Artillery posts nor recruit depots, supply depots, arsenals, general hospitals, nor disciplinary barracks.

MOBILE ARMY POSTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Fort Apache, Ariz.	Fort Meade, S. Dak.
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.	Fort Missoula, Mont.
Fort Bliss, Tex.	Fort Myer, Va.
Boise Barracks, Idaho.	Fort Niagara, N. Y.
Fort Brady, Mich.	Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.
Fort Clark, Tex.	Fort Omaha, Nebr.
Fort Crook, Nebr.	Fort Ontario, N. Y.
Fort D. A. Russell, Wyo.	Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y.
Fort Des Moines, Iowa.	Fort Porter, N. Y.
Fort Douglas, Utah.	Presidio of Monterey, Cal.
Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.	Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.
Fort George Wright, Wash.	Fort Riley, Kans.
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.	Fort Robinson, Nebr.
Fort Jay, N. Y.	Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
Fort Lawton, Wash.	Fort Sheridan, Ill.
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.	Fort Sill, Okla.
Fort Lincoln, N. Dak.	Fort Snelling, Minn.
Fort Logan H. Roots, Ark.	Fort Thomas, Ky.
Fort McIntosh, Tex.	Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
Fort Mackenzie, Wyo.	Washington Barracks, D. C.
Fort McPherson, Ga.	Fort Wayne, Mich.
Madison Barracks, N. Y.	Whipple Barracks, Ariz.

(The A. G. O., Jan. 17, 1916.—T. H. B.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are any of those posts useless?

Gen. BLISS. Certainly for the purpose of housing the troops, they are not useless.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking for an increase in the Regular Army. Is there any one of these Army posts you can do away with, if the Army is increased?

Gen. BLISS. I think absolutely none. I think it would be desirable, if we could do so, to get back those which were transferred to other departments of the Government, of which the other departments are not now making any use.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not the law that if an Army post is useless it can be abandoned by the Secretary of War without any action of Congress?

Gen. BLISS. Under the act of July 5, 1884, the President can transfer the land to the Secretary of the Interior.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Congress responsible for the failure of the executive department to abandon any useless post?

Gen. BLISS. Not at all, sir. It can withdraw the garrison, but it must take care of the public property there until the President transfers it to the Interior Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Magazines and newspapers have made it appear that certain Congressmen want these posts retained, and that Congress has the full power over them. Congress has conferred upon the executive department the full power to abandon and turn over to the Department of the Interior any one of those posts when the War Department thinks they are useless.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any post large enough to house a brigade?

Gen. BLISS. There are three that occur to me at this moment—the Presidio, Fort D. A. Russell, and Fort Sam Houston, in Texas.

The CHAIRMAN. They are large enough to house a brigade?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would call those brigade posts?

Gen. BLISS. Ordinarily we would speak of them as brigade posts.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you recall how many regimental posts you have?

Gen. BLISS. Within the United States there are posts each of which accommodates one regiment of Cavalry, and one of them accommodates a regiment of Field Artillery in addition. There is one post which takes a regiment of Field Artillery alone. There are eight posts each of which accommodates a full regiment of Infantry; that is to say, there are 17 posts each of which can take care of a full regiment and one of these can take two regiments.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am trying to get at is this: It has been stated that it is not well to have these organizations at full strength, because they would have to be separated. In other words, you could not keep all of them together; that is, if you have a regiment you could not keep it all at one post. Is it not a fact, now, that you can not keep them all at one post?

Gen. BLISS. In a great many cases they have to be divided. That is on account of antecedent local military reasons, which resulted in the construction of a large number of small posts—too small for a regiment.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated yesterday that the Field Artillery organization proposed in this printed bill was approved by you, with the exception that you desire Congress to make it mandatory to have the regimental organization?

Gen. BLISS. The regimental organization within the provisions of this provision.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Does not the provision as it is drawn give to the President power to do that?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; unquestionably.

The CHAIRMAN. Can Congress do any more than to give into the hands of the experts of the War Department the power to organize this Field Artillery in any way the experts in that department may deem best?

Gen. BLISS. I made that suggestion yesterday after conference with all of the Field Artillery officers in this vicinity with whom I could talk, and their idea was—they are so wrapped up in the development of the efficiency of their arm that they were afraid that the result of that might be that we would simply have a scattered collection of battalions, to the great detriment of the efficiency and discipline of

the organization. I made the recommendation also with the full belief that there would be no objection to it, because it maintained the very feature that was in the printed draft. The fear is that some administration of the War Department might detach the colonels for other duty and then say that it lacks the personnel to organize regiments. I think the regimental organization should be mandatory, but with power for the President to fix their batteries and battalions as he finds best in each case.

The CHAIRMAN. General, the fighting unit of the Field Artillery is what; is it a battalion?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; in the same sense that the battalion is the fighting unit of the Infantry and the squadron is the fighting unit of Cavalry. The regimental organization is largely for the purpose of cheaper and more efficient administration, as well as to have better tactical handling of these fighting units in their use in an actual combat.

The CHAIRMAN. If, as I understand what you intend doing, you propose to make the Coast Artillery mobile to a certain extent, why not organize the Coast Artillery into a regimental organization as well as the Field Artillery?

Gen. BLISS. If it were not for the fact that the organization of the Coast Artillery is absolutely determined by the collocation of the various guns in the coast defenses, I would not see any special objection to it; but if, habitually in time of war, the Field Artillery would operate by regiments, as is the case in every warring country to-day except in England, it is hardly conceivable that there would be any operations on any considerable scale in which a less group than the present number of batteries in a regiment would be handled together. By handling them in that way you get much greater efficiency in the discipline and instruction and get much better administration of the various groups by centering the responsibility for the efficiency of each group.

The CHAIRMAN. General will you state what the peace strength of a company of Infantry is? It is 65, is it not?

Gen. BLISS. We keep it at 65.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the war strength of a company of Infantry?

Gen. BLISS. Under the limit of the authorization it would be 150, approximately. I think possibly it may be 148.

The CHAIRMAN. It is proposed in the bill to increase that number and to make the war strength of a regiment 1,930, instead of 1,836.

Gen. BLISS. That is because in recent years, in the development of the efficiency in these regiments, there have been organized these companies which have been called provisional companies, a headquarters company, a supply company, and in the Infantry and Cavalry a machine-gun company. They have been made up by subtracting from the present authorized strength of the regiment the number of men necessary to enable the company to perform those functions.

Now the purpose is to restore to the ranks of the regiment the number of men thus taken away and still leave these men available for the extra companies. It is legalizing what heretofore have been simply provisional companies.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes an increase in the number of men in a regiment to 1,930?

Gen. BLISS. Whatever is enough to make up the difference; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many guns do you think there should be in the machine-gun companies?

Gen. BLISS. The original number was two, but it was thought that the number should be raised to four. I think, with the present number of men in the regiment, that number may be sufficient. We allow one extra gun without any additional men or packs to replace a gun that may jam in action, to have the latter quickly replaced while it is being put in condition. If you have larger regiments, as many nations abroad do, eight would be none too many.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think it would be better if we had six, with the strength we have?

Gen. BLISS. I am a great believer in the machine gun; and that being so, I should say yes. Whatever number there may be with a regiment, there should be great numbers in reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the peace strength of a Cavalry company?

Gen. BLISS. The peace strength of a Cavalry company is 71.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the war strength?

Gen. BLISS. The statutory strength is 100.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the peace strength of a company of Field Artillery?

Gen. BLISS. That is about 133. It varies above that number with the varying kinds of Field Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the war strength of a company of Field Artillery?

Gen. BLISS. That is something over 170.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 179, I think.

Gen. BLISS. I believe it is.

The CHAIRMAN. General, what information or experience has the War Department, or have you, which would lead you to believe you could enlist 133,000 men a year in the continental army?

Gen. BLISS. Of course, no one has had any experience in the matter, for it is an absolutely new proposition, but I have a firm belief that we could do that.

I have seen a letter from an ex-Cabinet officer—and I think that he was an ex-Cabinet officer belonging to the political party of the present administration—in which he said he was trying to arrange his business in the belief that some measure would be adopted so that he could perform his duty by going in as private for two months during the summer. I understand that the Assistant Secretary of War yesterday told the committee that he had information from a gentleman he knew that there were 2,500 men that that gentleman knew of in the city of Boston who would go into such an organization. Another gentleman of very high position in New York City told me he had not the faintest doubt but that he could lay his hand immediately on 10,000 men in the city of New York who would do that, and I am firmly convinced that if such a proposition were to be adopted, believing that it would be a reasonable one, if the gentlemen sitting around this table and other gentlemen in Congress generally and officials of the Government generally, whose ambition I should think would be to carry out and make a full and complete test of a

policy adopted by the Government, were to explain it and to preach it to the people in whom they are interested, as they explain and preach many other things, I personally have no doubt at all that there are enough people now in the United States who do not respond to the opportunity given them to become professional soldiers and who do not respond to the opportunity given to them to go into the National Guard, who will go into this organization.

The CHAIRMAN. General, would you mind telling us who the gentleman in New York was who told you he could lay his hand on 10,000 men who would go into such an organization?

Gen. BLISS. I would not like to say who he is without his permission. You know the gentleman, and I believe he has had various interviews with you in recent weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not remember any gentleman giving me that information.

Gen. BLISS. I do not doubt that he would have no hesitation in authorizing me to use his name, but I would not care to use it without his consent.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not want you to do that.

Mr. DENT. General, along that line, the Assistant Secretary stated the other day there were 1,800 civilians who were trained at the Plattsburgh camp last summer.

Gen. BLISS. I think that is true. There were two camps at Plattsburgh.

Mr. DENT. How long did that camp last?

Gen. BLISS. Those men were trained about one month; not more than that.

Mr. DENT. Do you mean by that there were 900 in each camp?

Gen. BLISS. I do not know just what the number was at each camp. I know that the first camp was crowded and that there were many men who wanted to go for whom we could not provide the facilities.

Mr. DENT. Do you know from what locality those men came who were at the Plattsburgh camp?

Gen. BLISS. I have never seen the figures. I have no doubt the great majority of them came from what you call the East—New York and New England—but I have been told that there were men from as far south as South Carolina who were at the Plattsburgh camp.

Mr. DENT. They were drawn from various sections of the country?

Gen. BLISS. They came from various sections of the country. It was purely voluntary. They were taken as they applied and as we had the opportunity to take care of them.

Mr. DENT. They were principally from New York and New England?

Gen. BLISS. I assume in that particular camp the majority of them came from that section. I do not know exactly about that.

Mr. DENT. That, as I understand it, is the only practical experience the War Department has ever had which led to its idea of adopting this continental-army scheme?

Gen. BLISS. That did not lead to the adoption of the continental-army scheme. We had some experience with camps in Chicago and in San Francisco, and we had also some camps in Oregon, and we turned down many applications because we could not provide the

officers for their instruction. I know there was at least one request for a camp in the South and at least one for another in Ohio.

Mr. DENT. Where was the one in the South?

Gen. BLISS. I think it was in Georgia, but I am not certain. I believe that Gen. Wood is preparing to have one at Fort Oglethorpe to meet the demand in that section.

Mr. DENT. General, it has been suggested to me that the camp in the South was at Aiken, S. C.

Gen. BLISS. It may have been.

Mr. DENT. Do you know how many men were there?

Gen. BLISS. I do not think we had a camp there. Those camps have been purely volunteer evidences of the military zeal on the part of local commanders. They did not originate in the War Department, and we have no official knowledge of them except as reports have been called for.

Mr. DENT. General, will you give the committee, in round numbers, the total strength of the army to-day, exclusive of the men in the Quartermaster and Hospital Corps?

Gen. BLISS. Those men that by law are not included in the authorized strength, and excluding the Philippine Scouts, my impression is that the total number is in the vicinity of 87,000 men. The Adjutant General's last report shows that the exact number is 86,937 men, and including all of the men excluded from that number, together with the Philippine Scouts, would make about 103,000 men.

Mr. DENT. If we should adopt the recommendation of the Secretary of War as to the increase of the Regular Establishment, what would the strength of the Army be?

Gen. BLISS. The total number of officers and men would be 141,000.

Mr. DENT. So that you really propose to increase the Regular Establishment about 35,000 men?

Gen. BLISS. Whatever the difference is.

Mr. FIELDS. General, as a general proposition, which do you consider the greatest arm of the country's defense, the Navy, the Coast Artillery, or the Mobile Army?

Gen. BLISS. That is very much like the ancient fable which represented a quarrel between the parts of the human body as to which was the most important part, the heart or the lungs or the brain. They can not get along without all of them in mutual coordination. That is necessary for the existence of all of them.

I tried to point out yesterday in regard to those first two elements of defense you speak of—the Navy and the Coast Artillery—the fact that the expenditure of an almost unlimited sum of money would make either of them sufficient for the protection of the country against foreign invasion. But it is inconceivable to me that such a course would be taken. You can build a Chinese wall around us and line it with 16-inch guns; build that sort of an obstruction all around the country, and possibly in that way do away with the Navy, if that is the only thing that is being aimed at in national defense; or you can build a Navy that will stretch around the country, and possibly do it in that way, too; but it is the proper coordination of these forces that would give you an impregnable defense, which an unlimited expenditure of money for one of them alone could hardly do.

**Mr. FIELDS.** In your opinion, General, it would work for efficiency if the increase in one arm were equaled by proportionate increase in the other two?

**Gen. BLISS.** Not necessarily; an increase in one might better enable the other two, as they stand, to properly perform their functions.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** Now, if we enact into law this provision of the bill about a continental army, what effect do you think it will have upon the National Guard in the various States?

**Gen. BLISS.** As I said yesterday, I am one of those who believe it will have no deleterious effect upon the National Guard. I see no reason why it should, with the increased aid that all the measures that have been suggested propose, on the part of the Federal Government, for the maintenance and increase of efficiency of the National Guard.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** If it were to have the effect of disorganizing and disbanding the National Guard, would you still favor it?

**Gen. BLISS.** I most certainly would not allow anything to interfere with the accomplishment of the essential object of the military policy that has been suggested to you—that is, to secure a fixed, definite, determinate number of trained men, absolutely and at all times under the control of the Federal Government for the purpose of Federal defense.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** Do you think this continental army would have that effect?

**Gen. BLISS.** No; I do not think so at all. I do not believe it would have that effect.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** It would have the effect of giving the Government a trained force of men under the control of the National Government?

**Gen. BLISS.** Yes, sir; I think it would.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** You would be in favor of this scheme, regardless of its effect upon the State Militia or National Guard?

**Gen. BLISS.** I have already stated that I can not allow myself to use the word "regardless," because I thoroughly believe that it will not result in the disintegration or disorganization of the National Guard or the deterioration of the National Guard.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** If it should have that effect, General—if you should be mistaken about that and it should have that effect—you still think it would be wise to enact this provision, as I understand you, believing it is the best thing for the Army?

**Gen. BLISS.** Not the best thing for the Army. The best thing for the country.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** The best thing for the country, then?

**Gen. BLISS.** Yes; and, as I say, with the limit added which I have mentioned, that being the only way to secure an absolutely Federal force for Federal purposes.

**Mr. MCKELLAR.** General, has the War Department any assurance, by having had offers from men to enlist—any considerable number? You spoke of a distinguished ex-Secretary of War having said that he would join this organization. I believe I saw in one of the newspapers an announcement that my splendid friend, Gen. Dickinson, of Tennessee, was willing to enlist in such a continental army as a private, and for that I think he deserves great credit. He is a splendid man. He is a little old now, because I think he served in the Confederate Army. But he is a splendid man.

Has the War Department any assurance from any considerable number of men that they would volunteer to enlist in the continental army under the plan that is proposed by this bill, if the provision of this bill were to be enacted into law?

Gen. BLISS. No effort has been made or could be made to secure any such assurances, in the absence of the adoption of the policy.

Mr. MCKELLAR. If there were many men who desired to enlist in such an army under such a plan, do you not think they would have signified their willingness to do so?

Gen. BLISS. I see no reason why they should.

Mr. QUIN. General, I would like to know something about the number of people in the United States that have some military training. Can you put in the hearings approximately the number of men between 16 years and 45 years of age that have had some kind of military training—six months, two, three, or four years? I am a member of this committee. I had four years' training, and no doubt there are hundreds of thousands of such men in the United States. Could you put those figures in the record?

Gen. BLISS. I think I could make a satisfactory answer to that in the hearings, but I could not give you the answer now.

Mr. QUIN. Would you be kind enough to do that for us?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The following statement in answer to the foregoing question is prepared from data furnished me by the Army War College:)

No data are available from which an accurate estimate can be made of the number of men between the ages of 16 and 45 years now in the country who have had some military training; therefore, the following figures should be regarded as only approximately correct and considered in the light of the following more or less arbitrary assumptions upon which they are based, namely:

- (a) That the average age of enlisted men at date of discharge was 29 years.
- (b) That 50 per cent of the men discharged from the Regular Army reenlist therein (data informally obtained from The Adjutant General).
- (c) That the average age of students at date of graduation from schools and colleges was 21 years.
- (d) That the deaths among the numbers of men who have had military training has averaged approximately 1 per cent per year.

Number of men who received some training during the War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection, Apr. 21, 1898, to Jan. 4, 1902 (data from brochure now being prepared by

Maj. R. H. Van Deman, General Staff):

In Regular Army	144, 849
In the volunteers of 1898	223, 235
In the volunteers of 1899	13, 447
Total	381, 531
Estimated deaths	57, 229
	324, 302

Number of men who received training in the Regular Army and who, upon discharge therefrom, did not re-enlist therein (annual reports of The Adjutant General and The Military Secretary for the corresponding years):

In the year ending June 30, 1903	6, 638
Estimated deaths	796
In year ending June 30, 1904	8, 296
Estimated deaths	912
In year ending June 30, 1905	11, 127
Estimated deaths	1, 112
	10, 015

## Number of men who received training in the Regular Army, etc.—Continued.

In year ending June 30, 1906	4,974
Estimated deaths	447
	4,527
In year ending June 30, 1907	6,838
Estimated deaths	546
	6,292
In year ending June 30, 1908	9,242
Estimated deaths	646
	8,596
In year ending June 30, 1909	6,451
Estimated deaths	386
	6,065
In year ending June 30, 1910	5,955
Estimated deaths	297
	5,658
In year ending June 30, 1911	13,521
Estimated deaths	540
	12,981
In year ending June 30, 1912	10,593
Estimated deaths	317
	10,276
In year ending June 30, 1913	6,047
Estimated deaths	120
	5,927
In year ending June 30, 1914	12,513
Estimated deaths	125
	12,388
In year ending June 30, 1915	13,510
	109,461

Number of men who have received some training in and been discharged from the Organized Militia during the period 1901 to 1915, inclusive (estimated from data informally obtained from the office of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs) -----

743,505  
50,000

Estimated deaths -----

\*693,417

(\*NOTE.—Of the 693,417 men discharged from the Organized Militia and estimated as being still alive, about 231,139 were discharged at expiration of term of enlistment, and the balance, about 462,278, were discharged prior to expiration of term of enlistment.)

Actual strength of the Organized Militia, Oct. 1, 1915  
(p. 5, Annual Report of the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, 1915) -----

129,398

822,815

Number of students who have had some military training at educational institutions at which officers of the Army were detailed as professors of military science and tactics during the period 1900 to 1915, inclusive -----

180,526

Estimated deaths -----

11,107

109,419

Actual strength of the Regular Army stationed within the continental limits of the United States June 30, 1915  
(annual report of The Adjutant General, 1915) -----

68,258

Grand total -----

1,494,255

The amount of military training which these 1,494,255 men have had varies from that received during several complete enlistments in the Regular Army to the limited instruction possible during one day's service in the Organized Militia or with a cadet organization at a civil educational institution. Furthermore, except as stated in the following paragraph, the Government has no knowledge of the present addresses of these men or of the number that would be willing to volunteer for service in time of war.

Of the total number of men between the ages of 16 and 45 years given above as having had some military training, only the following are known to be in the country at this time, and there are absolutely no data available relative to the whereabouts of the balance:

Regular Army stationed at home	68,258
Organized Militia	129,398
Listed graduates of military schools and colleges, about	1,100
Students now undergoing instruction in educational institutions at which officers of the Army are detailed	32,313
Total	231,069

(T. H. B.)

**Mr. SHALLENBERGER.** I listened to the chairman's questions as to which plan we should apply in regard to the enlistment of the men of the country, whether we shall bring it to war strength or peace strength. I gathered that you rather favored, as a matter of efficiency, that the company should be kept to war strength, so that in case we should go into war you would have a full company, or regiment, carrying out the different tactical divisions of men who are trained together.

Gen. BLISS. That, as I tried to make clear in my statement yesterday, is coupled with this: As I have said over and over again, the efficiency of an individual organization—a company, a battalion, or a regiment—would unquestionably be greatly increased by having it at full statutory strength, but the efficiency of the group of organizations in which that regiment would be incorporated may be absolutely nil if they are not properly balanced. Therefore I have no hesitation in saying that as to the proposition to have three Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division—that is to say, the normal Army unit complete in all its parts at the peace strength—I would rather have that than to make the present organization an improperly balanced one at war strength. But when you ask the question whether an organization is more efficient at war strength than peace strength, I say that the organization unquestionably is better in every respect if it can be kept at full statutory strength. But I am talking of the use that could be made in the first instant of time in an emergency when grouped together to perform their proper functions.

**Mr. SHALLENBERGER.** The next question is this: I gathered from Secretary Garrison that it had been the expressed opinion of many Army officers that because of our small number of trained regulars at the beginning of the Civil War that many of them thought that they would have done better if we had simply divided these regiments up among the volunteers and not attempted to hold them together as tactical units. On that line I would like to have your opinion on this: Would it be practicable, maintaining the companies and regiments at war strength as you have indicated, in case of war would it be possible to divide those companies and regiments up into about the number of men they carry now at peace strength and fill those gaps up then with the new recruits to make a fighting force? Or would it be a better policy to keep these regiments intact as they are and organize behind them this trained force of new recruits? In other words, which would make the better fighting force?

My idea is this, to get your opinion of a company or regiment made up of half-trained soldiers and half recruits, or to have the

first line of trained men, all men being trained with officers, and all recruits in the rear. Which would make the better fighting force?

Gen. BLISS. I think the latter, if you could have all of the units properly trained and filled up, even though the total force, of course, would be comparatively small. My own opinion is we would be far safer by retaining such a force intact—

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Than to attempt to divide them?

Gen. BLISS. And let it do its work in securing time for the country to train or complete the training of those who are not immediately ready to go into the field.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How many divisions of Infantry do we now maintain?

Gen. BLISS. We do not maintain them as divisions, but we would, if the plan of 1913 be carried into effect (which is very largely done, but not completely), we would have enough Infantry scattered throughout the United States, if grouped together, to make two Infantry divisions, minus one regiment—minus practically one regiment.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Would the companies and regiments be up to full war strength at that?

Gen. BLISS. No, sir; but we would have the organizations.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. About how many men would that make to a division? You said that would be something like 80,000 I understood.

Gen. BLISS. Well, the war strength of a division is, in round numbers, 23,000 men. The Infantry at peace strength would be somewhat less than one-half of that. The Cavalry at peace strength would be about one-fourth less, and the Field Artillery, I should say, would be one-fifth less.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Taking the number of troops that I understand are now enrolled, I could not exactly arrive at the figures of only three Infantry divisions being capable of being formed at half strength from that number of soldiers.

Gen. BLISS. I was speaking of the number of Infantry regiments that we would have in the United States. If you refer to the entire Army, we have 30 regiments, plus the Porto Rico regiment, which makes 31 regiments. The organization of an Infantry division calls for 9 regiments. If the division is at peace strength the regiments that compose it would be at peace strength. All the Infantry regiments together would be a little more than enough for three Infantry divisions.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. How many regiment of Field Artillery?

Gen. BLISS. We have six.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And of Cavalry we have 10?

Gen. BLISS. We have 15.

Mr. CALDWELL. You said that you did not think that the formation of the continental army would destroy or affect the National Guard. Did I understand you right?

Gen. BLISS. I said I hoped and believed it would not. I see no necessity for any other belief.

Mr. CALDWELL. Let us reason it out a little bit, if you will. You do not get the full quota of the National Guard strength authorized by law now, do you? I understood the Secretary to say when he was

here before the committee on the first day that the National Guard had reached its full strength, that they could not get as many as were authorized by law, and that they did not have any hope of increasing the National Guard.

Secretary GARRISON. I said nothing about being authorized by law. I have no way of knowing what all the States authorize by law.

Mr. CALDWELL. You said you thought they had as many as they could get.

Secretary GARRISON. I said I thought they had reached the end of their recruitable strength. I have never looked at the respective State laws to find out how many they authorize.

Mr. CALDWELL. The reasons undoubtedly why they can not get any more men are because the conditions do not attract the men to come to it, and if you organize a continental army you must therefore make the conditions better to attract them to it.

Gen. BLISS. It appeals to men under different conditions. I have been told by almost every militia officer I have talked with that the great thing that limits the recruitment of the militia—one great thing is the fact that from the highest to the lowest grades of so-called working men they have extracted all that are willing to go into the militia. It is on account of the relations or the fear of the use of State militia in the suppression of riots and in labor troubles. That is what puts a stop to it.

In the Federal militia the Federal volunteers are not contemplated to be used for any such purpose, and those men who otherwise would be willing to have military training, who do not go into the National Guard by reason of that limitation, would go into this organization.

Mr. CALDWELL. Under the present plan, as I understand it, it would give permission to those in the National Guard who wanted to come over to the continental army to come in a body. If the use of the National Guard in strikes prevents men from coming in, would it not tend to make the National Guard come over in a body—that is, in sufficient numbers to break up the National Guard?

Gen. BLISS. I do not think they could come over in a body, as I understand it, without the consent of their States, and I suppose the States may want to retain them.

Mr. CALDWELL. But when the period of enlistment was up they could not retain them any longer after that?

Gen. BLISS. Of course, individually, they could do as they pleased.

Mr. CALDWELL. The idea that is in my mind—understand I am not antagonistic and have not made up my mind on the plan—but in the State of New York they have millions and millions of dollars that are provided by the State for the purpose of housing and taking care of the State militia. If a plan is developed here that would tend to take the men who are interested in the State militia and carry them out of that and put them in a national organization, what would become of our investment; what would become of our State organization; what would become of our State bodies, which practically are State institutions? That is the thing that is before us, and if you could give us some light on that I would appreciate it.

Gen. BLISS. As it is all problematical, it is difficult to throw any light on it. I think it is the very fact of the existence of those

millions of dollars spent for your armories and other conveniences which goes a long way toward keeping the National Guard as it is. I am very certain that a large proportion of the men who are in the National Guard would not go into it were it not for the fact that the State provides all these facilities and conveniences which are not contemplated to be provided by the Federal Government for the so-called continental army. I know militiamen intimately from one end of the country to the other, and I do not know any body of men that I respect or admire more highly or in which I have more friends, but I think that they go into the National Guard for a good many reasons besides the mere desire to take a gun and drill with it.

Mr. KAHN. General, how many regiments have they in the United States or our possessions to-day that are at full war strength?

Gen. BLISS. An effort is made to keep the Infantry and Cavalry regiments in the Philippine Islands—you may remember that the number of regiments that were kept over there was reduced, but of those that were left an effort has been made to keep them at the highest strength that is authorized within the limits of the appropriation—and a part of the command in the Canal Zone, and, I am not certain, but I think a part of the troops on the island of Hawaii.

Mr. KAHN. Do you know how many regiments, all told, that may be?

Gen. BLISS. In Panama there are three regiments of Infantry. In the Hawaiian Islands, three regiments of Infantry; in the Philippines and China, four regiments of Infantry. And in the Hawaiian Islands one regiment of Field Artillery and in the Philippines one regiment of Field Artillery. The Coast Artillery, of course, is always at statutory strength wherever it is. I can not give you at this moment exactly what part of those are not kept at the strength that the appropriations will permit, but most of them are.

Mr. KAHN. You have none at statutory strength, then, in the continental United States?

Gen. BLISS. No, sir.

Secretary GARRISON. We have one that we brought back from the Philippines.

Mr. KAHN. Yes; they are in San Francisco temporarily.

General, you are familiar with the French system that was spoken of by Gen. Scott the other day. That is, they have skeleton regiments similar to the organizations that we have had, and in time of war they consolidate the regiments and then bring them up to full war strength. In this country, taking into consideration the sentiment of the people and our condition, do you think it would be better to keep on organizing skeleton regiments, with a view of having reserve officers, who could drill recruits in time of war, rather than filling the regiments in time of peace to full statutory strength?

Gen. BLISS. In regard to what you first said, of course you must bear in mind that in France, or in any of those large military nations abroad with great concentrated population, these so-called skeleton regiments, which would compare with ours at the rate of perhaps 150 or 160 men, where we would have 65, are grouped together by thousands in every town and city of any consequence, and, consequently, wherever they are, they are able to combine these to any extent and drill. But it is nonsense to talk about combining our battalions at half strength and making a war-strength battalion, and

our regiments at half strength and making a war-strength regiment, when they are scattered as many miles apart as they are.

Mr. KAHN. In case of war you would immediately mobilize at given points, wouldn't you?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. And then the regiments that are scattered would come to a central point?

Gen. BLISS. In regard to the second part of your question, I say, as I said before, that if whatever force you give is composed of the proper number of units to make the proper army unit, I should say give it full strength if you can afford to do it. But if you can not, I would rather have the number of organizations to make that expandable army unit at so-called peace strength; and that partly for the very reason I gave you, and, secondly, for the necessity of getting the number of organizations and number of officers available for training purposes, with whatever force of Federal volunteers may be provided.

Mr. KAHN. You would not want the officers for Federal volunteers alone, would you?

Gen. BLISS. No, sir. I mentioned that as a particular point, because that matter of Federal volunteers is the one we are all worrying about.

Mr. KAHN. In case of war, one of our difficulties heretofore has been that we have not had the proper number of officers. That has been one of our difficulties, has it not; trained officers?

Gen. BLISS. In time of war, when the officers that are detached go back to their commands, we have got as many officers as the command calls for. The great crying need in time of war has been that we haven't got enough organizations for the officers to go with, either Regular Army, National Guard, or from any other source.

Mr. KAHN. Then you really have had more officers than you actually needed?

Gen. BLISS. I do not see how you draw that conclusion.

Mr. KAHN. Well, from your answer. I understood you to say that in time of war you had a place for all the officers, that you brought in the men who are detached and put them into the regiments, and in that way you found a place for all the officers that you require. I understood you to say that.

Gen. BLISS. For time of war; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, the force then actually existing?

Gen. BLISS. That is all I am talking about; yes, sir. Of course, we have not got enough officers, if that is the object of the question. We have not got enough officers to officer the indefinite forces we would have to have in time of war.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think it is essential we should have in this country a good corps of officers who could be utilized for drilling the new recruits as they are called out by the President?

Gen. BLISS. Drilling and commanding them, and doing everything an officer has to do with the troops in the field.

Mr. KAHN. I understood you to say that by skeletonizing the regiment it would give you a greater number of officers.

Gen. BLISS. No, sir; I do not mean that. It would not give us a single additional officer under this plan of increasing the Army to

statutory strength proposed in the draft before you, if it should be carried into effect, and if at the same time you give the other feature of a continental army. The mere necessity to prevent the Regular Army at full strength from becoming a mob—a force of people dangerous to the community, I might almost be justified in saying—is going to require all its officers with it. Consequently, we can not detach those officers. But if you give us those organizations at peace strength, with the number of men requiring less attention, greater numbers of officers with those organizations could be diverted temporarily to some other peace purpose. That is all I mean by extra officers obtained in that way.

Mr. KAHN. You explained the situation in France, the nearness of the various recruits, and all that sort of thing, and you thought in this country we could not put two regiments or three regiments—throw them into one. In time of war do you not think that is possible?

Gen. BLISS. In time of war; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. You said that our division consists of about 33,000 men.

Gen. BLISS. 23,000 at full strength.

Mr. KAHN. A division in the United States. At the outbreak of hostilities in Europe I read many accounts to the effect that their division consists of 40,000 men. In what respect does their organization differ from ours so as to make such an enormous increase in the number of men in a division?

Gen. BLISS. That I do not recall, and I could not tell you without tables of organization of foreign services in front of me. They differ in all countries. It may be you are speaking of the corps organization instead of division. I do not know. Some foreign armies retain the corps which is made up of groups of smaller divisions than we have. Under our present organization the division takes the place of the old army corps.

Mr. KAHN. How many men were in the army corps?

Gen. BLISS. That was an entirely variable number. We never had the organization except in time of war, and it varied according to the necessities of the campaign.

Mr. KAHN. You were speaking about 2,500 men that would probably promptly come forward in the continental army in Boston and 10,000 in New York. Have you any idea as to what the ages of those men would be?

Gen. BLISS. No, sir; I made a reference to that solely to illustrate what I believe to be the underlying spirit of a great number of people in the United States, which gives me ground for belief that the requisite number of men of military age would come forward.

Mr. KAHN. Of the 2,000 men that you trained at Plattsburg, a very large percentage of them would be upward of 30 years of age, would they not?

Gen. BLISS. I do not know what the ages are, but I assume a good many of them might have been.

Mr. KAHN. To make such a force as you contemplate in the continental army a real effective force, will you not have to have young men from 18 to 27 years of age, largely?

Gen. BLISS. It would be most desirable to obtain the younger classes of men; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. To make it effective, would it not be absolutely necessary to do that? To make it an effective force in time of war?

Gen. BLISS. From what point of view, Mr. Kahn?

Mr. KAHN. Well, campaigning.

Gen. BLISS. You mean their physical ability to withstand the stress of the campaign?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Gen. BLISS. That has been a very much disputed point as to the best age, the age at which a man's physical powers are most resisting, and whilst, of course, all volunteers, especially volunteer armies, under the enthusiasm of war are made up of comparatively young men, I think that men in the vicinity of 30 years of age are the ones that endure the strain and stress of a campaign better than the younger ones. It is a matter, however, of medical statistics, which I could not give you.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, the statistics of the Civil War—

Gen. BLISS. But it is most desirable, if that be the object of the question, that this continental army should be composed of young men of the early age which you speak of. They have a longer period of availability ahead of them, and the amount of money you spend in training them is an asset available for a longer period of time.

Mr. KAHN. The historians have all said that the wars of the world have been fought by the young men.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; the old adage is, "Young men for war."

Mr. KAHN. You have no idea that the wars of the future will be fought by old men?

Gen. BLISS. I fancy there is one going on now that is being fought by a good many old men. It did not begin with them, however.

Mr. KAHN. As I understand it, even with calling out the Landsturm and the Landwher there is still a good many young men who are doing the severe fighting at the front?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. General, do you think that would be an asset to the United States, to cut down the period of enlistment from four years to two years, and thus turn out as many trained men as you can every year?

Gen. BLISS. With our present small Army I am inclined to doubt it. I think so long as the Army is maintained as small as it is it should be as perfect a model always as it can possibly be, and I think that the resulting gain in an unreliable force of reserves you would get in that way would not compensate for the disadvantage of lowering the standard. The Army as it stands is an exemplar and a model, a standard of comparison as to what we would like all of our trained men to be.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think that the American young man is any less capable than the German young man, or the French young man, or the Russian young man, or the Japanese young man?

Gen. BLISS. Not in the least.

Mr. KAHN. He is just as capable, is he not?

Gen. BLISS. Exactly.

Mr. KAHN. And yet two years' training is the maximum in Germany.

Gen. BLISS. Exactly. They train them for the purpose of turning them out and building up millions of reserves, and they do it

by keeping a standing army of something like 800,000 men on foot. Otherwise they would not be able to do it. I would be the first to agree that at the end possibly of the first year of hard training the soldier is as good as he is likely to be. I still say it is desirable to keep him for two or three more years in order to maintain this institution as a perfect model, rather than to—

Mr. KAHN. Do you think it can be maintained as a perfect model, and do you not think it will be a more efficient model if you keep the officers busy constantly in training young men and turning them out and letting new ones take their places every two years?

Gen. BLISS. I think the officers have plenty to do right at this moment, with the many things that our organization requires them to do, besides the training, as you speak of it, of individual men.

Mr. KAHN. They would not be training them as individual men. They would be training them in their organizations. This war in Europe at the very beginning was fought by men who had had two years' training in Germany and three years' training in France, was it not?

Gen. BLISS. Unquestionably the men can be trained in that time. I would not put it at two years as necessary to train them, and if the object of maintaining the Regular Army is to maintain a reserve, that is what you have to do—take them for short periods, train them hard, and turn them out.

Mr. KAHN. I had in mind a condition that prevailed in this country during the Civil War, when our volunteers failed to respond to the colors upon the call of the President, and then we had to resort to conscription, to draft. England has made every effort to induce the young men to enlist in this war, and finally she has had to resort to the draft, to conscription. Now, having the possibilities of war in mind—I hope that we may never have war—but having the possibility of war coming at some time in mind, do you not think it would be infinitely better for this country to have a large force of men who had had some military training?

Gen. BLISS. Unquestionably; but you are not going to get them in that way—that is, as reserves of our Regular Army.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that a young man starting out in life, say a graduate from a university—if he were told that he could go into the Regular Army of the United States for one year, then get an honorable discharge, would be inclined at the beginning of his life's career to take that year's training for the discipline it will give him, whereas if you tried to tie him up for four years or seven years he will not go in at all?

Gen. BLISS. I think not. I do not think anyone goes in for the purpose of getting the discipline, and the hardest thing to do in order to get him reconciled to the service is to get him used to that discipline that he gets in the Army. I do not think you will get anybody voluntarily to go into military service for one year unless it is for the purpose of becoming a professional soldier.

Mr. KAHN. I understood you to say with regard to the Coast Artillery that it would not be advisable to organize the Coast Artillery into regiments.

Gen. BLISS. I see no reason why it should be done. That has been very carefully studied out.

Mr. KAHN. In filling up the Infantry regiments, the Cavalry regiments, the Field Artillery regiments to the statutory strength, you can do so without additional officers, I understood you to say, thereby saving something on overhead charges. Can you do that with the Coast Artillery? Can you increase the number of men in the Coast Artillery without increasing the number of officers?

Gen. BLISS. No; because the present strength of the Coast Artillery is based on the assumption that the present number of officers are necessary for the present number of men. If you add more men you must add more officers to enable them to efficiently perform their duty.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, as I understand it, from the standpoint of efficiency, when the companies are desired for action, it is best to have them at full war strength?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. But if any increase is made in the size of the Army now you believe it more advisable to make that increase by organizations, rather than by increasing the size of the present companies?

Gen. BLISS. By organizations, with the general object in view of completing the large Army organization.

Mr. ANTHONY. And so provide organizations which could be expanded to the full war strength in time of need?

Gen. BLISS. Yes; or in time of peace, if you ever should have the money to permit that to be done.

Mr. ANTHONY. As I understand it, General, you now feel that there should be an increase in the Regular Establishment of at least four regiments of Field Artillery?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you recommend any increase in the number of regiments of Infantry?

Gen. BLISS. The total number recommended is 10.

Mr. ANTHONY. An increase in the Engineers and the Signal Corps—that is, for aviation—has also been recommended.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. If any increase is made at all, where do you believe it should be made? What is the most important branch of the service to augment at this time, if we can not give them all an increase?

Gen. BLISS. If it came to be determined that only one increase was to be made, I should say in the Field Artillery.

Mr. ANTHONY. You believe that an increase of not less than four regiments of Field Artillery is indispensable to make our present establishment effective, if called upon?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, the present establishment; that is to say, if called upon it would complete the Artillery for the three divisions.

Mr. ANTHONY. If that increase is granted of four regiments, would they be organized the same as the Field Artillery is now; that is, with light guns, with the present light field guns, or—

Gen. BLISS. With both that and heavy. And the War Department tentative draft, and this printed draft before you, both provide for the heavy guns up to and including the 6-inch, which fires a 120-pound projectile, and includes the 3-inch also.

Mr. ANTHONY. Of course the authority for the organizations does not provide the armaments? That is under a separate head?

Gen. BLISS. Under a separate head, this contemplated armament.

Mr. ANTHONY. The matter of armaments would be determined by the department afterward?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; under this draft before you. The other draft contemplated two regiments to be organized with the heavy Field Artillery.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, do you believe it is necessary, in any increase made in the regular establishment that it should be made with the idea of properly balancing the establishments that we have, as between Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and so forth?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; if that be the sole consideration, and it is the principal one, I should think that should be the guiding principle. Of course, in the proposed reorganization of the Army the department has had to keep in view the great function of the Regular Army as the instructor of its hoped-for Federal Volunteer Army.

Mr. ANTHONY. If any branch of the service is increased by legislation, say, the Coast Artillery, by a certain number of regiments, that would mean promotion for the officers in that branch of the service?

Gen. BLISS. If confined to that branch.

Mr. ANTHONY. If confined to that branch?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. And no promotion in the other branches? How do you reckon, then, that the promotion should be made in any one branch of the service when that increase is not made in the corresponding branches? In other words, do you believe it should be equalized or not?

Gen. BLISS. Of course; but that is a very delicate and difficult subject. It depends, to a certain extent, on the extent of increase that you provide. There is no doubt that it is unfortunate whenever it is found necessary in an organization like a military establishment, where you have to consider the contentment and satisfaction of everybody—it is very unfortunate if you find it necessary to increase one group and therefore greatly advance people of the same length of service in that group as compared with others. And at first sight the remedy would appear to be to take everybody altogether and just shuffle them out of the box—so many majors, so many colonels, and captains, etc—and redistribute them as necessity requires. If the increase is not so great as to make a drastic measure like that absolutely necessary, I think that a provision such as is made in this bill is the better one—to give the promotion to the higher grades in that arm as being the men who are responsible for the efficiency and the instruction of it, bearing in mind that the older men get the less adaptable they are and the less able are they to be transferred to another arm, where they have got to go through a new process of acquisition of knowledge and experience, and confine the equalization to the lower grades, where men, being younger, are able to adapt themselves better and the cavalryman becomes a field artilleryman, or the coast artilleryman becomes a field artilleryman, and so on, with the minimum loss of time on his part.

Mr. ANTHONY. Isn't it true that there would be a greater degree of harmony and unity among the officers of the service if the matter of promotion were so equalized?

Gen. BLISS. If it were so equalized, unquestionably, if you mean by "so" in that particular way.

Mr. ANTHONY. Properly equalized?

Gen. BLISS. Properly equalized; yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. What is the method in other armies in the matter of promotion? Do they have one list, or do they promote in all branches of the service, like we do?

Gen. BLISS. It varies very much. I can not recall of one that has one list. I can not for a moment conceive—

Mr. ANTHONY. I am told that in the French Army and in the German Army the promotion is by a single lineal list up to the grade of a field officer, and thereafter by selection. What would you think of that?

Gen. BLISS. And they secure the object you have in mind now in the German service, where they do not do things haphazard at any time. If they make an increase in one arm, it is because they want to increase the efficiency of the entire service, and they give all branches whatever increase their funds will permit, and consequently the men somewhere about the head of all grades in all arms of the service have had about equal experience. Consequently they say, when a captain comes to the head of the list, "There is a vacancy for you now," but they look over the list and they find in other arms men who are also at the top of the list who exceed his length of service by probably a short time. So they say to him, "Your promotion stops for a short time. There is a vacancy for you, but we will not allow you to jump over the cavalryman or field artilleryman, or whatever he is." So they stop his promotion until everybody in every arm of the service of the same grade and of the same length of service have gotten their promotion.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then in any increase in any one branch of the service made now you would recommend that some steps be taken for the equalization of promotion that would follow?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; whatever way that could be found that is just and that would promote efficiency without injuring efficiency.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, in regard to the stationing of the Army at the different posts in this country, do you believe that the troops should be stationed where they can be subsisted at the least expense to the Government—with that idea in view—the most economical cost.

Gen. BLISS. Partly.

Mr. ANTHONY. In other words, you believe that the idea of cost would outweigh any strategic advantage?

Gen. BLISS. No; I say partly.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is there any strategic advantage in stationing troops of our mobile Army in that way?

Gen. BLISS. In my opinion, absolutely none.

Mr. ANTHONY. Of course, I waive the matter of the Mexican border.

Gen. BLISS. They are there for a matter of temporary necessity. But you have got to have a force of considerable size, with respect to the job that you anticipate, before you are warranted in talking about—and especially if it involves the expenditure of much money—before you are warranted in talking about the requirements of strategy. If you have an available Army in the United States—a mobile

Army—and at the most the present increase contemplates only something like 50,000 men here in the United States, to talk about the division of those men into four or six or eight localities for the purpose of strategy is absurd.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is the way it has appealed to me.

Gen. BLISS. Absurd; unless the force is large enough to warrant strategical consideration.

Mr. ANTHONY. Isn't it the fact that in these days of quick transportation by rail, especially, our Army could be assembled at any point on our coast, North or South, where needed, within a reasonable time?

Gen. BLISS. It can be very rapidly assembled—much more so than in former times.

Mr. ANTHONY. You would be absolutely unable to tell where you would be needed with the Army—whether it would be on the Pacific coast or the Atlantic coast—and it would be absurd to station it from a strategical standpoint on any coast or North or South?

Gen. BLISS. Unless we have got enough to handle the situation on both sides there is no use talking about strategic locations at the expense of the Treasury.

Mr. ANTHONY. General, one more matter. The question has been brought up that perhaps one of the drawbacks to service in the National Guard as now constituted was the fear of being compelled to serve on strike duty or strike service. You rather express the idea that that was the deterrent to present service in the National Guard.

Gen. BLISS. A very strong deterrent.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you not believe that the element of cost to the average citizen, the average workman, is a greater element perhaps?

Gen. BLISS. I judge from what officers of the Organized Militia have told me that the question of cost becomes a very considerable factor in keeping an organization together after the novelty of it has worn off and men begin to think of what the monthly car fare is, and that sort of thing. They go into it, however, with a knowledge of the expense that is in front of them and with a willingness, due to that temporary enthusiasm, to meet it. Consequently, a provision for at least the reimbursement of their expenses ought to be made, in my opinion, to guarantee that they will hold together and as a matter of abstract justice.

Mr. ANTHONY. What does it now approximately cost a man a year to serve as a lieutenant or captain in the National Guard? That is, cost for his uniform and equipment, which I understand he must provide.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; he has to provide that. He has to do that just as an officer in the regular establishment has to do it. So far as his uniform is concerned, it depends a good deal on his tailor and depends a good deal on the extent to which he had had to turn out and use his uniform, and all that. I could not tell you, but it is very easily obtainable, I think—a fair average figure.

Mr. ANTHONY. But it is a considerable cost to both officers and enlisted men of the guard?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. You believe that if Congress was to provide some fair remuneration for the expense incurred to both officers and men it would result in an increased service in the National Guard?

Gen. BLISS. I am not certain of that. What you now contemplate is not, in my sense of the word, a remuneration. It is a reimbursement. Now, you reimburse the expenses of these people with the idea of holding the organizations together, keeping these men who have lost their enthusiasm, and are beginning to think of dollars and cents—holding them together. But whether it will cause a man to go into the service who is not now in I do not know.

Mr. ANTHONY. If we increase our military strength, either by means of a continental army or by augmenting the National Guard, do you believe we ought to have some method for training the new officers that are created or the present officers of the National Guard?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you believe it would be wise to give them opportunity for training at the service schools, a reasonable number of them each year?

Gen. BLISS. I think so.

Mr. ANTHONY. You think the same good results that have been obtained in the Regular Army would be obtained in this new body of officers?

Gen. BLISS. I think so.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I understand that in the mobile Army we now have what you designate as divisional organizations?

Gen. BLISS. Only on paper. We can not get the people together to form the organization.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is that plan authorized by statute, or is it simply provisional?

Gen. BLISS. I do not think that the statute provides anything beyond the regimental organization. It did in the Spanish War. When you then organized volunteers it prescribed the composition or corps, divisions, and brigades.

Mr. MCKENZIE. What would you think of the wisdom of fixing that kind of an organization by law?

Gen. BLISS. I doubt the wisdom of it, for the reason that it unnecessarily deprives the organization of the benefit of elasticity. You have got to fix an organization, as I understand, here in Congress—the regimental organization—because on that the appropriation depends; the number of officers depends on that, and the noncommissioned officers of various grades and enlisted men. You have got to say how many shall be in a regiment, because that is the basis of your estimate and your appropriation. But having done that, and having provided the President with a given number of regiments so organized, I think it is wiser to let him exercise his discretion in a combination of them which does not cost any more money.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Has there not been a great deal of criticism on that very point that, while we appropriate money for what is supposed to be an Army, we haven't any practical plan of organization that composes or makes up a real Army?

Gen. BLISS. Oh, yes; we have that most carefully worked out. As I say, until we can get troops together from scattered posts and put something like 15,000 of them in one locality we can not form the actual physical division of troops. But we have the organization. That matter of organization, as you know, is a matter of constant change up to within a very short time. Our own organization

contemplated two regiments of Field Artillery as a component part of what is called an Infantry division. We are all agreed that there should be three regiments now as a result of experience in the European war. If we have the regiments, the War Department or the President is able to put them together. It does not cost the Government a penny more of money to do it, provided you have the regiments.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I do not assume to know anything about military affairs. But, as I understand you, a division is a complete little army in all of its details?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; supposed to be able to take care of itself under any conditions where such a body can take care of itself.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Isn't it true that you had that idea in your mind that in case we would get into war that would throw these troops which we now have into divisions?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Do you have that all planned out in your plans?

Gen. BLISS. That is all figured out most carefully; yes.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Do you know which regiments of Cavalry and which regiments of Infantry, etc., go into a division?

Gen. BLISS. We can not say which regiments. We can not say whether the First, Second, and Third Cavalry are going to be put, in case of an emergency to-morrow, into a particular division, when they may be scattered from here to the Philippine Islands. But we know the number of regiments that the division calls for, and if they exist we put them together to form that division.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Then, as a matter of fact, you have to create the divisions after the emergency arises? Is that true?

Gen. BLISS. Yes; that is necessarily true until we shall have our Army all physically gathered together.

Mr. MCKENZIE. As to the matter of appropriations, could not that be easily regulated to make appropriations to take care of the divisions, just as we make appropriations to take care of the regiments?

Gen. BLISS. Well, I suppose it could; but I see no reason why you should do it, because the division does not cost you anything more than the combination of regiments that are in it.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You will pardon my question, but in my mind I can not help but feel that if we are going to have an Army—what we call an Army—that if war were declared to-morrow we could call out the first division, and we would know exactly where those troops were coming from in that division, and act accordingly. Maybe I am wrong about that, but it seems to me that would be sound military policy.

Gen. BLISS. Mr. McKenzie, that is exactly what we contemplated doing, provided the troops physically exist. I see nothing whatever that stands in the way, by reason of lack of present legislation, of accomplishing that. If we have got nine regiments of Infantry in the United States, when the time comes we can combine them as the Infantry of a division. If there is a Cavalry regiment in the United States, we add it, and it is the Cavalry of the division. If there are two or three regiments of Field Artillery in the United States, we add them, and that is the Artillery of that division. But this division is not a concrete organization which expires the moment one of its

organizations is taken away or replaced by another one, like lopping off the limbs of an inanimate being. It is simply the aggregation of so many units. For the purpose of drill and instruction of the general officer who is going to command it, it would be very desirable to get such divisions as we can get out of existing organizations together once a year and train them. I can not see anything else outside of that to be gained by it.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You think it is all right, just as it has been going on?

Gen. BLISS. I see nothing better that you can do.

Mr. GREENE. Just one word more on the line of skeleton commands, if I may attempt to fix in my mind what that is a little more clearly. You spoke yesterday about the fact that in maneuvers and in the working out of tactical problems generally and problems of strategy that it was very difficult, of course, for the small force to imagine itself encompassed around, so to speak, by an imaginary force.

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

Mr. GREENE. That it was exceedingly difficult to work out military problems in the field, at maneuvers, say, when officers had to imagine that there was a force here and there in opposition to them, covering points where in reality there were no men at all. Now, while there is always a certain amount of advantage in having your units at full strength, would it not be far better, if you must choose between the two, to have a greater number of organizations, even at peace strength, that could be deployed in a field and made to represent, for maneuvering purposes, a full brigade, a full division, or a full corps, for instance, than to have to trust to imagination altogether?

Gen. BLISS. You have in mind some general tactical problem that is being worked out?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir; exactly that.

Gen. BLISS. And you contemplate in that problem instead of putting a flag up there and saying, "That is a regiment of Infantry," to have a regiment of Infantry there?

Mr. GREENE. That is exactly what I mean.

Gen. BLISS. Of course, it is very desirable, and, of course, with whatever combination of troops we have we stop our problem when we reach the limit. There is no question, as has been said over and over again, in the training and in all the tactical problems you can give a company; it is better trained by having it at full strength. So the training of the battalion is better by having it full strength, and so with the training of the regiment, and you may carry that on. If you have three regiments, you can make an Infantry brigade. It is better at full strength than at reduced strength, if that is all the number of troops I could get together and I wanted to work out problems with them. If I go beyond that, I have then to resort to these makeshifts, which enable everybody to see that that line which is really held by one regiment of Infantry is really according to the conditions of the problem a line that is held by a division of Infantry. I have got to stake it out, put up markers, or I have got to scatter a few men, and each man is told, "You are a regiment" and "You are a company."

Mr. GREENE. You have got exactly the spirit of my question, although my phraseology was betrayed into the same imaginative condition that you state yesterday. In other words, if you had a greater

number of units, no matter what their strength, you could so disperse the units as to more nearly work out a problem in strategy practically than you could with two units, even though at full war strength?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir. That would have a tendency to promote the efficiency of instruction of the general officer, and diminish the value of the instruction for the subordinate officer, and vice versa.

Mr. GREENE. So that where with the skeleton unit provided you can not get a sufficient number of units at full war strength, the preference would be for a larger number of units at peace strength?

Gen. BLISS. Well, I come back, Mr. Greene, to what I said before. I think the answer is the same as your question calls for, provided those depleted units make the complete skeleton of a larger organization.

Mr. GREENE. Another point which was developed, I think, by a question from Mr. Anthony, that if you were to enlarge the Army as it now stands you would like each branch of the service to be proportional to the total of that Army. Would you take into consideration, as doubtless in your long studies and experience you have, the wisdom of having separate branches that require specialized and intensive training, like with your Artillery and Cavalry units in time of peace, maintained at a disproportionate strength because in an emergency there would not be time to bring a sufficient number of those troops up to the standard?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir. As I stated to the chairman of the committee in answer to a question a little while ago, I think we should complete a unit. If it is two—if you can not complete but two—complete two. Or complete one. But after completing that one unit, whatever it is, and you say we can't complete any more, of course, but we are going to give you 15, 20, or 25 regiments of Field Artillery, I say do it, it would be a good thing.

Mr. GREENE. Now, as to the attempt to concentrate the troops, either in the Army as it stands or in such enlargements as may be found wise, into larger tactical units in the country as a divisional organization, for instance, you have said there is no place in the country now prepared to house and accommodate by means of barracks such divisional organizations. General, is it the opinion of military men generally that—well, we will say, loosely—the moral effects of bringing together such a large body of men as is contemplated in a division in any one locality in a country at peace is altogether to be desired?

Gen. BLISS. I do not know that I have ever heard it discussed from that point of view.

Mr. GREENE. Would not the residence of 23,000 men, for instance, all within a small area in the midst of one of our cities, or near by, be regarded, after some experience with it, as being somewhat objectionable?

Gen. BLISS. Oh, it would be impossible to conceive it, in my opinion. When you assume one infantry division, we will say at war strength—now they are 23,000 able-bodied grown men. What the proportion of married people would be, and the people who would become married and settle in that vicinity, I do not know. But you have got the personnel of a town of 40,000 inhabitants. That is a

good, big community; and, consequently, if we were ever to reach the point of combination of troops to form such bodies, it has got to be off where you have plenty of cheap land and where you have not large cities and large communities of any kind. In a city, if we had such a force of men, it would doubtless be scattered around as they would be under a European system, and a barracks for a regiment would be here and a barracks for a regiment would be in a totally different part of the town, and so on.

Mr. GREENE. That is one of the very points that I hoped you would suggest, because information comes to me that this city barracks system as followed by many, if not all, the European countries, where large bodies of troops are dispersed in perhaps regimental barracks throughout a city, is not found to be altogether satisfactory to the men, and has often proved to be very disagreeable to the citizenry of the city.

Gen. BLISS. In the European system?

Mr. GREENE. Yes.

Gen. BLISS. I do not know how that is, but I do know this: In the first place, that system grew up gradually with the communities, and at no time did any government find itself called on to purchase enormously expensive land for the purpose of accommodation of these troops. It grew up. They found themselves in this situation. The advantage of it from their points of view is—and if you have ever been abroad much in connection with that feature of national life there you will have noticed this, that the young men who constitute the troops and are living in this particular barracks; the father and mother of this one lives right around the corner and the father and mother of that one lives right around the other corner, and the father and mother of another one lives right across the street. They all come from within that immediate radius. The colonel of the regiment knows the fathers and mothers of most of his people down to the privates in the ranks. The officers know them; and, in my opinion, that is the only possible advantage of that so-called cuartel system of locating troops in a city. I think under our system of voluntary service, where we have to recruit from the entire country and then group them together, where a regiment in Washington will be made up of people from San Francisco to the southern point of Florida, I do not see any advantage that would be gained by it. But if we could have the territorial system, and, more particularly, if instead of recruiting from the class of men which we have to take, if they represented the average of the community—say that the banker's family that live across the street have a son in the ranks here, and the lawyers and doctors and everybody down to and including the working people—if every class in that community were represented in the Army, I should think it would be a very great advantage, if a regiment of Infantry were charged against the city of Washington as its quota, to have that regiment stationed right in the very heart of the city, where the fathers and mothers would see them and have an influence over them.

Mr. GREENE. Then, your alternative is, if you are to mass such a division, to place it out in what might be called practically unoccupied land?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; for economy.

Mr. GREENE. Would that be likely to induce young men to enlist in the standing Army if they knew they were to be quartered in divisional organizations out on a desert, because no city would have them near?

Gen. BLISS. I can hardly see that it would make any special difference.

Mr. GREENE. In other words, it comes back to what you stated awhile ago, does it not, that probably the most elastic and practical plan under present conditions is to have the tactical unit on paper and assemble its lesser units as necessity arises?

Gen. BLISS. As necessity arises for drill and instruction. I say this always with reference to present conditions.

Mr. GREENE. If there is an advantage in this Territorial recruitment, and the return of these reserves to the locality where they were recruited, and their being kept in barracks there, right near their fathers and mothers and sisters and cousins and their aunts, as you have suggested, why would not the National Guard, with sufficient money, go a long way toward serving that advantage of Territorial location, recruitment, and reserve?

Gen. BLISS. I do not advance that statement as a reason for their going into the military service, but as a condition which mitigates the disagreeable features of military service very much. I can not conceive that the fact that my father and mother live around the corner is going to make military life in a barracks any more attractive, unless I determine to be a soldier and individually want that. I can not conceive that is going to take me into the barracks. But if I have got to go in, as these people abroad do, the fact that my father and mother live around the corner is a great mitigation of the inconvenience and generally disagreeable features of military life.

Mr. GREENE. Unquestionably; but in this case we have to rely not on the certainty that we will get soldiers anyway by compulsion but we must rely on their volunteering to apprentice themselves to Uncle Sam for a little while, so that they may at some time be fit to be called to the colors if they are needed. Then why would not the territorial recruitment and reserve system help to induce young men to resolve to go in and try this experience?

Gen. BLISS. I think it would; and that is what we largely count on in the territorialization of this so-called Federal Army we talk about—the continental army.

Mr. GREENE. If you territorialize the continental army you must place it right down in regions occupied by the National Guard?

Gen. BLISS. To a certain extent; yes.

Mr. GREENE. Then it is a question of the survival of the fittest?

Gen. BLISS. No. As I have said over and over again I do not think it is that at all. I think it is a very misleading comparison. I think if a company or regiment of the territorial army could be raised in the city of Washington it would be composed of men who would not dream of going into one of the two regiments of the National Guard in the city of Washington.

Mr. GREENE. Then, following that idea, your mind is, as I understand it, directed to the thought that there are varying classes of people seeking an opportunity to gratify a desire for volunteer service, and that the National Guard gets one part of those people

and your proposed continental army will get another part. If the proposed continental army system is going to entail upon young men such a period as a month's absence from business, for instance, just at the age when they are beginning to form business connections and business responsibilities, would it not be more likely to take its recruits from the ranks of men of comparative leisure or wealth or assured business situation rather than from the rank and file of beginners of the age of 24 or 25?

Gen. BLISS. I think it might possibly result in bringing in a larger proportion than you would otherwise expect in that class. I should hope so.

I have heard a great deal of criticism of the proposed continental army indicated by questions like this: Do you think that employers will let their men off for that? and questions of that kind. That all points to an underlying idea that somehow we expect the laboring man to bear the stress and brunt of war when it comes. I do not believe it. I do not think we ought to contemplate it. When anybody asks me that question, I say I sincerely hope the employers themselves will make arrangements to perform their share in this proposed body.

Mr. GREENE. Then you are imposing another contingency upon the contingency upon which the continental army itself is formed; that is, men will come forward—first contingency. The second contingency is that their employers will let them. Whereas the National Guard being already territorialized, and a man not being called upon to leave his home or his business for the period of military instruction he may derive in it, overcomes both those contingencies and only lacks the element of the Federal authority and control.

Gen. BLISS. No; unfortunately it lacks a great deal more than that, and that has been the obstacle in my way in arriving at the conclusion which your questions would indicate that you have arrived at. The question has been asked here whether if we guarantee a system by which men will go to their armories and drill 45 times a year and put on top of that 10 days' service in the field, whether that is not going to make them at least as efficient as this proposed continental army, if we should get it, with two months' intensive training. I say that it will not, and it can not. If war comes and these men turn out, you would still have your death roll of honor of men who die of preventable diseases. There is not a single particle of experience that is gained by men who march around a hardwood floor in the armory forty-five or forty-five hundred times a year that is going to be of any benefit to them worth speaking of when they get into war. They take their field experience of 10 days. They get a certain amount of it, but this experience is something like a cumulative poison—if you do not get enough of it at one time to survive the interval between the time when you take it and the next dose, you have got to repeat the dose with the same effect. You can go on with that kind of training for 100 years with the same set of men, if they live that long, and I maintain that at the end of that time they will not be as fit to take care of themselves in the field as these men, if we can ever get them, who would agree to take two months' training for a period of three years—two months each year—and then drop it.

Mr. GREENE. Of course, as a professional military man, I know that you have pointed out some weaknesses of the National Guard system. I am only asking these questions because we must reconcile a perfect military theory with actual civic conditions.

Mr. TILSON. General, we hear a great deal of criticism about our scattered Army posts, and the statement generally made that that is responsible for our lack of preparation, or at least that that is one of the handicaps of our preparation. If you were starting all over again, *de novo*, to locate an Army of such size as is contemplated in this bill, where would you locate them? Would you put a Cavalry post in my friend Greene's State, and another large post in San Antonio, Tex., and another one at Des Moines, Iowa, and so on over the country, or would you put them all, as Brother Anthony would like to have you, at Leavenworth?

Gen. BLISS. No; I would not put them all at Leavenworth.  
[Laughter.]

Mr. TILSON. I use Leavenworth simply as a general term. I mean some one place.

Gen. BLISS. I had no animus against Mr. Anthony in saying that at all.

Mr. TILSON. I was using that simply as a figure of speech.

Gen. BLISS. Col. Tilson, if it were all to be done over again, and I had the doing of it, there is no question at all that I would adjust some things. I would put some Cavalry where they are not now, and so on throughout the line of the Army. And possibly in some localities I would not put troops. But I would not make so many changes as you anticipate because, unless you increase the Army very materially, I think it is very much better if you can keep units of reasonable size together, to scatter the Army around the country, and to let people see what there Army is. And, moreover, to use that Army with the greatest efficiency and the least expenditure of money, in assisting in the training of Organized Militia, or anybody else who is willing to take training in time of peace.

Mr. TILSON. Then you do not think this scattered-post criticism causes so much alarm?

Gen. BLISS. Nothing like so much as the people who make the criticism think it does.

Mr. TILSON. In your very complete statement of organization, referring to the bill, you have spoken of the increase of artillery, but you have not dwelt at any length on the increase in machine guns and in our aerial service.

Gen. BLISS. No; I did not do that, because I thought that would come up when you come to discuss the details of the bill. And as I said a while ago in answer to a question from the chairman of the committee, I think that an increase in the present strength of machine guns would be a good thing. If you do, you have got to increase the machine-gun company. That is, we would ask to increase the machine guns without diminishing the number of rifles in the companies.

Mr. TILSON. Has it not been demonstrated in the European war that machine guns used in great numbers are a very effective weapon?

Gen. BLISS. Oh, enormously effective; but in the organization of an army neither we nor they can contemplate the hundred thousand

machine guns as being added to the organization of a regiment, for example. The regiment takes up a position on the battle front on the western line, for example, and in a short time there may be 50,000 machine guns there, when each regiment has got 12—50,000 over and above that. That sort of thing, like the heavy mobile artillery, you have got to have on hand and put it where it is needed as circumstances indicate, but you can not count on including that in the organization of a regiment.

Mr. TILSON. Could we not, then, have a very large reserve force of machine guns?

Gen. BLISS. I think so; unquestionably. We have got a considerable number of them, and with every appropriation more are obtained.

Mr. TILSON. Would not the same obtain as to aeroplanes or aircraft?

Gen. BLISS. Yes; I should think so, too. My recollection is that the productive capacity of the United States in aeroplanes such as we would want—if you provided the money for it—is at the rate of 200 per month. We could build at that rate right now with the present capacity in the United States, and it is a question of relation between productive capacity and the total number that you want, whether you would wisely advocate a large reserve.

Mr. TILSON. Then, as to an aerial corps—training a larger number of officers—do you not suggest there be a larger number trained for this?

Gen. BLISS. Unquestionably; and I think the bill before you calls for an increase now of 73 in the aviation section of the Signal Corps.

Mr. TILSON. Speaking of the Plattsburg and other summer encampments, it is a fact that these were purely voluntary?

Gen. BLISS. Absolutely.

Mr. TILSON. The men had no strings on them when they went out!

Gen. BLISS. None whatever.

Mr. TILSON. It is, of course, realized that there will be quite a considerable difference between a young man going to a summer camp for five weeks and having the experience and that being the end of it and his volunteering to go to three of such camps and then thereafter be held to service for six years, or five years, or whatever the term is—three years—that the conditions are quite different from what they were in the Plattsburg or other camps?

Gen. BLISS. Unquestionably; but if you do not have the element of an obligation to serve, you depart from the one thing that I can not allow myself to be diverted from. That is, that the essential element of a military policy is to provide a fixed, definite, determinate number of men. You can not get around it. And whatever the number is, that is the number that your policy calls for, and everything in the plan connected with it is subsidiary to that one thing.

Mr. TILSON. Provided you could get the fixed determinate number of men and have them subject absolutely to the control of the Federal Government, would it not be an additional advantage if it could be so arranged that they would have at the same time the use of the armories, rifle ranges, and maneuver grounds now owned by the several States?

Gen. BLISS. If that does not divest the Federal Government of one iota of its absolute and exclusive control of those things, yes.

Mr. TILSON. If it could be so arranged as to be under the absolute and complete control of the Federal Government, and at the same time have the use of the armories, rifle ranges, and maneuver grounds, you would think it an advantage, would you not?

Gen. BLISS. Yes; if, as they say, there is no divesting of exclusive and absolute control at all moments of time.

Mr. TILSON. Would you consider it worth while to educate a considerable force of officers and turn them out, as we will call it, into the body of the citizenship, to become National Guard officers, or whatever they might become, to educate military officers in the community, after having educated them at West Point, we will say, would it be worth while educating more officers than we do for the purpose of turning them out into the citizenry?

Gen. BLISS. I think so, unquestionably. I think it could be done without a very great increased expenditure of money.

Mr. TILSON. As a matter of experience, do these officers not come back to the colors whenever they are needed? Has not that been the experience in past emergencies?

Gen. BLISS. What officers come back to the colors?

Mr. TILSON. Officers that have been educated at West Point and have not remained in the Army, but have gone out into the citizenry.

Gen. BLISS. I think the figures would show a very considerable proportion. I do not know. I would have to look that up.

Mr. TILSON. What I was asking is, whether it would not be worth while to encourage this very thing, and enlarge the number of officers at West Point, even if they do not all remain in the Army, and to make it more easy for officers to get out who wish to get out of the Army.

Gen. BLISS. I would not do that, speaking in the interests of the Federal Government, unless you have a string to them.

Mr. TILSON. Suppose it was only required that they should come back to the colors in case of war?

Gen. BLISS. In case of war, yes; unquestionably.

Mr. HULL. What number of the militia actually in existence at the outbreak of the Spanish War were used in any way during that war?

Gen. BLISS. That I could not tell you. Gen. Mills—I do not know whether he is present—the Chief of the Militia Division, can give you all of the information about that.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I just want to ask one or two questions about this organization, and then we are through. As I understand, you are asking for 786 extra officers?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you already have 200?

Gen. BLISS. Two hundred, by the act of 1911.

The CHAIRMAN. So that would make 986 extra officers to perform duties outside of organization in the army?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. These 10 regiments of infantry that you spoke of, you would not desire that the officers of those 10 regiments of infantry should be detached from their command to perform duty elsewhere?

Gen. BLISS. I have contemplated that such of them as could be spared could be used in case we have Federal volunteers to train. You understand, Mr. Hay, that the 769 men that are asked for, in addition to the 200 men formerly granted in the act of 1911, do not totally take the place of the actual detachments that are now made.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have 815.

Gen. BLISS. Now, at this moment. These men, if they were used to fill up the vacancies in command made by the detachment of these men, would all be used for that purpose alone. There would not be any of them available for continental-army work or militia work.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you put in the hearing a statement showing what these 813 officers are now doing?

(In further answer to this question the following abstract from the last annual report of The Adjutant General of the Army is given:)

Excluding 5 general officers who are on duty with the Panama Canal, General Staff, and the Army War College, there are 808 officers detached from their commands in the line of the Army or staff departments. These officers are detached for the following enumerated duties:

The General Staff	34
With the General Staff	1
Army War College	18
United States Military Academy	94
Service schools, instructors and students	209
Instructors at civil institutions	61
Recruiting service	87
Aides-de-camp	27
With Philippine government	3
Isthmian Canal Commission	9
Military attachés	17
With Philippine Scouts	11
In bureaus of War Department	18
At department and brigade headquarters	22
At disciplinary barracks	21
With militia	114
Alaskan Road commission	3
Office Engineer Commissioner, District of Columbia	4
Superintendent State, War, and Navy Departments Building	1
Office Public Buildings and Grounds	2
With Signal Corps	7
Special duty abroad	5
Members of boards	1
With Porto Rico Regiment	2
Special duty	6
With American Red Cross	1
United States Soldiers' Home	3
With Chilean Government	1
With Panama-Pacific Exposition	7
Observers in Europe	8
Relief work in Europe	2
With Yellowstone Park detachment	7
Alaskan Engineering Commission	1
School for bakers and cooks, Fort Sam Houston	1

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Of the foregoing officers 27 are of the grade of colonel, 25 of the grade of lieutenant colonel, 84 of the grade of major, 274 of the grade of captain, 320 of the grade of first lieutenant, and 78 of the grade of second lieutenant; 89 of these officers are detached from Staff Corps and departments, 178 from the Cavalry, 59 from the Field Artillery, 146 from the Coast Artillery, and 336 from the Infantry. With respect to the grades, there are on detached service 3

colonels of Staff Corps and departments, 8 of Cavalry, 1 of Field Artillery, 3 of Coast Artillery, and 12 of Infantry; 7 lieutenant colonels of Staff corps and departments, 6 of Cavalry, 1 of Field Artillery, 2 of Coast Artillery, and 9 of Infantry; 27 majors of Staff Corps and departments, 18 of Cavalry, 3 of Field Artillery, 11 of Coast Artillery, and 25 of Infantry; 33 captains of Staff Corps and departments, 52 of Cavalry, 19 of Field Artillery, 48 of Coast Artillery, and 122 of Infantry; 19 first lieutenants of Staff Corps and departments, 66 of Cavalry, 26 of Field Artillery, 74 of Coast Artillery, and 135 of Infantry; 28 second lieutenants of Cavalry, 9 of Field Artillery, 8 of Coast Artillery, and 33 of Infantry.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What commands they are detached from, and how long they they have been?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say that these detached officers, these 815 officers, are not performing duty with their organization at all, and that the extra officers that you are asking for would only take the places of the men that are now detached and could not be used to train the continental army, for example?

Gen. BLISS. Speaking subject to later correction, my impression is that the number of men who are asked for will do no more than take the place of men that are now detached.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood somebody here, either the Secretary, or Chief of Staff, or Assistant Secretary, to say that you were asking for these extra officers for the purpose of training the continental army, or at least going to use a part of them for that.

Gen. BLISS. Of course, that is what they are going to be for.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand you to say that you want to take the officers of these new organizations to train the continental officers?

Gen. BLISS. The new organizations in a body, officers and enlisted men, will be used to train the continental army.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to get at is, how are you going to use these officers? The complaint of the War Department has been for years that they have had to take officers from their organization and put them to doing other duties, and that that was very bad for the organization, as, of course, anybody can understand. What I want to get at is, why not have some more extra officers than the 786 you asked for, rather than to have organizations and then strip them of their officers? What is the use of having an organization stripped of officers?

Gen. BLISS. If I understand the question, there is no doubt it is desirable that every organization as it stands should have its full complement of officers, and that we should have enough officers to provide for all the duties that are now required by law and custom, outside of these organizations. What that number would be I would like to have an opportunity to later say.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you put in the hearings a statement of how many officers you will need for the purpose of college work, training of the continental army, or National Guard, whatever may be finally decided upon, and all other purposes or uses of officers?

The War College Division of the General Staff, taking into consideration all of the calls made upon the line of the Army for details, recommended the number of additional officers to meet the estimated necessities which exceeded the number proposed by the Secretary of War by 931. The two large increases, aside from the requirements of training for the continental army, were for civil

educational institutions at which it is desired to provide officers for military instruction, and to provide a larger number of inspector-instructors for the Organized Militia.

A proportionate reduction in the numbers proposed by them, in order to bring the total to the number asked for in the War Department tentative draft, results as follows:

Continental army	322
Organized Militia	139
Cadet companies	45
Educational institutions	137
United States Military Academy	22
School for line officers	33
Military attachés	12
Abroad studying languages	1
Recruiting service	40
Disciplinary barracks	6
Acting judge advocates	3
Commanding Philippine scout battalions	5
Philippine Constabulary	2
Aides to general officers	14
Ordnance Board	1
Alaska Road Commission	3

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The foregoing numbers are not sufficient to meet the estimated requirements either for the continental army, the Organized Militia, or civil educational institutions, provided officers detailed for those respective purposes devote their work exclusively thereto. As far as possible, however, officers assigned to the training of the continental troops will be used on the other two duties and vice versa.

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that we may get at just what the Army needs, or think it needs, in the way of officers. General, you have in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and in Panama full-strength regiments. What is the idea of having them at full strength?

Gen. BLISS. Well, Mr. Hay, before that was done we had a certain number of Infantry regiments and a certain number of Cavalry regiments in the Philippines. It was considered desirable, especially, as I think, among other things that would enable officers to be utilized to better advantage, to cut the number of those organizations down to practically one-half and double the strength of the enlisted men, so that the total available force that was calculated on as necessary for the maintenance of peace and order and the carrying out of the responsibility of the United States Government toward the nationals of other countries over there, would be provided by that reduced number of organizations but with practically the same enlisted strength as before.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I understand. In other words, you want your regiments at full strength in these over-seas places in order that they may meet any emergency that may arise?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is the policy of the department, to have those regiments at full strength in order to meet any controversies that may arise in these over-seas possessions, why is it not right and more effective to have organizations at full strength here to meet this sudden war that may occur—that some people think may occur? Would you not be infinitely better prepared to meet an emergency if war was declared on this country and an expedition sent here if

you had full-strength organizations than if you had skeleton organizations?

Gen. BLISS. To a certain extent; but, as I have said before, not completely.

The CHAIRMAN. How long would it take you to build up to war strength a skeleton regiment when the emergency comes?

Gen. BLISS. Well, I can counter that question by asking how long is it going to take to provide the necessary regiments of Artillery that have got to go with the Infantry division?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you as a military man. I am not a military man. I have only got a small modicum of common sense.

Gen. BLISS. It is an equal disadvantage in any case. In the one case the Artillery is not at its full war strength in number of organizations, and in the other case the Infantry divisions are not at their full war strength.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not proposing to have the Infantry division or any division concentrated at any one point in time of peace?

Gen. BLISS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. What you propose to do is to order the different arms that make up the division at any point where it is necessary to order them?

Gen. BLISS. Yes. Now, Mr. Hay, as I explained yesterday with the utmost care, or tried to, those Infantry divisions and Cavalry divisions I spoke of we would like to have at full strength, but we could not figure out how we could ask you to do it. And the question then was, shall we let things remain as they are, or is it better to adopt this other course for the purpose of providing the necessary number of organizations?

The CHAIRMAN. My purpose is, if we are going to increase the Army, to increase it the way that will make it efficient in time of emergency. I understand that is the purpose of everybody. If we are going to spend the money, we ought to spend it in the best way to meet an emergency if an emergency arises. I understand from all of you gentlemen, Gen. Scott and yourself, that undoubtedly an organization is more efficient in every way at its full strength, both in officers and men. That is all that I have to ask.

Gen. BLISS. I am inclined to think if you had asked the question in another form that I would have replied in this way: If I were to be placed in charge of a field army of three Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division, I would rather contemplate filling up the skeleton organizations on the outbreak of war than I would to have the present haphazard, incomplete organization, the suborganizations being at full strength. I am inclined to think that is what I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. And you would take the risk of filling up an organization? As I understand it, in time of war what we want is men to fight. It does not make so much difference whether they are in a division or whether in a corps, or what, just so there are the men there. It is units of defense we want.

Gen. BLISS. I think the few additional men that would be necessary to raise the infantry regiments to their war strength would be so quickly absorbed, so quickly taught, even if they were green men, that I would rather take that alternative in respect to that. I think the same in respect to the Cavalry, that it would have to be increased a

comparatively small amount to bring it to its war strength. And in respect to the Infantry, which would have to be a little more in grand total, I think I would rather take the chances of getting in men partly trained and putting them alongside of these thoroughly trained men than I would to take the responsibility of these incomplete large organizations. That is my present opinion. I dislike to discuss a matter like that offhand.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that it was the best opinion of yourself and of the War Department that there ought to be three regiments of Field Artillery to a division.

Gen. BLISS. I said that the consensus of opinion now was—yes, sir; I say that we ought to have three regiments.

The CHAIRMAN. You propose to have three divisions in this country and one abroad. That would make four divisions. That is correct, is it not? You have a division overseas, have you not?

Gen. BLISS. They are not in the formation of divisions abroad any more than we have got at home now.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you; but I mean to say you have on paper—

Gen. BLISS. We have got in Panama one-third of the Infantry of one division. In the Hawaiian Islands we have got one-third, and in the Philippines we have got neither a third or a half. We have got four regiments out of nine. And the same disproportion exists in respect to all the others.

The CHAIRMAN. You recommended 10 regiments of Field Artillery. That does not give you three regiments of Field Artillery to an Infantry division, does it?

Gen. BLISS. No; because at the time that recommendation was made this other matter had not been discussed. I say as the result of experience the General Staff of the Army has recently concluded, after a long study, which was not completed when we first discussed this matter, that we ought to have an increase in the proportion of guns from three and a fraction to nearly 5 per cent per thousand gross, Infantry and Cavalry. That makes about a proportion of three regiments of Field Artillery to the division.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say if the regiments were at full strength you could not take the officers away from the regiment and detail them to other duties because—I think you used the word "mob."

Gen. BLISS. Of course, at full strength we have far more men to instruct and to keep instructing and trained, and we would need all the officers to insure discipline.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think a regiment of United States Infantry would be a mob?

Gen. BLISS. Of course, I used an exaggerated expression to illustrate the difficulty—

The CHAIRMAN. The illustration of a large number of men?

Gen. BLISS. You fix the number in a company of Infantry at 3 officers and 150 men. It is to be assumed, as the common opinion of Congress, that those 150 require the 3 officers for all purposes. If you give 150 men, you ought to have 3 officers. When you cut it down to 65 men it is more easy to detach an officer.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. Why do you suggest 15 lieutenants for an Infantry regiment and 16 for a Cavalry regiment? I just want to get at the reason for that.

Gen. BLISS. In the organization proposed of the regiment every attempt was made in asking for the legalization of the three provisional companies to provide the officers out of those already provided by law.

The CHAIRMAN. An Infantry regiment has a headquarters company, a supply troop, a machine-gun company, and the Cavalry has the supply troop, a headquarters troop, and a machine-gun troop?

Gen. BLISS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why are there more officers required in the Cavalry than Infantry?

Gen. BLISS. I would like to look at that a minute, but I think they were given simply to utilize—we wanted that number of officers with duties to perform in the organization of the regiment, in case the officer was available, to provide two in the one arm and not two in the other. And it was to avoid the necessity of asking for the additional officer in the other arm that that apparent discrepancy in the organization appears.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you think there ought to be 16 in the Infantry, too?

Gen. BLISS. I would like to refresh my memory.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have you answer that when you get an opportunity to look it up. I will not detain the committee now.

(The answer of Gen. Bliss to the above question is as follows:)

In converting the present provisional organizations known as the headquarters, supply, and machine gun troop or company into organizations recognized by law as part of the regimental organization, every effort was made to utilize the present authorized number of officers without having to ask for any increase. But in considering the habitual uses of the Cavalry arm it seemed necessary to provide two extra lieutenants as compared with the Infantry organization. The Infantry regiment will be used almost invariably in time of war as an unbroken unit. Even if its battalions are separated it will be only for a very short time and by no considerable distances. The Cavalry regiment, on the other hand, will much more frequently operate by squadrons for considerable periods of time and widely separated from each other. This will frequently make it necessary to divide the supply troop and the machine-gun troop into detachments to accompany the separate squadrons. In order to provide officers for each of these detachments an increase in the Cavalry organization by two lieutenants has been recommended.

Mr. MCKELLAR. I want to ask you a question I overlooked. Do you now think that any plan of preparedness should include the larger, the more systematic, and the more effective military training of the youths of our country in schools?

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir; I undoubtedly do.

Mr. MCKELLAR. And do you not think we ought to establish additional schools for the training of officers who can be utilized in the time of trouble to officer our Volunteer forces?

Gen. BLISS. I do not think we ought to do that at public expense. At least, I am not going to recommend it if it can be done otherwise. At this moment, if I recall correctly, we have got 102 institutions of all classes at which officers of the Army are detailed. I think they have about 32,000 young men under military instruction at those

schools, and they graduate annually somewhere from 5,000 to 7,000 young men who have taken those courses. I think that the proposition of the War Department, and it is cordially agreed in by the authorities of those institutions, to thoroughly standardize the course of instruction so that we will get the best results from it combined with an extension of that system to universities and colleges which have not yet taken part in it, but now show a disposition to do it, is going to provide enough officers to make unnecessary this system which you speak of.

Mr. MCKELLAR. With the system as it at present stands, do you think that is sufficient for your purposes now? Would you have a sufficient number of well-trained officers in the event of trouble from these schools under the Morrill Act that you speak of?

Gen. BLISS. Not limited to those under the Morrill Act—

Mr. MCKELLAR. There must be some improvement of military training in schools? Do you not think so?

Gen. BLISS. I think so.

Mr. MCKELLAR. And you are in favor of any proper and legitimate kind of military training in schools that will produce that result.

Gen. BLISS. Yes, sir.

Thereupon, at 1.15 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until tomorrow, Friday, January 14, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.

(The following data were submitted to the committee by the Assistant Secretary of War, Hon. Henry Breckinridge:)

*A. Students receiving military instruction at educational institutions within the United States.*

Total number, 1915-----	82,313
Number graduated, 1915-----	5,200

*B. Attendance at so-called "business men's camps," 1915.*

Plattsburg, first-----	1,254
Plattsburg, second-----	545
Fort Sheridan, Ill-----	520
Lansdowne, Pa-----	200
American Lake, Wash-----	95
San Francisco, Cal-----	72
 Total-----	 2,666

*C. Attendance at so-called "student camps" during summer of 1915.*

Plattsburg-----	614
San Francisco-----	216
Ludington, Mich-----	149
 Total-----	 979

*D. Percentage of reenlistments in the Regular Army during the past three years.*

The percentage of reenlistments to enlistments in the Regular Army have been as follows:

	Per cent.
1913-----	28.74
1914-----	29.87
1915-----	34.30

E. Average age of attendants at so-called "business men's camps" at Plattsburg.

32 years 2 months.

F. Copy of letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, September 9, 1814 (writings of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, vol. 11, p. 422).

DEAR SIR: I am sorry to learn by Francis's letter that you are not yet recovered from your rheumatism, and much wonder you do not go and pass a summer at the warm springs. From the examples I have seen I should entertain no doubt of a radical cure. The transactions at Washington and Alexandria are indeed beyond expectation. The circumjacent country is mostly disaffected, but I should have thought the motions of the enemy long enough known and their object probable enough to have called the well-affected counties of Virginia and Maryland into place. Nobody who knows the President can doubt but that he has honestly done everything he could do to the best of his judgment. And there is no sounder judgment than his. I can not account for what has happened but by giving credit to the rumors which circulate against Armstrong, who is presumptuous, obstinate, and injudicious. I should hope the law would lay hold of Sims, &c., if it could lay hold of anything, after the experiment on Burr. But Congress itself can punish Alexandria by repealing the law which made it a town, by discontinuing it as a port of entry or clearance, and perhaps by suppressing its banks. But I expect all will go off with impunity. If our Government ever fails it will be from this weakness. No government can be maintained without the principle of fear as well as of duty. Good men will obey the last, but bad ones the former only. Our country is a desert. None are to be met in the roads but grayheads. About 800 men are gone from it, & chiefly volunteers. But I fear they can not be armed. I think the truth must now be obvious that our people are too happy at home to enter into regular service, and that we cannot be defended but by making every citizen a soldier, as the Greeks and Romans, who had no standing armies, and that in doing this all must be marshalled, classed by their ages, and every service ascribed to its competent class.

Ever affectionately, yours,

G. An estimate of the land militia of the United States by Thomas Jefferson (writings of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, vol. 10, p. 209).

The census of 1800 gave us of free white males—

Of 16 and under 26	384, 554
Of 26 and under 45	423, 836

Our military age, excluding those under 18, we must from the number 384, 554 Deduct those in the seventeenth and eighteenth years, which, by

Buffon's tables, will be 80, 405

Remain of the age of 18 and under 45, towit, the minor and junior classes 304, 149

Our census of 1790 and 1800 having showed our increase to be in a geometrical ratio of 3½ per cent per annum, the increase from 1800 to 1805 is 54. 184

Leaving our whole number of free white males from 18 to 26 in 1805 358, 333

From these are to be deducted the Naval militiamen, but for the greater part of those employed in the foreign trade and whale fisheries being always absent, it is believed that not half of them were included in the census. Those supposed included then are 35,000, of which, according to Buffon, those of 18 and under 26 will be only 11, 711

Leaving of free white landsmen from 18 to 26 in 1805 346, 622

From these are still to be deducted those not able-bodied; suppose them 1 to 10 34, 662

Leaving of free, white able-bodied landsmen of 18 and under 26 311, 960

To find what proportions of these will be of the minor and what of the junior class, we are to inquire, of 311,960 persons of 18 and under 26 years of age, how many will there be of each different year of age? Buffon's tables resolve them as follows: As 84,589 in Buffon from 18 to 26: to 311,960 in the United States of the same age: so are 11,014 in Buffon in their nineteenth year: to  $x$ , the number in the United States in their nineteenth year; then

$$x = \frac{311,960}{84,589} \times 11,014 = 3.69 \times 11,014.$$

Consequently those in their—

$$84,589$$

Buffon's Nos. In U.S.

19th year will be  $3.69 \times 11,014 = 40,619$   
 20th year will be  $3.69 \times 10,919 = 42,267$   
 21st year will be  $3.69 \times 10,768 = 39,712$

22d year will be  $3.69 \times 10,675 = 39,368$

23d year will be  $3.69 \times 10,514 = 38,775$

24th year will be  $3.69 \times 10,380 = 38,281$

25th year will be  $3.69 \times 10,259 = 37,834$

26th year will be  $3.69 \times 10,060 = 37,100$

311,956      311,956 of the junior class.

To obtain the respective numbers of the middle and senior classes,  
 the census of 1800 gave for both \_\_\_\_\_ 423,836  
 Add the increase from 1800 to 1805 \_\_\_\_\_ 75,506

From which are to be deducted seamen from 26 to 45 \_\_\_\_\_ 499,342  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 23,289

Deduct those also not able-bodied, suppose 1 in 10 \_\_\_\_\_ 476,053  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 47,605

Leaves free, white, able-bodied landsmen from 26 to 45 \_\_\_\_\_ 428,448

Buffon's tables make the numbers of 26 and under 35=84,182, and those of 35 and under 45=84,018.

These are so nearly equal that we may consider the middle class one-half, to wit \_\_\_\_\_ 214,224  
 And the senior class one-half, to wit \_\_\_\_\_ 214,224

#### RECAPITULATION.

Naval militia _____	50,000
Land militia :	
Minor class _____	120,598
Junior class _____	191,358
Middle class _____	214,224
Senior class _____	214,224
	740,404
	790,404

On Dec. 31, 1805, Jefferson wrote to Dearborn:

"Considering that the important thing is to get the militia classes so that we may get at the young for a year's service at a time, and that training may be supplied after they are called out, I think we may give up every part of the bill which respects training & arming. Let us once get possession of the principle, & future Congresses will train & arm. In this way we get rid of all those enemies to the bill to whom different details would be objectionable. I send you the bill thus modified, & I have thrown in a few words in the clause beginning with the words 'The junior class shall be liable,' &c., in order that the law may execute itself without waiting for any legislature. Will you be so good as to communicate it to General Varmum & Mr. Bidwell? The sooner the better."

*H. An act for classing the militia and assigning to each class its particular duties, by Thomas Jefferson. (Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Federal Edition, volume 10, p. 218.)*

*Be it enacted, &c., That every free, able-bodied white male citizen of the United States of the age of 18 years and under the age of 45 whose principal occupation is not on the high sea or the tidewaters within the United States shall be of the militia for the land service of the United States.*

**Enrollment:** The persons so to constitute the land militia shall be enrolled by their names and ages and their proper districts, and in books to be kept for that purpose; such enrollment to be made without delay of those now within the description, and from time to time as to others who shall hereafter become so, always noting the date of the enrollment and placing in a distinct page or part of the book those of every different year of age, from 45 down to 18. In deciding on the ages of the persons to be enrolled, the officer shall make up his judgment from the information of the party himself, and from such other information as he can obtain, and where this is not satisfactory, then from his own inspection.

**Classification:** The said militia shall be distributed into classes as follows, to wit: The junior class shall be composed of those above 21 and under 26 years of age, the middle class of those above 26 and under 35 years of age, the senior class of those above 35 and under 45 years of age, and those above 18 and under 21 years of age shall compose the minor class.

**Their training:** The junior and minor classes shall each have their separate captains and other inferior officers, those for the juniors being selected with a view to actual service, and shall be strictly trained to the exercises and maneuvers of a soldier, either of artillery, infantry, or cavalry, as may be lawfully designated; for which purpose they shall be mustered and trained one whole day in every month of the year, two of which musters shall be in battalion and the others in companies. The captains of the said two classes, with the general and field officers having command over them, shall form a district court-martial for the rigorous enforcement of the duties of attendance and training. Each person of the said junior class shall be furnished with a good musket, bayonet, and cartridge-box at the public expense, so soon as they can be provided, which, except where he shall be of the cavalry or artillery, he shall be bound to produce in good order at every muster of which he shall be, so long as he shall be under the age of 45 years, after which it shall be his property.

Where, at the passing of this act, any members of the militia shall be in the possession of such arms provided by his State or Territory, or by himself, the same shall be reviewed and valued by some person appointed on the part of the United States and if found in perfect order, and of proper caliber, they shall be paid for by the United States if such be the choice of the party furnishing them, and shall thereafter be in the hands of the holder as the property of the United States, under the same trust and right as if they had been originally furnished him by the United States.

The middle class shall in like manner be formed into companies by themselves, to be commanded by their own captains and other inferior officers; they shall be mustered and trained twice only in the year in companies, and once in battalion. The senior class, in distinct companies, also, and under its own captains and other inferior officials, shall be mustered and trained one day in the year only in companies, and one in battalion; and both the middle and senior classes shall be under the jurisdiction of their captains, formed into one and the same court-martial, with the general and field officers having command over them.

**Actual service:** The junior class shall be liable to perform all active military service within the United States, or the countries next adjacent (in their vicinity) by tours of duty not to exceed one year in any two; and in order that the said services may be required of them equally, those of every company (battalion) shall be divided by lot into ten parts or portions, as nearly equal as may be, each portion to be distinguished by its particular number, from 1 to 10 and to be called into duty in the order of their numbers, such call extending to so many numbers as the exigency may require; and every person so called on may be assigned to the service of the artillery, infantry, cavalry, or of any other description as the competent authority shall direct.

The middle class shall be liable to be called on to do duty within their State only, or in one of the adjoining States, and that by tours not exceeding three months in any year, for which purpose they shall be distributed into portions and numbers and called on in routine, as is provided in the case of the junior class.

The senior and minor classes shall be liable to be called on to do duty within their own State only and by tours not exceeding three months in any year, and they shall be separately distributed into


portions and numbers and called on in routine as provided for the other classes.


Exemption from militia duty shall only extend to the ordinary duties of mustering and training after having entered the middle or senior class. Such exempts shall nevertheless be enrolled in their classes and numbers and, when called on for actual military service, shall be bound, as others are, to perform their due tours.

If any person called on to do the actual duties of his class shall refuse or unnecessarily delay to enter on duty, he shall be arrested as a deserter either by the civil or military authority, shall be delivered to the proper military officer, and either punished as a deserter or compelled to perform his tour of duty; but any person so called on may commute his personal services by tendering as a substitute an able-bodied, free white man fit for the service, in the judgment of the officer who is to command him, and willing to engage therein. And all persons while engaged in the performance of a tour of duty shall have the pay and rations allowed in the Army of the United States and be subject to the rules, regulations, and articles provided for the government of the same.

All provisions in any law of the United States, or of any particular State or Territory, inconsistent with those of this act are hereby repealed; and all provisions in the laws of the United States, or of any particular State or Territory, not inconsistent herewith shall be understood to be left in force and liable to alteration by their respective enacting authorities.







TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

*W. C. Brewster* HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENTS OF

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE P. SCRIVEN  
*Chief Signal Officer*

AND

LIEUT. COL. SAMUEL REBER  
*Assistant*

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JANUARY 18, 1916




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TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Tuesday, January 18, 1916.

The committee this day met, Hon. James Hay (chairman) pres-  
iding.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Scriven, we will hear you now.

STATEMENTS OF BRIG. GEN. GEORGE P. SCRIVEN, CHIEF SIGNAL  
OFFICER, AND LIEUT. COL. SAMUEL REBER, ASSISTANT.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you are the chief signal officer of the  
Army?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I am; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any proposition in this bill sent up by  
the War Department for an increase in the Signal Corps, outside  
of the aviation section, either of commissioned officers or enlisted  
men?

Gen. SCRIVEN. By the War Department? No, sir; not that I know  
of, as I do not know what the War Department has sent up. I have  
submitted some tables and have some arguments showing the neces-  
sity, as we see it, for an increase in the service of information for  
the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not recommended by the General Staff?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir; the General Staff recommended an in-  
crease in its study, and I think there is something in the pay tables  
which would indicate that. Have you a copy of the War Depart-  
ment's measure, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. "That the Signal Corps, exclusive of the aviation  
section thereof, shall consist of the commissioned officers now allowed  
by law, forty-seven master signal electricians, one hundred and  
fifty-five first-class sergeants, two hundred and four sergeants, two  
hundred and seventy-three corporals, thirty-two cooks, seven hun-  
dred and seventy-four first-class privates, two hundred and thirty-  
three privates."

Gen. SCRIVEN. The law allows a total of 1,212 men in the Signal  
Corps. The total enlisted strength of the present Signal Corps is 36  
master signal electricians, 132 first-class sergeants, 144 sergeants, 156  
corporals, 24 cooks, 552 first-class privates, and 166 privates, a total  
of 1,212.

The CHAIRMAN. This proposition is an increase; this increases the  
master signal electricians by 11 and the first-class sergeants by the  
difference between 55 and 32, which is 23?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So you have asked for an increase?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I have asked for one; yes, sir; but not as stated there. I have here the proposed organization. And I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am speaking according to my conscience and my vocabulary, as the Secretary of War suggested. I have here the organization that I have asked for in the annual report of the Chief Signal Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. What I would like to know, General, is the reason for this increase asked for by the War Department; for instance, you want 55 master signal electricians in place of 47?

Gen. SCRIVEN. It is a slight increase arbitrarily selected. I can find no other reason for that. It is very acceptable, because it is an increase which we are badly in need of.

The CHAIRMAN. That comes by reason of the suggested increase in the Army?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I think so; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking for 73 additional aviation officers. I wish you would state the reason for that.

Gen. SCRIVEN. In order to explain it thoroughly, I think it might be well for me to state to the committee the scope, as I understand it, of the aviation service which is needed at the present time. I will do that briefly, sir, and give you the figures in regard to that.

The organization of the aviation units in the foreign armies suggests a squadron of 12 machines as the basis for our organization, 8 of these machines to be of the reconnaissance type and two each of the pursuit and combat type. In case the Army remains at its present authorized strength the personnel of the aviation section should be increased to give the sufficient personnel to supply seven aero squadrons, one for each of the four tactical divisions organized for duty in the United States, three for over-seas garrisons, and a detachment for duty at the aviation school.

It is to be pointed out that there is additional need for at least one squadron for reconnaissance work in each of the three Coast Artillery districts in this country, and that a sufficient number of aeroplanes should be provided for fire direction and control of the Field Artillery on the basis of one aeroplane per battery, with one in reserve, or, in round numbers, six aero squadrons for this arm. This calls for the addition of nine squadrons to those above mentioned.

While the above-mentioned force will give a personnel for a flying establishment in time of peace, a much greater number of officers and men will be required in time of actual hostilities. As a step toward getting the flying men necessary to meet war conditions, an aviation reserve corps should be created including citizen aviators, mechanics, and constructors of air craft. The officers of the aviation reserve corps should be such qualified polits of American citizenship as shall have demonstrated their fitness for the aviation service under regulations to be established by the Secretary of War, and should be subject to call whenever hostilities are imminent. On entering the corps these officers should agree to serve at least three weeks in each year at one of the aviation stations in the country, and while so serving should receive the pay and allowances of a first lieutenant. The men should be enrolled as members of definite organizations of the aviation reserve corps, and while so enrolled and while actually so engaged or employed in business connected

with the operation or manufacture of air craft or certain air-craft materials, should be given pay upon a peace basis. Members of the aviation reserve corps should be subject to call to aviation service, and while on such service should receive the same pay per grade as in the Regular Army. Organizations of the aviation reserve corps should conform to similar organizations in the Regular Army.

It is believed that the personnel needed for such an organization is available in the country. Although there are very few skillful cross-country fliers among the civilian pilots in the United States, there is undoubtedly material among them that could be utilized at the outbreak of hostilities. The methods of recruiting and officering such troops would be entirely dependent on the methods adopted by the line of the Army.

I have said that the organization of the aviation units in foreign armies suggests a squadron of 12 machines as the basis of the present organization. We have heretofore had eight machines, which we have called squadrons. They have been scout machines. It seems desirable, in accordance with the present practice, to add a third company of four machines, two of which shall be what we call pursuit machines, capable of pursuing dirigibles or attacking aeroplanes, and two of them heavy carrying machines, which would be capable of carrying a considerable amount of ammunition in the shape of bombs, and which could be used for combat or destructive purposes. That makes the squadron as at present proposed 12 instead of 8.

Now, it is also, I think, to be accepted that an aeroplane is an expendable article. It is like ammunition used with the gun. It is subject to destruction, and therefore we must have 12 machines for replacement, and also a reserve of 12, so that a squadron consists of 36 machines. In case the Army remains at its present authorized strength, the personnel of the aviation section should be increased to give sufficient personnel to supply the following aero squadrons: One for each of the four tactical divisions organized for duty in the United States, three for over-sea garrisons, and a detachment for the aviation school.

In regard to the recommendation for the establishment of a flying reserve corps in time of peace, the time has gone by when it is worth while counting the number of machines, except in estimates of cost. Mr. Curtis told me the other day that his factory could turn out 10 machines a day, and the total output of the country would probably be 20 at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Per day?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Per day. Therefore, we can get the machines, as things are now, without any difficulty whatever.

But it is necessary to consider the question of organization.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say 20 machines a day, do you mean 20 complete machines?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I understand so; yes, sir. When my report was written I put the number down as 100 a month. It has been largely increased since then and additional factories have been added. I think we can count on several hundred machines a month.

The CHAIRMAN. How many factories are there?

Gen. SCRIVEN. They are increasing all the time. I think there are five or six now which we can count on.

In case the Army remains at its present authorized strength the personnel of the aviation section should be increased by 46 officers and 462 men to give sufficient personnel to supply five aero squadrons, one for each of the five tactical divisions at present organized in the Army, and to maintain the aviation school. It is to be pointed out, however, that there is need for at least one squadron for reconnaissance work in each of the three Coast Artillery districts in this country, and that a sufficient number of aeroplanes should be provided for fire direction and control for the Field Artillery on the basis of one aeroplane per battery, with one in reserve, or in round numbers, six aero squadrons for this arm. This calls for the addition of nine squadrons to those already mentioned.

As I have said, if the reorganization plan of the Army by the War Department, which calls for seven tactical divisions and five cavalry brigades, should be approved by Congress, provisions should be made for one aero squadron for Corregidor, one for Hawaii, one for the Canal Zone, one for each of the three Coast Artillery districts in the United States, one for each of the tactical divisions and five for the Field Artillery, giving in all 18 squadrons, with a total strength of 368 officers, counting 20 officers to a squadron and 6 officers for the school, with a total strength of 368 officers and 2,360 enlisted men.

The CHAIRMAN. The War Department recommends 133 officers.

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir. That would be the total number of aviation officers required for seven squadrons, less the seven squadrons commanders, and providing no officers for the school.

The CHAIRMAN. And 710 enlisted men. How many officers are now authorized by law?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Sixty.

The CHAIRMAN. How many have you in the corps?

Gen. SCRIVEN. There are precisely 46 now on aviation duty.

The CHAIRMAN. How long has this law been in operation?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Since July 18, 1914.

The CHAIRMAN. About 18 months?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not yet been able to get the 60 officers which the law allows?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir. The following table shows the total number of officers that have been on aviation duty:

Officers on duty at time of passage of act-----	18
Officers detailed since passage of act-----	39

Total-----	57
Loss by death-----	2
Loss, relieved-----	9

Now on duty-----	46
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The CHAIRMAN. Are all the officers who are at present in this corps fliers?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of them are fliers, and how many have been fliers?

Gen. SCRIVEN. The total number of fliers has been 43, of whom 23 are now flying, 14 have been relieved, and 6 killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Reber is in charge of aviation?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not a flier, but all the others are; is that correct?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I think so.

Col. REBER. Mr. Chairman, there is only one man on flying duty who has not qualified yet as a flier, but he is under instruction. He is flying. I am the only man who has not indulged in flying, and I have had no opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Taking into consideration the fact that you have had the law in operation for 18 months and have not been able to fill the Aviation Corps, how long do you think it would take you to get the 73 officers? They have to volunteer in time of peace. You can not detail any man to fly. He can refuse to fly; therefore you can not detail him, unless he accepts the duty voluntarily.

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you recommend a law requiring these officers to fly?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the system as now in operation, how soon could you expect to increase the officers to 123?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Under the present law we never could get them, but I think that many of the restrictions of the law can be revoked to great advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state what those restrictions are, and why you think they ought to be revoked?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes, sir. The law limits the detail of aviation students to such unmarried lieutenants of the line as are under 30 years of age. This limitation makes the process of filling the aviation section up to its authorized strength a matter of serious difficulty. I have a table here which shows the number of first lieutenants of the line who are unmarried, under 30 years of age.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of them are there?

Gen. SCRIVEN. In the Cavalry, of those who are unmarried under 30 years of age, the total number eligible is  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

The CHAIRMAN. How many is that?

Gen. SCRIVEN. The total in the eligible list is 6, who have had more than 2 years' service.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there are only 6 lieutenants of Cavalry who are eligible?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Six first lieutenants.

The CHAIRMAN. How many second lieutenants?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Of the second lieutenants there are 143 in the Cavalry, 59 in the Field Artillery, 127 in the Coast Artillery, and 274 in the Infantry, making a total of 603 second lieutenants, and a total of first and second lieutenants of 668.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the present law you have only 668 officers of the line to draw upon?

Gen. SCRIVEN. 668 officers of the line to draw upon, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You can not draw upon them unless they volunteer?

Gen. SCRIVEN. You can not draw upon them unless they volunteer.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been the experience of the Signal Corps as to whether or not these officers do volunteer?

Gen. SCRIVEN. They volunteer rather freely.

The CHAIRMAN. What other restriction is there?

Gen. SCRIVEN. It is to be observed that only 6.4 per cent of the first lieutenants and 64.9 per cent of the second lieutenants, or 34.4 per cent of both first and second lieutenants of the line of the Army are eligible for detail. Approximately one-fifth of the applicants for this duty fail to pass the prescribed physical examination. That is a very rigid medical examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you whether or not you think the rigidity of that examination ought to be relaxed?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Not at all, sir. If this ratio persists only 27 per cent of the total number of lieutenants in the line of the Army are eligible. As, for obvious reasons, it is not considered advisable to detail officers who have had less than one year's experience in the military establishments on aviation duty, the percentage of those eligible is still further reduced. The requirement that an officer be unmarried is believed unnecessary, for the reason that the service is purely voluntary, and no married officer will apply for duty unless he has carefully considered the extra hazard connected therewith.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that restriction ought to be removed?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I do, sir. This extra hazard is compensated for by the increased pay and the extra gratuity allowed under the act of July 18, 1914. In this connection it is to be pointed out that if the reports of the present war in Europe are correct, the air service is less hazardous than that in the trenches. Moreover, several officers who were detailed for aviation duty have subsequently married while on this duty, and it is believed that more will marry. The practical effect of this proviso is merely to reduce the number of eligible lieutenants and not to keep the aviation officers in a state of singleness. That has been the experience of many officers.

The CHAIRMAN. They generally get married and have to go out?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir; they stay in.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you could not have anybody in the corps who is married?

Col. REBER. There is nothing in the law that compels them to go out.

The CHAIRMAN. They can only go in if they are unmarried. That is the way you have construed the law?

Col. REBER. That is the way the department has construed it.

Gen. SCRIVEN. It is believed that the age limit of 30 years is not only unnecessary but works a detriment to the aviation service. Owing to the demands of the service and the small number of officers in the Signal Corps, it has been found impracticable to detail more officers from it than those now connected with the aviation section—three in number. The main source of supply for officers for the aviation section is the commissioned personnel of the line of the Army. The effect of the existing law is to fill the aviation section with young and inexperienced officers of few years service, the vast majority of whom are second lieutenants.

Of the 29 line officers on duty with the aviation section on August 16, but 5 are first lieutenants. There are now 37 on duty, I believe.

Age and experience are necessary qualifications for the officers

selected to command aviation organizations. Under the present system it will be impracticable to obtain officers who are old enough and who have served long enough to have acquired the necessary experience for the command of aviation organizations. Age in itself is not a limitation on an individual's ability to learn to fly. We have very strong evidence of that in the case of Capt. Foulois, who is probably the very best man in all the flying service in this country. He is approaching the time of his promotion to a captaincy in the Infantry and will necessarily be relieved from the Aviation Corps. He is much more valuable there than he has ever been. He directed the flights from Fort Sill to San Diego.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would remove the age limit?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes; I would, by all means. Those things, of course, were looked upon as necessary in the earlier days, because it was considered extra hazardous.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you put any age limit on it?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, sir; I think it should be decided by the man himself.

The CHAIRMAN. General, from your experience in recruiting men for the aviation corps, if we removed the restrictions you have recommended to be removed, do you think you would be able to recruit the corps up to 137 officers?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I think we could bring it up to 137. I do not believe we could ever get a sufficient number of men from the Army itself to form an adequate aviation organization for war.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you recommended or advised any plan by which the Army can, in time of war, be supplied with fliers?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I have. I have devised a tentative sort of plan.

While the above-mentioned force will give a personnel for a flying establishment in time of peace, a much greater number of officers and men will be required in time of actual hostilities. As a step toward getting the flying men necessary to meet war conditions, an aviation reserve corps should be created including citizen aviators, mechanics, and constructors of air craft. The officers of the aviation reserve corps should be such qualified pilots of American citizenship as shall have demonstrated their fitness for the aviation service under regulations to be established by the Secretary of War and should be subject to call whenever hostilities are imminent. On entering the corps these officers should agree to serve at least three weeks in each year at one of the aviation stations in the country, and while so serving should receive the pay and allowances of a first lieutenant. The men should be enrolled as members of definite organizations of the aviation reserve corps, and while so enrolled and while actually so engaged or employed in business connected with the operation or manufacture of air craft or certain air-craft materials should be given pay upon a peace basis. Members of the aviation reserve corps should be subject to call to aviation service, and while on such service should receive the same pay per grade as in the Regular Army. Organizations of the aviation corps should conform to similar organizations in the Regular Army.

It is believed that the personnel needed for such an organization is available in the country. Although there are very few skillful cross-country fliers among the civilian pilots in the United States,

there is undoubtedly material among them that could be utilized at the outbreak of hostilities. The methods of recruiting and officering such troops would be entirely dependent on the methods adopted by the line of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any fliers in the Organized Militia in the several States?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes; there are some fliers there. How many there are it is almost impossible to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you not a report in regard to that?

Gen. SCRIVEN. We have nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. As to the Organized Militia of the States?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I think there are a very few in the Organized Militia. Perhaps Col. Reber can tell you about that. It has been proposed in New York to adopt a very extensive scheme in that regard, but so far as the actual outcome is concerned, I think it is exceedingly limited.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us anything about that, Col. Reber?

Col. REBER. The situation is this: In the State of New York an aeroplane has been presented by some private parties to the State, and it has been accepted by the State, and they have, to my knowledge, two pilots who are flying. In addition to that they are organizing an aviation detachment in which they are going to have at least four officers under instruction at Hempstead Plains.

I have received a letter from the gentleman who is in charge of this work, and he has written me that they have obtained two planes now at Hempstead Field.

I believe the State of Rhode Island has been presented with one. Whether they have any fliers or not I do not know. There has been a movement to present aeroplanes to the militia, and they have been accepted. As yet we have not any definite information as to the ability of the people to fly.

I might say that none of the States as far as I know has made as yet any application to the Federal Government for machines or for instruction for their officers in our aviation school.

The Militia Division and we are prepared, in case the States desire any of their officers to attend the aviation school, to allow them to do so in the same way that any of the militia officers can attend any other of the service schools.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be prepared to furnish the plans and necessary equipment?

Col. REBER. That is simply a question for the States; they can utilize their money as they please.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose Congress appropriates money enough for that purpose, it can be done by the Signal Corps?

Col. REBER. Yes; and we can supply them with anything else they need.

The CHAIRMAN. With hangars?

Col. REBER. We can give them plans and specifications on which they can have hangars built, or anything of that sort. If they have the money to pay for it, we can do the rest.

The CHAIRMAN. From your information, is there material in the different States which would lead you to believe that you could recruit quite a large number of people in the different States who could fly?

Col. REBER. That is rather a difficult question to answer. All I can say is this, that our experience has been that it takes six months to make an aviator. There is evidently plenty of material, if the material is willing to take six months' training. There are plenty of men who can learn to fly. There is enough material all over the country which could be utilized.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell the committee how many men in the United States are engaged in flying—outside the Army?

Col. REBER. That is rather difficult, but I do not believe at this time there are more than 12 or 14 professional fliers who are making a living out of it. There are, as I recall it, some 350 who are called licensed pilots. These pilots are not necessarily cross-country fliers. They are people who have simply taken the first step, and who have received their certificate of qualification.

The CHAIRMAN. So that outside the Army there are only 358 men in the country who are able to fly at all?

Col. REBER. No; because that 358 includes the men in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Outside of the Army, there are a little over 300 men?

Col. REBER. Approximately that.

The CHAIRMAN. Who can fly at all?

Col. REBER. That we know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think, from the information you have, that it would be feasible, if the appropriation were made, to have the different States instruct these people who desire to fly how to do it? Have you any officer who could be detailed to a group of States for the purpose of teaching those people how to fly?

Col. REBER. Yes; we have a number. But if you will pardon me, Mr. Chairman, I would not suggest that way of doing it. I would suggest sending the officers to our schools and let us train them there, and let them go back to the States and fly, if the States have the equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you confine it to men who hold commissions in the Organized Militia, or would you take in anybody who is willing to learn to fly?

Col. REBER. I would be glad to do that, but that is a question of policy for the War Department and Congress to decide, whether we should do that. We are prepared to do it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think as to whether or not it ought to be done?

Col. REBER. I think it would be a good thing to establish a general flying school.

Mr. KAHN. The fliers we have are all commissioned officers, are they not?

Col. REBER. No, sir; some of them are enlisted men.

Mr. KAHN. How many are enlisted men?

Col. REBER. We have 7 enlisted men who are fliers. We have had 21 under instruction, altogether. That, of course, is voluntary duty, and any man who wants to fly is given the opportunity to do so.

Mr. KAHN. You have only had that small number of men out of the entire enlisted men of the Army?

The CHAIRMAN. There are 260 authorized as the enlisted strength of the corps.

Col. REBER. We have 242.

Mr. KAHN. Along the line of questions the chairman was asking, I wish to ask if you think the service would be improved if you were allowed to take enlisted men from the line of the Army to become fliers, if the law were amended in that respect?

Col. REBER. I think I can answer that by indirection, because any enlisted man in the United States Army who desires to be transferred to the aviation section is promptly accepted. They all know they have this opportunity of transferring. My inference has been that they do not want to be transferred.

The CHAIRMAN. They have to volunteer; you can not detach the men?

Col. REBER. No; we do not.

Mr. CALDWELL. How many can you train at a time?

Col. REBER. That depends entirely on our plant.

Mr. CALDWELL. With your present plant?

Col. REBER. We have 25 people under instruction to-day. We have a limited plant, because the appropriation is limited. If we had more money, we could do more work.

Mr. CALDWELL. Under your system could you have as many as 300 or 400 at a time by simply increasing the plant? Would that be too many?

Col. REBER. It would be if you made such a sudden increase all at once at the present time. If you asked me to train 400 to-day, I could not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have in the aviation section 260 men now authorized, and you are asking for 710?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your experience that the men in the line of the Army will volunteer for this service pretty freely?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. One reason why we have not filled up to the full limit of 260, which could have been done within two months, has been the fact that we have not had the physical cover for the men. At first the entire aviation section was located at North Island, San Diego, Cal., where we have only temporary construction. As we have recently been getting barracks elsewhere, by sending detachments away from San Diego we have more accommodations and can receive more people there. In the next few days I hope to have the full number of the 260 men authorized by law.

The CHAIRMAN. You think you will have no trouble getting 710 men?

Col. REBER. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. You have more trouble to get the officers than to get the men?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. I do not think we will have any trouble in getting the necessary number of officers to fill what is, I take it, the War Department's program of seven squadrons if the limitations are removed. Also I think that with the increased knowledge of the work of the aviation section, the increased knowledge the Army has had of the importance of aviation, we will get them more rapidly than we did in the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Scriven, how many machines have you now?

Gen. SCRIVEN. We have 25, and 2 enroute to San Diego. There are 25 on hand to-day.

Col. REBER. We have actually in our possession 19 that the Government owns to-day. We have 6 under orders, 4 of which are now on the field awaiting trial at San Diego. I think these 6 will pass the trials, but we have these pending delivery.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice in the hearings of last year that Gen. Scriven stated at that time that you had 21 machines, and that you had \$40,000 in the appropriation left over from the previous fiscal year—the year 1915. We appropriated last year, I think, \$250,000 for the purchase of machines.

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A machine costs \$10,000.

Col. REBER. Approximately.

The CHAIRMAN. And counting in the upkeep, how many machines would \$250,000 buy?

Col. REBER. Mr. Chairman, because we have this number of machines that does not show that we had a good many more. There have been some broken up in accidents.

Gen. SCRIVEN. The total number of aeroplanes heretofore recorded as dropped is 34.

Col. REBER. We have owned 59 machines, including those under orders, but we have left out those that have been wrecked in accidents, so that the number now is only 25. Every time there is one smashed up it has been taken away from the actual number of machines we have. It is gone, and so the actual number of machines we have on hand does not represent the number we have had during any year.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you machines enough now sufficient for the number of men in your corps?

Col. REBER. You mean as it stands to-day?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Col. REBER. No, sir; we are short several machines according to the program of the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you means on hand to buy machines?

Col. REBER. No, sir; we have not. That is the trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. How many machines do you calculate you will have if this recommendation is put into effect?

Col. REBER. Which recommendation do you mean, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The recommendation for 73 additional officers and 450 enlisted men.

Col. REBER. On the basis of 7 squadrons, with 12 machines for each squadron, that would be 84 machines. We have got to have at the school 6 or 8 training machines. Of those 74 we have at present 12, and that would mean the purchase of 72 new machines.

Of course, we must consider this, that after we have issued a machine to a squadron it becomes a part of its equipment. As soon as that machine is broken up through accident we replace that by another machine.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of your experience in the past, how soon do you believe you will be able to fill up the 73 officers and the 450 enlisted men?

Col. REBER. I do not think we will have any difficulty in doing that in two years.

The CHAIRMAN. How many machines do you think you ought to have appropriated for in the appropriation bill for the year 1917?

Col. REBER. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that by first asking what will be the organization we will have?

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming you will have the organization recommended.

Col. REBER. Seven squadrons?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Col. REBER. Before I go into that, I want to say that we have found the average life of a machine, based upon actual experience, to be one year and one month. Owing to a shortage of equipment and the times we have been compelled to suspend flying, we have not had machines as frequently as now. The average life of a machine can be said to be a year. For the equipment of each organization the machine part of it would have to be renewed each year. On that basis, if you gave us seven aero squadrons, we would want a complete equipment of 84 machines. With those machines, in order to keep them going throughout the years, you would require a certain amount of maintenance or a certain percentage of renewals.

If you are going on the service basis the war has developed, you would require one machine for purposes of replacement and then another machine behind it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you want three times 84 machines?

Col. REBER. I do not think you will need that many in peace times. That is a war proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. You only want 84 in time of peace?

Col. REBER. Eighty-four? No, sir; I want 8 or 10 machines for the schools, if you are going to increase the schools, and then I have found from experience that the average maintenance cost of a machine which is broken up in a year is between \$4,000 and \$5,000, but that will be decidedly reduced as soon as we get the permanent plant and hangars.

I have charged against the maintenance cost the entire cost of hangars and buildings, which will disappear after the buildings are up. Then the maintenance cost would come down.

The CHAIRMAN. You would want 84 machines and a certain sum for upkeep?

Col. REBER. Yes; plus the machines we would want at the schools.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you would want 96 machines?

Col. REBER. Yes; plus the cost of maintenance and upkeep.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be about a million dollars, would it not?

Col. REBER. Our estimate is \$1,358,000. As time goes on, machines are going to be more expensive.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you not think you ought to buy the very best type of machines to protect the lives of the men?

Col. REBER. I certainly do. The type of machine has had little to do with the cost. It has been a question of the manufacturer's demands, what the manufacturer thought he could get.

The CHAIRMAN. At the present time you can get machines without any trouble at all?

Col. REBER. No trouble except deliveries.

The CHAIRMAN. How many machines can you get in a week?

Col. REBER. If I could go in the market to-day and want to get the machines in a hurry, they would tell me they are filled up with orders, but if there were war conditions in the country and we

needed the machines in a hurry, the manufacturers would turn over their output and we could get an ample supply. It is simply a commercial proposition now.

May I call attention to the figures in the War Department's measure which you have, and to the difference between that and what we had figured on for the number of officers in squadrons.

The organization of squadrons prescribed by the War Department calls for 20 officers. In the seven squadrons that would make a total of 140 officers. We must have an organization at the school, which requires 64 officers. So that makes a total of 146 officers. If you will take the 60 now allowed by law away from that you will find that the necessary increase is 86 instead of 73.

That, of course, presupposes you will give us the organization prescribed by the tables, and that you will have a major in command of each squadron. I had suggested that in order to meet that condition the way would be to simply give temporary rank to the officer commanding a squadron, just as in the case of the officers who command the Philippine Scout battalions. When one of those men went off the job he lost his rank, and somebody else would take it. It would not be a permanent increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Col. Reber, the newspapers charged last summer that the machines at San Diego were very unsafe machines to use. What have you to say about that?

Col. REBER. I do not think there is any basis or foundation for those charges.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that came out in the Goodier court-martial case.

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. The machines we bought then, the particular machines they referred to were the machines which were specified by the officers of the aviation school, with the assistance of Mr. Loening, who is an aeronautical engineer of standing and who is now vice president and general manager of the Sturdevant Aeroplane Co.

In a theoretical investigation which arose at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Naval Constructor Hunsaker said that at certain angles these machines would be dangerous. This was in discussing the angle of pitch and the angle of roll. The statement meant that the machines were dynamically unstable at certain angles if sufficient control was not used. It was subsequently stated that the machines could not climb a certain height in a certain distance at a given angle of incidence.

The machines were carefully tested subsequently by Capt. Foulois and Lieut. Milling.

They reported that with half the angle of instance it made it possible to climb and they were safe. They were flown from Fort Sill to Fort Sam Houston. In my judgment, those machines were safe. I do not care to go into a question of controversy with a newspaper.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to bring out the facts. I think it is proper that we should know about these things.

Col. REBER. I wish you would know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is also charged, Col. Reber, that Capt. Patterson, I believe, who has been put in charge of the Philippine aero squadron, has only flown something under an hour. Is there any truth in that statement?

Col. REBER. That statement, if you will limit it by dates, is perfectly correct. But if you ask me how much he has flown, I will read you his record. He has made 122 separate flights, with 48 hours and 54 minutes in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. So that it is not true that he has only flown 54 minutes?

Col. REBER. I said you would have to limit that by dates. This is his record up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time he was assigned to duty as commander of the aero squadron in the Philippines how much had he flown?

Col. REBER. Capt. Patterson was assigned in command of the aero company for Manila on December 1, 1915, at which time he had made 101 flights, with 39 hours and 47 minutes in the air. He sailed for Manila with the company on January 5. May I state what it meant by 54 minutes? At the time of the passage of the act approved July 18, 1914, there was a provision which said that within 60 days after the passage of the act those officers then on duty might be detailed by the Secretary of War as junior military aviators upon recommendation of the Chief Signal Officer, provided that they had shown by practical tests, including aerial flights, that they were especially well qualified for military aviation service.

I am depending on my memory for dates. About the 7th or 8th of September Capt. Patterson, who at that time was in the Latterman Hospital, came to San Diego, Cal. He then went up in the air with one of the best instructors we have, a civilian, under observation of two of our most experienced aviators, Capt. Foulois and Lieut. Milling. He spent his 54 minutes in the air. When he came down to the ground these officers told Capt. Cowan that they considered this man was qualified, and as a result of the recommendation Capt. Cowan sent a telegram recommending his detail.

This all happened when I was abroad, and so I am giving this from memory. The War Department then acted and detailed this man as junior military aviator under the law, because he had shown he was especially qualified for the detail. The law does not say a man has to be a skillful flyer, but recognizes the fact that he might not have had time to gain skill in flying. The detail was made.

Capt. Patterson continued his course of instruction. Immediately after his detail he was under a surgeon's charge. He was on sick report. He had to go on sick leave, and he went to the Mayo Bros.' Hospital and had a very extensive operation. He recovered from that, came back, finished his flying course, and he has gone to the Philippine Islands in command of a company. I think he is perfectly competent to command a company.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. Has there been any person connected with the aeroplane department of the Government who has resigned and gone into an organization for the manufacture of aeroplanes to be sold to the Government?

Col. REBER. Not that I can recall. In fact, I think every person who has been in the aviation service, except those who are out on account of accidents, is still in the service.

Mr. LITTLEPAGE. You know of no person now connected with the manufacture of aeroplanes who has resigned from the service and gone into that business?

Col. REBER. No, sir; not that I can recall.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Have you any knowledge of the aviation section of the Nebraska National Guard?

Col. REBER. No, sir; unfortunately I have not. Those things only come to me through the Militia Division. The only questions the Militia Division puts up to me are questions of cost and equipment.

Gen. Mills took up the question of instruction of the militia, and I said we would be glad to do that, but said, "You must remember our appropriation is limited." He said, "It can be arranged so that I can give you the money after the 1st of July for the training of those men." He said he could give me \$70,000. That amount will help us a good deal.

When you have to lay the machine up it costs money, and we have been too limited in funds up to the present time.

I would like to state that in the beginning of the aviation section, in the 18th of July, 1914, we had 18 officers and 104 men. To-day we have 46 officers and 242 men. I do not think we will have any trouble in developing the aviation section if certain of these limitations which were, perforce, put on as experiments are removed.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I understood you to say you had seven enlisted men who had qualified as aviators. Did that include those outside?

Col. REBER. No, sir; they have been in the aviation section.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. So you have only seven enlisted men altogether?

Col. REBER. No, sir; we have had 21, but of these 7 have become good flyers.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And the total number of flyers you have includes these seven men?

Col. REBER. Leaving out the students.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Men whom you consider are competent flyers?

Col. REBER. About 30. We have a number of officers who were in the aviation section and who could come back, and by a little training become a part of the flying force.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I understood you to say there were something like 15 professional flyers able to make a living out of the business at this time.

Col. REBER. No, sir; I said that of the professional flyers there were 12 or 15 making a living out of aviation at present, but of the total number of flyers, so called, some of them are not professional flyers. I do not believe there are—in fact, I have been told by aviators themselves—that the number of expert cross-country flyers to-day is less than the number of fingers on your hands.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You do not consider the 300 so-called flyers are to be depended upon?

Col. REBER. No; but I think there is a good deal of good material in the country which could be used as a part of a reserve corps for aviation. That could be created on the same lines as the present reserve for the Medical Corps.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You mean there are not over 10 first-class cross-country flyers in America?

Col. REBER. Outside of the Army to-day, but I should say that of the flyers who have taken their certificates and given three weeks or a month's training we might get 100. I think that in that body you have good material to draw upon, and it is partially trained material.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I did not exactly get the detail in regard to the matter the chairman asked you concerning Capt. Patterson—that is, in reference to the amount of experience he had before you commissioned him as an expert in charge of some aviation section. Did he operate the machine himself, or did he go as a passenger?

Col. REBER. He went up under observation. He could not operate the machine.

Mr. CALDWELL. You said the machines used in San Diego were of Government design?

Col. REBER. The Government furnished the specification. The specifications were drawn by the officers out there, but the machines were built by the Curtis Co., following their own designs, but built with our specifications.

Mr. CALDWELL. Built under the patent of the Curtis Co.?

Col. REBER. Built under their name. I do not know about their patents, because that involves the whole question in regard to the original patent. What we do is this: We require any manufacturer to bond us against any patent litigation.

Mr. OLNEY. What is the complement of a machine? Does an aviator have besides himself one or two mechanicians in connection with his machine?

Col. REBER. It takes a crew of six men to take care of a machine.

Mr. KAHN. Colonel, what is the type of machine that you use; is it a biplane or a monoplane?

Col. REBER. It is a biplane tractor, sir; that is, with the propellers in front. That is, it is a "puller" rather than a "pusher" with the propellers behind.

Mr. KAHN. Have you made any tests with any of the machines that are used by any of the European countries; for instance, the German *taube*?

Col. REBER. No, sir; because we have not been able to get any. We have been so poor that we have just about been able to keep our equipment going without doing any experimental work that has amounted to anything at all, sir.

Mr. KAHN. You have made no tests at all then with monoplanes?

Col. REBER. No, sir; we have not.

Mr. KAHN. Monoplanes are used, largely, are they not, in the European armies?

Col. REBER. Not so much as they were. Both sides are giving up the monoplane for the biplane?

Mr. KAHN. Have you read anything about the new machine that is being utilized—practically, I should judge, a dreadnaught in the air?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir; we have reports on all three types—English, French, and German—but our reports are more or less vague and indefinite. No government is now giving out any new data, but we have certain data and a certain records of performance only.

Mr. KAHN. Is there any doubt in your mind that they are using machines of the types suggested in the dispatches?

Col. REBER. None whatever, sir.

Mr. KAHN. You do not believe that is a figment of the imagination?

Col. REBER. No, sir. I say there is no doubt in my mind that they are using machines of those types, but as to the particular characteristics and size of the machines I would not be able to say, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Now, in case this war comes to an end and it should develop that they have been using these wonderful aircraft, would you think it would be well to go slow in the construction of machines of the type you have been using, in view of the possibility of getting those newer and more formidable machines that are now in use in the European armies?

Col. REBER. No, sir; for this reason: The life of any one of our machines is practically a year, and if the emergency should arrive we would need so many more of the present type plus the new type that I think any money spent on the present type would be well spent, and we would have ample leeway to use the other type also, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Now, with respect to Gen. Scriven's idea of a reserve corps; the men who are taught to fly outside of the Army learn through instructors furnished by the manufacturers of airplanes, largely, do they not?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think it would be feasible and practicable to get into touch with the manufacturers so that they could advise you when they have trained a man whom they believe to be a first-class man, so that your bureau of the War Department could get into touch with these men with a view to enrolling them in the reserve?

Col. REBER. Mr. Kahn, not only do I think it would be a good scheme, but practically it has been done already, sir.

Mr. KAHN. You are keeping in touch with those men?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. I get the name and the characteristics of every man that gets a pilot's certificate. I find out through the Aero Club of America—through the contest committee, of which I am a member myself.

Gen. SCRIVEN. If I may interrupt for a moment; in regard to these heavy machines you speak of, I happened to be talking with Mr. Santos Dumont the other day, and he said that undoubtedly a machine had been devised, and was now in use, with the power of carrying a free weight of three tons—some 6,000 pounds. I was very much astonished. We know that the Russians have had a very heavy weight carrying machine, but they have never done anything with it. They have gone, perhaps, a mile or two, or something of that sort, but they have showed no effectiveness. But Mr. Dumont made that statement, and I suppose that Mr. Santos Dumont knows as much about those things as anybody in the world.

Mr. KAHN. I would like to continue just a little further. Have you been able to follow the work of the Zeppelins—the dirigibles?

Gen. SCRIVEN. In a general way; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do you think it would be a good plan for our Army to have some dirigibles?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I think that in certain phases of activity, the coast defense, for instance, the dirigible is a very desirable thing. But whether that lies more with the Navy than with the Army is a question, of course, for Congress to decide. As for the dirigible in actual

field work, I do not think it has made good. Neither has it any destructive power; that is to say, taking the cost of it and the effort that is made, and all the expectations, it is a failure, so far as my reading shows.

Mr. KAHN. Have they not, as a matter of fact, done greater damage when they have dropped bombs than the flying machines?

Gen. SCRIVEN. They have done some damage, surely; but I am not sure that it is commensurate with the effort.

Mr. KAHN. Well, I have in my office here in this building a picture that was issued by the British Government calling for volunteers, with a legend on it that this was the damage done by a German dirigible; and according to that picture the wreckage was something terrific. Now, does the bomb dropped by an aeroplane accomplish the destruction that those heavier missiles accomplish? As I understand it, the dirigible can carry much heavier missiles.

Gen. SCRIVEN. Oh, yes. Of course, the bomb dropped by the aeroplane is a very small matter; that is to say, it has very slight destructive power, because, so far as we know, they have not had the power to carry free weight enough to make it worth while. They can carry a bomb or two, but it is not much. If you notice the reports, the dirigibles have done nothing since somewhere along in October and November, and the latest ideas from London appear to be that, in the face of the present methods used for defense—the anti-aircraft guns, the searchlights, and the aeroplanes especially—the day of dirigible attack on London is pretty well passed.

Mr. KAHN. Don't you think that is rather a matter of strategy? You noticed they would attack for two or three days hand running, and then, of course, they felt that everything was in readiness against further attacks and they quit. Now, when there is a relaxation of the vigilance, don't you think that they will probably try further attacks with the dirigibles?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Of course, if the dirigibles can have a perfectly clear field it is a very dangerous weapon; but it has never had those favorable circumstances.

Col. REBER. If you would care to have it, Mr. Kahn, I have a list of the raids made both by dirigibles and aeroplanes. It is based, of course, upon newspaper reports, but it might be interesting for you to have.

Mr. KAHN. I suggest you put it in the hearings.

(The list submitted is as follows:)

*Raids made by dirigibles and aeroplanes.*

Date.	Place.	Character.	Apparent results.
Aug. 15, 1914....	Verdun to Metz.....	2 aeroplanes.....	Believed to have destroyed Zeppelin.
Sept. 22, 1914....	Dusseldorf.....	5 aeroplanes.....	Unknown.
23, 1914.....	Bickendorf.....	...do.....	Set fire to hangars.
27, 1914.....	Paris.....	? aeroplanes.....	Two killed: property destroyed.
Nov. 21, 1914.....	Friedrichshaven.....	3 aeroplanes.....	Damage to Zeppelins and shed.
Dec. 9, 1914.....	Warsaw.....	2 Zeppelins.....	40 killed.
16, 1914.....	Scarborough.....	? Zeppelins.....	127 killed.
19, 1914.....	Dundirk.....	? aeroplanes.....	Unimportant.
24, 1914.....	Cuxhaven.....	7 aeroplanes.....	Sheds damaged.
Jan. 19, 1915.....	Falmouth.....	3 Zeppelins.....	4 killed; property damaged.
20, 1915.....	Krupp and Essen.....	? aeroplanes.....	
22, 1915.....	Dunkirk.....	14 aeroplanes.....	20 killed; warehouse burned.

*Raids made by dirigibles and aeroplanes—Continued.*

Date.	Place.	Character.	Apparent results.
Feb. 12, 1915....	Bruges, Ostend, and Zeebrugge.	32 aeroplanes.....	Railroad station and transport wagons damaged.
16, 1915....	Ostend, Midalekerke, and Ghislette.	40 aeroplanes.....	Aerodromes damaged.
Mar. 20-21, 1915....	Paris.	4 Zeppelins.....	Unknown.
26, 1915....	Frescarty and Metz.	10 aeroplanes.....	Do.
26, 1915....	Hoboken.	5 aeroplanes.....	1 killed; property damaged.
22, 1915....	Paris.	8 Zeppelins.....	Unknown.
Apr. 14, 1915....	Tynmouth.	2 Zeppelins.....	Do.
16, 1915....	Ostend.	15 aeroplanes.....	Chemical factory fired.
30, 1915....	Bowestoft.	4 Zeppelins.....	6 killed.
May 16, 1915....	Calais.	3 Zeppelins.....	Damage unknown.
24, 1915....	Venice.	2 aeroplanes.....	Several killed.
26, 1915....	Ludwigshafen.	18 aeroplanes.....	Damage to hangar.
31, 1915....	London.	? Zeppelins.....	Chemical factory fired.
31, 1915....	Calais.	4 aeroplanes.....	6 killed.
June 1, 1915....	London.	? Zeppelins.....	Damage unknown.
5, 1915....	East coast of England.	do.....	4 killed; 70 injured.
8, 1915....	Headquarters Crown Prince.	29 aeroplanes.....	24 killed; property damaged.
15, 1915....	Karlsruhe.	23 aeroplanes.....	Damage unknown.
15-16, 1915....	English coast.	? Zeppelins.....	Ducal palace wrecked, railroad station and arms factory damaged.
July 13, 1915....	Hattonchatel.	20 aeroplanes.....	16 killed, 40 injured; Armstrong works damaged.
16, 1915....	Chaunay.	10 aeroplanes.....	Do.
20, 1915....	Colmar.	6 aeroplanes.....	Do.
20, 1915....	Conflaus.	31 aeroplanes.....	Do.
22, 1915....	do.....	Squadron of French aero.	Do.
27, 1915....	do.....	38 aeroplanes.....	Do.
30, 1915....	Freiburg and Pechelbroum.	45 aeroplanes.....	Do.
Aug. 3, 1915....	Strasbourg.	? aeroplanes.....	Warships bombarded; 14 killed.
9, 1915....	England.	5 Zeppelins.....	10 killed; 17 injured.
12-13, 1915....	do.....	? Zeppelins.....	6 killed; 36 injured.
17-18, 1915....	do.....	4 Zeppelins.....	Casualties and property damaged.
25, 1915....	Dilligen.	62 Zeppelins.....	Bombarded stations and bivouacs.
25, 1915....	German camp.	Squadron of Zeppelins.	Property damaged.
Sept. 7, 1915....	East coast of England.	3 Zeppelins.....	10 killed; 46 hurt.
8-9, 1915....	London.	do.....	Little damage.
11, 1915....	England.	? Zeppelins.....	4 killed; others hurt.
13, 1915....	Treves.	19 aeroplanes.....	50 killed; 114 hurt.
22, 1915....	Stuttgart.	? aeroplanes.....	45 killed.
22, 1915....	Bensdorf.	19 aeroplanes.....	12 killed; 27 injured.
Oct. 3, 1915....	Headquarters Kaiser.	do.....	30 killed; 49 injured.
13-14, 1915....	London.	? Zeppelins.....	Bombs dropped on arsenal, etc.
24, 1915....	Venice.	? aeroplanes.....	Unknown.
Nov. 12, 1915....	Udine.	Squadron of aeroplanes.	3 killed.
14, 1915....	Verona.	3 aeroplanes.....	2 killed; others hurt.
18, 1915....	Venice.	18 aeroplanes.....	Museum damaged.
18, 1915....	English camp in Belgium.	Squadron of aeroplanes.	Do.
18, 1915....	Lunneville.	8 aeroplanes.....	Do.
28, 1915....	Habskeim.	10 aeroplanes.....	Do.
30, 1915....	Miramont.	29 aeroplanes.....	Do.
Dec. 10, 1915....	Ancona.	4 aeroplanes.....	Do.
18, 1915....	Metz.	4 aeroplanes.....	Do.

Col. REBER. If you would care to introduce it into the hearings, sir, I have extracted from the various official reports both of Field Marshall Sir John French and Gen. Joffre some comment upon what has been done by the flying forces, and also a description of the work of the Royal Flying Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we would like to have that in the hearings. (The matter submitted is as follows:)

Field Marshal Sir John French, in his report made public September 10, 1914, said: "I wish particularly to bring to your lordship's attention the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance has been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with most complete and accurate information which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of operations. They were fired on constantly, both by friend and foe, and, not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have

remained undaunted throughout. Further, by actual fighting, they destroyed five of the enemy's machines."

September 9, 1914, Gen. Joffre sent this message: "Please express most particularly to Marshal French my thanks for services rendered on every day by the English Flying Corps. The precision, exactitude, and regularity of the news brought us by its members are evidence of their perfect organization and also of the perfect training of pilots and observers." The press report containing this continues: "To give a rough idea of the amount of work carried out it is sufficient to mention that during a period of 20 days up to September 10 a daily average of more than nine reconnaissance flights of over a hundred miles each has been maintained."

July 12, 1915, Gen. French said: "I have once more to call your lordship's attention to the part taken by the Royal Flying Corps in the general progress of the campaign, and I wish particularly to mention the invaluable assistance they rendered in the operations described in this report under the able direction of Maj. Gen. Sir David Henderson.

"The Royal Flying Corps is becoming more and more an indispensable factor in combined operations. In cooperation with the Artillery, in particular, there has been continuous improvement both in the methods and in the technical material employed. The ingenuity and technical skill displayed by the officers of the Royal Flying Corps in effecting this improvement have been most marked.

"Since my last dispatch there has been a considerable increase both in the number and in the activity of German aeroplanes in our front. During this period there have been more than 60 combats in the air, in which not one British aeroplane has been lost. As these fights take place almost invariably over or behind German lines, only one hostile aeroplane has been brought down in our territory. Five more, however, have been definitely wrecked behind their own lines, and many have been chased down and forced to land in most unsuitable ground.

"In spite of the opposition of hostile air craft and the great number of anti-air-craft guns employed by the enemy, air reconnaissance has been carried on with regularity and accuracy.

"I desire to bring to your lordship's notice the assistance given by the French military authorities, and in particular by Gen. Hirschauer, director of the French aviation service, and his assistants, Col. Böttiaux and Col. Stammier, in the supply of aeronautical material, without which the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps would have been seriously impaired."

In the dispatch from Sir John French, dated October 15, 1915, and covering the period from June 15, there was the following reference to the work of the Royal Flying Corps. Referring to the attack on September 25, it is stated:

"The wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to this army (third) performed valuable work by undertaking distant flights behind the enemy's lines and by successfully blowing up railways, wrecking trains, and damaging stations on his lines of communication by means of bomb attacks."

Dealing with the work of the royal artillery, it is stated:

"The work of the artillery, in cooperation with the Royal Flying Corps, continues to make most satisfactory progress, and has been highly creditable to all concerned.

"I would again call your lordship's attention to the work of the Royal Flying Corps. Throughout the summer, notwithstanding much unfavorable weather, the work of cooperating with the artillery, photographing the positions of the enemy, bombing their communications, and reconnoitering far over hostile territory has gone on unceasingly.

"The volume of work performed steadily increases; the amount of flying has been more than doubled during this period. There have been more than 240 combats in the air, and in nearly every case our pilots have had to seek the enemy behind his own lines, where he is assisted by the fire of his movable anti-air-craft guns; and in spite of this they have succeeded in bringing down 4 of the German machines behind our trenches and at least 12 in the enemy's lines, and many more have been seen to dive to earth in a damaged condition or to have retired from the fight. On one occasion an officer of the Royal Flying Corps engaged four enemy machines and drove them off, proceeding on his reconnaissance. On another occasion two officers engaged six hostile machines and disabled at least one of them.

"Artillery observation and photography are two of the most trying tasks the Royal Flying Corps is called upon to perform, as our airmen must remain for long periods within easy range of the enemy's antiair-craft guns.

"The work of observation for the guns from aeroplanes has now become an important factor in artillery fire, and the personnel of the two arms work in the closest cooperation."

#### THE WORK OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS.

The following interesting story of the work of the Royal Flying Corps, written by Mr. Philip Gibbs, from the British general headquarters, appeared in the Daily Telegraph of November 15, 1915:

"Conditions of this war would be utterly altered if aerial reconnaissance were made impossible. The knowledge we have of our enemy's movements, and their knowledge of ours, would be restricted to an astonishing degree, and something like profound ignorance would reign on each side of the trenches. Our aviators are the eyes of the Army, and it is mainly due to their audacious vigilance that we are able to obtain quick information of the enemy's movements of troops from one part of the line to another, of gun positions, of trench geography, and of our artillery results. Unfortunately the enemy has the same air service, carried out with not less valor, so that here, as in most aspects of this war, neither side can claim a supreme advantage.

"This at least can be fairly said. That unless we had had a number of efficient air pilots at the outbreak of the war who were able to raise and train a large body of young enthusiasts with extraordinary rapidity during the war, the work of our armies in the field would have been sadly handicapped, and our gunners especially would have been like blind men fumbling in the dark compared with the present accuracy of their range finding. Of the courage of these men of the Royal Flying Corps it is impossible to write too much praise. Scores of times I have seen them in flight above the German lines, with shrapnel bursting all around their planes, so that they seemed to be sailing to certain death. They escaped by their own skill, or by just the fluke of luck, time after time, but it is not work which looks more dangerous than it is—a spectacular exhibition with little risk. The danger is constant and real, and these men know that every time they get into their saddles for a reconnaissance within range of the enemy's guns they are playing a game of hide and seek with death.

#### "GERMAN LOSSES.

"Take the German losses over a period of a few months and the risks of the air service in war are apparent. The official returns for the air squadrons alone were in June of this year, 53 killed, wounded, and missing; in July, 43; in August, 89; in September, 79. I do not know our own figures—I believe they are as nothing compared with the enemy's losses. But the skill of our men in maneuvering and the cool courage with which they engaged in aerial duels do not eliminate the hazards of their adventures. The number of breadth escapes, even in one month's work, would make a long and thrilling record.

"A typical episode happened on November 4. A flight captain and a second lieutenant were engaged in artillery observation when they were attacked by a huge hostile pusher machine—that is, a machine with its engine and propeller behind the wings—closely followed by three tractors, or machines with forward engines and propellers. Our officers immediately opened fire upon them, using one drum containing the cartridges of the Lewis gun. The pusher was hit and flew off at once, followed by two others. The remaining one engaged our aeroplane, chased it in full flight, and then, while it was maneuvering for position, dived underneath its wings, and fired as it passed. The flight captain was wounded in the right arm and the patrol tank was pierced.

"Two other flight officers of ours on patrol duty saw the machine mentioned above closely pursued by a German monoplane, and they made a steep dive toward it like a sweeping hawk. The Germans saw their danger, and making a swift turn, flew straight beneath the wings of the British aeroplane, passing it about 30 yards below. Half a drum was fired at them, but they turned again and spiraled three times around our men, while both machines were dropping rapidly. Suddenly the Germans decided to make off and flew away at a great pace, but they were followed at about 8 yards distance by our machine, which fired the remaining cartridges in the drum. Some of these shots were aimed true. The German monoplane turned right-handed and banked steeply, then toppled upside down, and plunged to earth just inside our lines. The pilot and observer were both killed.

"On the same day, in a different neighborhood, two of our flight lieutenants had a very close shave, and in spite of the great spaciousness of the sky found themselves in a tight corner. They were making a reconnaissance as a matter of ordinary duty when a German Albatross came out of the clouds and passed them at a range of 200 yards. They were on the qui vive for an attack from this particular bird, when suddenly they heard firing behind them. They turned sharply to the right and discovered another Albatross. At the same time, as if two were not enough, a hostile aeroplane bore down swiftly with a continual rattle of bullets from its machine gun. The two flight lieutenants got their Lewis to work and drove off the monoplane, but the Albatross maneuvered round and round in a most sinister fashion and for nearly 20 minutes fired continually at our machine. Fortunately their shooting was not so good as the skill of the British officers in maneuvering out of the range, and after this long duel the hostile aeroplane swooped away, leaving the British machine alone and untouched.

"Two sergeants in one of our flying squadrons had a perilous time when they were dropping hand grenades and flechettes (steel arrows) over a town occupied by the enemy. A German monoplane gave chase, and one of our men was hit in the hand and had his face grazed. When reaching out for his rifle he was wounded in the other hand. The pilot made a steep dive toward our lines, closely followed by the enemy, and at this critical moment he was hit by a bullet in the leg, and another shot put the engine out of action. For a moment or two the situation may have seemed hopeless and death certain, but with steady nerves the pilot succeeded in landing within our lines, and a British biplane appeared in sight and drove off the enemy.

"But of all the experience of these air combats continual proofs of the stability and apparent safety of the new types of aeroplanes emerge in a striking way. Often when I watch our military machines setting off from their grounds with the regularity and assurance of motor cars from a garage my thoughts go back to the days—only a few years ago—when the first feeble tentative flights were made, and when I saw so many brave pioneers of flights dashed to earth by a sudden slight gust.

"Even now they look such gossamer things up here above the battle fields of Flanders when the wind is moaning and beneath the smoke of artillery bombardments. Yet they make audacious swoops and dives and turns with bird-like grace and ease, and men 3,000 feet from earth or more clamber upon those thin struts and canvas planes in moments of peril as though the insubstantial structure were a racing yacht and the air as buoyant as the wave.

"When, for instance, a corporal in one of our air squadrons was followed by two hostile aeroplanes he shifted his gun from its position in the front to the rear mounting from which he could fire at his pursuers. This was done in full flight, and when the enemy's machines made a downward swoop upon our own aeroplane from the prodigious height of 1,000 (?) feet firing through our men's propellers. The handy alteration of the gun position secured a quick result. After firing half a drum of bullets the corporal saw the leading machine tail-slide for a fraction of a second and then plunge to earth in a vertical nose-dive. The pilot watched the machine go down in this way for several thousand feet, and then it fell among some trees and a cloud of dust was evidence of its fate. The other machine gave up the fight and disappeared.

"One of the most remarkable and gallant examples of changing the weight and balance in a machine happened on October 26. Two of our flight officers taking photographs over the enemy's ground were attacked by a Fokker at a height of about 7,000 feet. While getting his gun ready the observing officer was hit in the left hand, so that he could not use the weapon. The pilot kept maneuvering to avoid the fire from the enemy's air craft, but was hit in the arm and shoulder and lost consciousness. Greater danger can hardly be imagined. High up, and without a guiding hand, the machine rocked and swayed about in a giddy spiral, which was the first sign to the observing officer that his companion was out of action.

"Seeing the pilot limp and senseless the other officer climbed over between the two back struts and caught hold of the control lever. He moved this about, but nothing happened. He then tried to close the throttle. This did no good, the wire apparently having been broken. Finally he turned off the petrol and, getting the machine under control, managed to land behind the French reserve trenches. It was a rough landing, and the machine was flung over so that the wounded pilot was thrown out. He lay there in a pool of blood until assistance was brought by the observer (who climbed out safely) from the French Red

Cross. They were still under fire, however, and another observing officer, who happened to be with his machine in the neighborhood, managed to reach the scene and rescue the Lewis gun and instrument board.

"Although there is no mercy on either side during these acrid combats the battle of the air is enlivened by some of those little touches of chivalry and gallant humor which belonged to old-fashioned warfare. Most of the German flight officers are young men of good social standing, all the observers having the rank of officer also. There is a great aeronautical school at Berlin, through which many of them pass before qualifying for active service. The training consists of flying observation, use of machine guns, bomb dropping, photography, wireless telegraphy, and a special course of shooting in the air on hostile air craft. All observers have to pass a standard test before being sent up on reconnoissance.

"Our men will often fight with two. More than that is too much, even for the most audacious, and certainly few men have had the luck of a certain young officer who on October 28 had a series of combats. Going out in a Morane "Parasol" on escort duty to a photographic reconnaissance, and flying at 10,000 feet, he saw an Aviatik 500 feet below, and dived toward it as he fired his machine gun. The German turned toward his own lines, but the Morane was then attacked in the rear by two more Aviatiks, which opened fire at 150 yards. Nothing daunted, our aviator fired at them both and made them beat a quick retreat.

"A fourth Aviatik now opened fire from above and swept past the Morane into its own lines with its propeller stopped. Even this was not the last of that hostile flight of birds, and when the officer was going back to the aerodrome he met still another Aviatik, which he chased for about 15 minutes, until it escaped over its own lines.

"All these adventures happened during the last few weeks. They belong to the daily routine of the Royal Flying Corps, which has done 15 months of splendid service."

Col. REBER. I would like also to insert in the record, sir, a note showing some of the difficulties that anyone must encounter in organizing and carrying out an air force—some figures from the British air service. The first part was compiled from the Official Gazette up to and including December 28, 1915. At the outbreak of the war there were 153 officers in the Royal Flying Corps; added since, 649; a total of 802. Of these, 91 have been reported killed, 88 wounded, 55 missing, 37 prisoners, and 7 interned in Holland, making a total of 278. The balance is 524.

The official British Army list of December, 1915, gives 1 major general, 11 lieutenant colonels, 46 majors, 176 captains, 106 first lieutenants, and 259 second lieutenants, making a total of 599.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is anything else you desire to put in the record, Colonel, just put it in.

Mr. ANTHONY. Col. Reber, you have had some trouble securing the desired number of commissioned officers in the aviation force?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir; but I think those troubles can be obviated. I think they are due to causes which can be remedied.

Mr. ANTHONY. It is said there is some degree of discontent and dissatisfaction among the officers already in the force. Is that correct?

Col. REBER. That I can not answer, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. For your information I will state that I have been so advised by officers—that there is that discontent and dissatisfaction. You have doubtless heard of it?

Col. REBER. In an indirect sort of way, sir, I have understood that there was something of the sort.

Mr. ANTHONY. To what do you attribute it? To what causes?

Col. REBER. I think it would be pretty difficult to give any direct answer. I might suggest that those feelings were probably more or less personal.

Mr. ANTHONY. I have heard it stated, for instance, that some of the officers now in the corps think that the fliers, the men who really do the expert flying, have not been favored in matters of promotion. Is that true?

Col. REBER. Why, no, sir; because there is no promotion about it.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it proper that promotion should be afforded to the men who really do the flying?

Col. REBER. I certainly do, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. And under the present law there is no such opportunity, then?

Col. REBER. None whatever. The law simply says this: The student comes in, if he gets his certificate, and after passing the examination prescribed by law becomes a grade higher than what he was. That is all the promotion he gets.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think that if you were permitted to throw open the opportunity to men in civil life who had developed into expert fliers to secure commissions in the aviation corps that it would be desirable?

Col. REBER. Not permanent commissions; no, sir; no person in the aviation section should have a permanent commission.

Mr. ANTHONY. There is no such opportunity now for a civilian flier to get a commission?

Col. REBER. No, sir; there could not be under the law. If you had a reserve, a civilian could come in and get his commission in the reserve, and he would then, if he were on duty, be required to fly three weeks a year and as much longer as he desired.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not true that that would not be sufficiently attractive?

Col. REBER. I am not so sure about that.

Mr. ANTHONY. But would not a permanent commission in an aviation corps be attractive enough so that men who develop skill and ability in flying would want to enter the Army as fliers?

Col. REBER. How long would you keep them in there, sir?

Mr. ANTHONY. I have no specific idea; but would it not be desirable to have such men as officers of the corps for life?

Col. REBER. No, sir; I do not think so. I do not think that in this game any person should remain in it one minute longer than he is thoroughly qualified.

Mr. ANTHONY. What would be your objection to giving such men commissions in the Army and keeping them in the aviation corps as long as they rendered efficient service?

Col. REBER. That would put them exactly on the same basis, as far as aviation is concerned, as under the present law.

Mr. ANTHONY. Why is it that you have not been able to develop the Army fliers to as high a degree of perfection as those in civil life?

Col. REBER. I do not believe that is necessarily true, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Isn't it true?

Col. REBER. No; I do not think so, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is there not a much large number in civil life than in the Army?

Col. REBER. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. I have heard that there was.

Col. REBER. I would like to ask their names, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. How many officers and men have you that are expert fliers—that have absolute command of aircraft—that is, that would have no difficulty whatever in undertaking any air work that anyone would undertake?

Col. REBER. I have 23 officers and 5 men.

Mr. ANTHONY. That you would not hesitate to have do any kind of air duty that is done in any army?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. And you consider them just as competent?

Col. REBER. I think so, sir. Of course, I have no standard comparison with the other people, but I know our people can fly..

Mr. ANTHONY. I have heard it said by officers at the San Diego school—that is, by men who have demonstrated their ability to fly—that they did not receive commands in reference to the use of aeroplanes and in regard to flying from men who could not fly themselves and who they did not believe knew as much about it as they did. Does such a condition as that exist?

Col. REBER. Why, I can say this—

Mr. ANTHONY. Another thing they said, some of these fliers think they receive more aid and assistance from expert civilian fliers—for instance, around Los Angeles and other cities of California—in their problems than they are able to receive from their superior officers in their own branch of the service.

Col. REBER. That I do not know, sir. These statements are all new to me, and they have not been brought to my attention before. I would say this, that as far as expert civilians are concerned I do not think you can find two more expert men in the country than the two at the school.

Mr. ANTHONY. So the only course that is open to a young man who has perfected himself in flying and who would like to be a commissioned officer in the Aviation Corps, is just to secure a commission in the Army in the regular way?

Col. REBER. That unfortunately is the law.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it would be an advantage to your corps if the doors were opened so that young men who were already accomplished in flying could secure commissions?

Col. REBER. I certainly do, sir. The only question, Mr. Anthony, is one of policy, and that is for you gentlemen to decide.

Mr. ANTHONY. Well, after an officer develops into a capable and efficient flier you do not want to lose him?

Col. REBER. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. And if he receives promotion above, say, the grade of captain, you can no longer keep him?

Col. REBER. We can not keep him under the present law.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think it would be desirable to make that change?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. And there is another thing. I think it would be very desirable to keep any person—the law is very specific on the one subject; as soon as a man is no longer qualified he must be returned forthwith. If the law would give us a broader field, we

would be better off, and the machinery for that is in your hands. We need more people, and we want them.

Mr. GREENE. Gen. Scriven, you said that Curtis, I believe, told you they could produce for you about 10 aeroplanes a day?

Gen. SCRIVEN. So I understood him. I was talking with him and some other a few days ago. I asked him, "How many machines do you reckon you can turn out a day with the full capacity of your works?" The reply, as I remember it, was, "Well, about 10 machines a day." I asked him, further, what he thought he could reckon as the capacity of all the factories in this country, and he said about 20.

Mr. GREENE. That means the making and assembling of the machines complete?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Yes; I think it means the delivery of the number they could actually turn out and put on the loading platforms—10 a day.

Mr. GREENE. Then, it is probably needless to ask whether that means a full test and installation of the motor so that the machine is complete?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I doubt very much if it means much in regard to the testing. I think it means that they take a model and turn out 10 a day in accordance with that model. I do not think they could make thoroughly satisfactory tests of as many as that. I did not ask him that question, though. No doubt the great difficulty will be in the supply of motors.

Mr. GREENE. That is just why I made this memorandum, because, as I understand it, the greater part of your problem is this motor test afterwards?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Absolutely. The most important thing in the whole game is the motor.

Mr. GREENE. Then, your calculation as to the probable supply of the Army is based upon this suggestion, that Mr. Curtis as an individual producer can turn out 10 a day, and those figures must not be taken in gross, but must be subjected to the elimination test?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I should think so; a very large reduction should be made. But anyhow I think the contractor could make 100 or 200 machines a month, so the number of machines hardly comes into the question. It is a question of the organization, the flying men, that is the hard problem to solve.

Mr. GREENE. So, as a general thing, you are confident that no matter what the requirements for test, nor the time required in the elimination of a good many machines that do not meet the tests, you would still have a sufficient supply for all the men you would be likely to have that would be able to fly?

Gen. SCRIVEN. I should think so; most decidedly, as things are now.

Mr. GREENE. I mean this more particularly: If this is the scale upon which you base your estimate for emergency purposes, would that same rule hold good there?

Gen. SCRIVEN. It is like everything else. If there is no encouragement—if this war ceases and there is no longer any encouragement to these men to go on building—they will abandon their plants more or less. What the conditions would be under those circumstances Col. R. do not know. As things stand to-day I believe we can count on Mr. G. number of machines that we can man.

Mr. GREENE. So, again, as a general conclusion, that leaves still the matter of the supply of machines themselves as a matter of conjecture?

Gen. SCRIVEN. For the future, after the present conditions cease.

The CHAIRMAN. Gen. Scriven, I would like to ask you whether or not in your opinion it would be a wise thing for the Government to have a plant and build its own flying machines?

Gen. SCRIVEN. That is a very large subject, but in this particular case I believe that if we had under the aerodynamical board or the Ordnance Department, or somewhere else, a laboratory or experimental plant from which we could turn out the model of the thing we wanted, it would be an excellent thing. But I do not think that to go into the actual supply of aeroplanes for the Army itself would pay at all.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any information that would enable you to tell the committee how much it would cost to erect a plant for the manufacture of these machines, and how much it would cost the Government to turn them out after the plant is in operation?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, Mr. Chairman; I have not. But, judging from long experience in the Army, I believe that the cost to the Government of manufacturing in its own plant would be much greater than when it is done in private plants. In the case of saddles, bridles, and things of that kind—

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the experience in the manufacture of powder and ammunition?

Gen. SCRIVEN. That, of course, I can hardly speak about.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know about the saddles.

Gen. SCRIVEN. The Government itself does wonderfully fine work. Everything is perfectly done; the hours of labor are short, the best of materials are put in, and what you get is worth the money, but it is more expensive than what you would buy outside. I am not speaking as an expert on that subject, but merely as a matter of experience.

Mr. HULL. I would like to ask you, General, what particular thing it is that costs more.

Gen. SCRIVEN. Well, I do not like particularly to answer that question. But I do think, as a matter of fact—if I may speak without being quoted—that a horse outfit, for instance, saddles and bridles—

Mr. HULL. As a matter of fact, they do not cost as much?

Gen. SCRIVEN. Speaking for myself, I know that I can get a bridle—it may not be as good, but I can get a bridle from a private factory for less than I can get one from the Ordnance Department. That is my impression; I am not speaking from figures.

Mr. HULL. You have not the figures, have you?

Gen. SCRIVEN. No, I have not the figures, but I have inquired about such things and I think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And Gen. Crozier furnishes the saddles and bridles and he can tell us about that.

Mr. GREENE. Col. Reber, something has been said about extending opportunities for flying to the enlisted men of the service, and you have indicated that in some degree they now have that opportunity?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. Did I understand you to say that there was likely to be some difficulty in increasing the number of men who would fly

because not many enlisted men made application for details with the aviation section?

Col. REBER. No, sir. What I mean is this: You asked me a question, and I presumed I was answering that alone. I know this, that of the 242 men that we have now, only 21 of them have asked to fly. I know that every enlisted man in the United States Army of suitable character would be transferred to the aviation section on his application. Now, the Army at large know that the enlisted men of the aviation section are allowed to fly if they want to. We have not got any more people from the Army at large than we have, so my notion was that the Army at large did not care to fly.

Mr. GREENE. That is as I understood you. Now, upon what do you base your subsequent statement that in your opinion there would be no difficulty in increasing the enlisted personnel of the aviation section to about 700?

Col. REBER. Because I have had any number—I hesitate to say how many—of requests from young men on the outside of excellent material who want to enlist for that purpose.

Mr. ANTHONY. How much additional pay does an enlisted man get in the aviation section?

Col. REBER. Fifty per cent of the pay of his grade, when on flying status or as qualified aeroplane mechanic; otherwise none.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think that if you allowed your enlisted men increased pay commensurate with the pay, say, of the commissioned officers that fly, it would help?

Col. REBER. It is practically the same ratio.

Mr. ANTHONY. Suppose you allowed an enlisted man some substantial increase; suppose you gave him the pay of a sergeant major, the highest enlisted rank, while he was flying. Would that increase your number of enlisted fliers?

Col. REBER. I could not say without trying, because we have men of the highest grade who are flying. We have had first-class sergeants flying. The lowest man who is flying now is a corporal.

Mr. ANTHONY. There is no special financial inducements, though?

Col. REBER. Fifty per cent.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is about \$10 a month?

Col. REBER. Oh, no. He gets 50 per cent additional of the pay of his grade.

The CHAIRMAN. Fifty per cent increase in the pay of a master signal electrician would be considerably more than that.

Mr. ANTHONY. How much would a private get?

Col. REBER. A private would get \$8.75, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Which would be practically no inducement.

Col. REBER. A master signal electrician gets—

Mr. ANTHONY. My proposition is, Mr. Chairman, that if we allowed them the pay of the highest enlisted rank while they are flying—say, of master signal electrician—it would be a material inducement to enlisted men to fly, and it ought to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, Colonel, that if you had an enlisted man you would make him a corporal or sergeant, would you not?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir; he would probably get his promotion very quickly; because a man that has the necessary characteristics would be recognized right away.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have the power in the Aviation Corps to promote him to corporal or sergeant and up to master signal electrician?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. The seven men that are fliers are all—

Col. REBER. Are all noncommissioned officers.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. If we could secure, say, 50 or 100 good fliers—which you seem to be short of now—by increasing their pay to \$50 a month, would it not be a very good proposition for the Government to secure them that way?

Col. REBER. I am not sure, sir, that the average enlisted man—

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Is not that the proposition?

Col. REBER. I do not think the average enlisted man would make half so good a flier as the average officer.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I mean if he is a flier and if you could get him for \$50 or \$75 a month, taking into consideration the difficulties you have had and the money that you have spent to get these 30 fliers now, would it not be a good proposition?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir; if we could do it.

Answering that other question, two of the men are sergeants, and the other five are corporals.

Mr. GREENE. One of the points about the preference that the Army gives to commissioned officers in its selection of candidates for fliers, as I understand it, is that they are trained along special lines necessary for military reconnaissance?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. And that being true, then the enlisted man in and of himself, by lacking that training, at least to such a highly specialized degree, is not as desirable for your service, other than for practical scout flying on an emergency, or message carrying, or something of that kind?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. So that there is a distinction to be made between the use of commissioned officers as flying men and of enlisted men, and the probable use of them in time of emergency?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. And that would have some effect upon the number of enlisted men that you would really care to train?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Is it not true, Colonel, that the observer that is carried along is the man that really makes the reconnaissance, if there is one made, and that the observer is generally a commissioned officer?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. He is the brain of the reconnaissance then? That is, the driver of the machine does not draw any maps?

Col. REBER. Very true.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then it is skill in reconnaissance that you want to get?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir; and you will get that more from the more highly educated type of man.

Mr. KAHN. Is not this also a fact, Colonel, that while theory requires a driver or pilot in addition to the reconnaissance officer, yet

when the emergency of war comes only one man is put in charge of a machine, and that it is always the unusual that you must reckon with?

Col. REBER. Absolutely, sir. And when we talk about strategical reconnoissances that are made we must remember they are always made by the pilot, the man who drives the machine.

Mr. KAHN. And most of the machines sent up in time of war carry only one man, and there is very little map making in action?

Col. REBER. That is correct.

Mr. KAHN. And he directs the artillery fire as well, and that can be done by the pilot without the help of the observing officers?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir. In other words, they meet the emergencies as they arise from day to day with whatever available material they have.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do I understand that when they send a machine up to direct artillery fire they have only one man?

Col. REBER. Two is the better scheme. They are using two right along over on the other side.

Mr. GREENE. You referred to the number of qualified cross-country fliers likely to be found in civil life, and you made a distinction between the man that makes the exhibition flight within a circumscribed area and the rough-and-tumble cross-country man?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. Have you any means so far of making any estimate as to the number of men found to be qualified for exhibition work who are likely to qualify still further for cross-country flights?

Col. REBER. All I could say, sir, is this, that the last prize that was put up was the Curtis prize. That was for cross-water work in distinction to cross-country work. That carries with it \$5,000; my recollection is there were only 12 entrants.

Mr. GREENE. In estimating the cost of upkeep of machines has it been found by experience that much of a wrecked machine can afterwards be utilized for spare parts?

Col. REBER. As a rule; no, sir.

Mr. GREENE. There is very seldom anything found that can be utilized?

Col. REBER. There is a difference between a wreck and a smash-up. Up to a certain point that is possible to differentiate, but it is very difficult to say except after seeing the machine yourself.

Mr. TILSON. You spoke, Colonel, of directing artillery fire from an aeroplane. What are the means of communication used between the man in the air and the battery?

Col. REBER. There are quite a number, sir; they have used wireless. They have used directional flying. They have used different shapes and colors by dropping. They have codes of different colored lights. They also use the very pistol.

Mr. TILSON. Except for directional flying, all the methods you have mentioned require the presence of an additional person?

Col. REBER. No, sir; a pilot can fire a pistol with one hand.

Mr. TILSON. But for the sending of wireless messages another person is required?

Col. REBER. Not necessarily, sir; the man can have his key right in front, on his control, and that is what they have done.

Mr. TILSON. But from general experience, you regard it as the better plan to send up two men?

Col. REBER. It is the universal policy, so far as I have been able to find, in all the services, that for ordinary fire control and reconnaissance work they use two men.

Mr. TILSON. Then, in case it should become the policy to use two persons in a machine and you should have difficulty in getting enough men willing to go into the air, or who were capable of going into the air, then would not the problem be simplified to some extent if you were able to take a man as the flyer who was simply the flyer and nothing else, and let him take along with him a commissioned officer who was efficient in the other things?

Col. REBER. Under your premises, most decidedly, sir; but I do not believe we can ever find those conditions in real life. I do not think you would get the necessary number of people in an emergency. You can see what the English have had, after 18 months and out of a body of 3,000,000, only about 800 officers on flying duty.

Mr. TILSON. If you had a very expert flyer and he knew nothing about reconnaissance or anything but how to drive that machine to perfection, and then you had along with him an Army officer, well trained, who could do all the rest, would not that make a pretty good workable scheme?

Col. REBER. It would, sir; with just one condition—that that expert flyer should be in the military service and subject to military control.

Mr. TILSON. There is no doubt about that.

Col. REBER. That is the ideal case, sir.

Mr. TILSON. My idea was to get that man into the service, of course.

Mr. GREENE. Then, does not your problem resolve itself into this. If you are going to adopt a policy under which one man must be the expert flyer and the other the expert reconnaissance man, in an emergency you would have to look for two persons, whereas in the other system, combining in one person both qualifications, you are only looking for one?

Col. REBER. That is very true, sir; but as I said—

Mr. GREENE. I am introducing another element.

Mr. HULL. I would like to ask the Colonel what he thinks of Government manufacture.

Col. REBER. Outside of building types, sir, I do not think it would be a good proposition. In order to meet the demand for the required number in time of war you would have to put up such a gigantic plant.

Mr. HULL. What is there about an aeroplane that costs so much?

Col. REBER. There is not, sir; it is the plant. In order to turn out a large number per day you have to have a large plant.


Mr. KAHN. Do you not have to pay a considerable sum now for patent rights?


Col. REBER. Indirectly; yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. And when the patents expire they will probably be much cheaper?

Col. REBER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TILSON. Assuming that you had finally reached the model which you thought was the thing to be used, then would it not be





## 36 TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

*Proposed organization of signal troops for an army, etc.—Continued.*

	M. S. E.	1st-class sergts.	Sergts.	Corpls.	Cooks.	1st-class pvt.	Pvts.	Total enlisted.
<i>Signal Corps, less aviation section.</i>								
MOBILE ARMY.								
Nine field battalions.....	27	144	225	369	54	1,080	243	2,142
Two telegraph battalions.....	12	42	66	92	8	280	86	566
Chief signal officers of divisions (proposed).....								
Chief signal officers of two field armies.....								
ALASKA.								
W-A. Mil. Cable & Tgh. System.....	8	28	30	33	5	112	34	260
SERVICE OF THE INTERIOR.								
Office Chief Signal Officer.....								
Army Signal School.....								
Dept. signal officers, including Phil. & Haw'n Depts.....								
Supply depots, cable boats, Ft. Wood & Asst., at N. Y.....								
Enlisted men for det. svc.....	9	33	36	39	6	135	42	300
Army Signal School and recruit detachment.....	3	11	12	13	2	45	14	100
	59	258	369	546	75	1,632	419	3,358
Aviation section.								
OVERSEAS GARRISONS.								
Philippines, 1 aero squadron.....	5	8	15	33	6	44	18	129
Hawaii, 1 aero squadron.....	5	8	15	33	6	44	18	129
Canal Zone, 1 aero squadron.....	5	8	15	33	6	44	18	129
IN THE UNITED STATES.								
Mobile army: 4 divisions, 4 aero squadrons.....	20	32	60	132	24	176	72	516
Aviation administration.....								
Aviation School, detachment.....	3	6	12	18	2	24	12	77
Total proposed aviation section.....	38	62	117	249	44	332	138	980

O. C. S. O., April 90, 1915.  
Revised Dec. 15, 1915.

NOTE.—This table is a proportional one. The proper number of signal troops for an army of any size may be found by simply adhering to these proportions and substituting the proper signal units to correspond with the number of divisions and army corps taken.

Overseas garrisons, with strengths arbitrarily taken, would require additional telegraph companies in numbers to fit the local situation in each case.

Thereupon, at 1.20 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned to meet Wednesday, January 19, 1916, at 10 o'clock a. m.

X

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENT OF

HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON  
SECRETARY OF WAR

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JANUARY 8, 1916



WASHINGTON  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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## TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,  
*Saturday, January 8, 1916.*

The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

### STATEMENT OF HON. LINDLEY M. GARRISON, SECRETARY OF WAR—Continued.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Kahn, I believe you had not concluded?

Mr. KAHN. No. Now, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary GARRISON (interposing). Mr. Kahn, may I interrupt you just a minute?

Mr. KAHN. Yes, sure.

Secretary GARRISON. Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand a report of the special commission on military education and reserve, appointed by the governor of Massachusetts in June of 1915, a commission of very eminent men of that State, who, under the term of the appointment, made a most careful and exhaustive examination of the question which is now before this committee in so far as it relates to the National Guard or State militia and have embodied their findings in a most comprehensive and intelligent report which I would like to submit to the committee for its consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. You can put that in the hearings, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. I merely wish now to call attention to their final disposition of this particular question, after going over the whole subject matter and having hearings throughout their State of practically all classes of people, beginning, of course, with the National Guardsmen. On page 22 they say: "For these reasons the commission wishes to state clearly that its recommendation goes to the point of making the militia actually a Federal force and nothing else. It should be controlled and paid by the Federal Government and subject to the orders of the Federal Government," etc. The testimony and bases of their report I herewith submit to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be put in the hearing.

Secretary GARRISON. I should like to do so.

Mr. KAHN. The Associated Press on December 31 carried a résumé of that report in a very few words.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. I would like to put that in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

4 TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

Mr. KAHN. It is as follows:

BOSTON, December 30.—The special commission on military education and reserves, appointed to investigate the defence needs of Massachusetts, will present the following recommendations to the Legislature:

Federal control of the State militia.

An increase in numbers by means of a reserve, and change in methods of training of the militia if it remains a State force.

Relieving the militia of police duty and the establishment of a State mounted police.

Courses of military instruction in colleges located in Massachusetts.

Development of physical training in the public schools according to a prescribed standard.

Teaching of military history, personal hygiene and camp sanitation in the public schools.

Establishment for schoolboys of summer training camps.

Enrollment of mechanics and census of factories of certain industries if the same is not provided for by Federal legislation.

Institution of courses in military hygiene in medical schools.

So that all of these recommendations are most excellent.

Secretary GARRISON. Those are all in this report.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Secretary, I think when we closed the hearing on Thursday I was asking you about short-term enlistments.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Several years ago, about two years ago, I think, you felt that short-term enlistments would be of material advantage to the Army of the United States. Have you changed your views?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir. The assumption that I thought it of material advantage is based upon the fact that I then urged the shortening of the service with the colors in order to increase the number of men who should be in reserve. That was at a time when, as we all know, there was little likelihood of our getting any substantial increase in the Army, or any substantial first line troops outside of the Army, and it seemed to me, therefore, that the only other recourse was to have the Army train as many persons as possible and turn them back into the community, but if we are going to be able to have constantly a first line of 400,000 Federal volunteers, then I think that the Regular Army must at all times be composed of men of sufficient experience to be a highly effective and highly trained force. So that while they seem to be inconsistent, they are not so at all. They depend upon the different points of view with respect to the whole military establishment.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that two years would make a pretty efficient soldier?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. I think two years will make a very efficient soldier.

Mr. KAHN. Exactly, and if you were to train new men every two years, do you not think that you would have among the citizens of the country, in the course of a very few years, a large number of men who had been trained to such a degree of efficiency that they would become exceedingly valuable in the volunteers if the President should call for volunteers in case we are attacked?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes. The only point I want to make is this: That at one time when I felt that that was practically the only military advantage I could get, I was strenuous about it, and now, when I feel that I can get something of real material value, I am not so strenuous about it.

Mr. KAHN. Well, men who have had two years actual training in military tactics would be of much greater value in time of war than men who had had two months experience every year.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, two years will make as efficient a soldier as any country wants for any service. But that is not the point I want to dwell upon. If the Regular Army is going to act as the model, as the trainer, then I would not lay any particular stress upon the term of enlistment in the Army, because it does not make any difference if you are constantly training a large force subject to call, but if you are going to train small numbers of men from whose ranks you can turn out a large army in time of necessity, I am more interested in the term of enlistment.

Mr. KAHN. But in giving them a shorter term of enlistment would you not get a much higher type of men?

Secretary GARRISON. I think it would make some difference. I think that all that you have in mind, Mr. Kahn, can be accomplished if, with whatever term we fixed, we placed in the President the power, after some period, say one year or eighteen months, to put on furlough any man who applied therefor and who, upon examination, measures up to certain specifications that will give him the furlough subject, for the balance of his enlistment contract, to come to the colors in case of need.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you let me ask the Secretary a question, Mr. Kahn?

Mr. KAHN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the average service of a soldier in the Army with a two-year enlistment at the end of, say, three years, if your plan was put into effect?

Secretary GARRISON. Which period are you going to have for the term of enlistment?

The CHAIRMAN. Two years' enlistment. What would be the average service? Suppose we had a war. What would be the average service then under a two-year enlistment of a soldier in the Army?

Secretary GARRISON. I should say off-hand a year. I am not so sure about that, but it seems such an easy answer; maybe it is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are correct.

Secretary GARRISON. It would seem to be so, because the purpose of a two-year enlistment, I presume, if we take the War College division's plan, is to turn out each year into the reserve one-half of the Army, and that would be so circumstanced, in the view of the War College, to raise the necessary reserve in six years, if we turn out one-half of the Army for each year.

Mr. KAHN. The short-term enlistment is not a new principle.

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. It was used very effectively by Prussia in 1807, after the treaty of Tilsit, and she turned out her boys at the end of every year and gave a pretty good account of herself both at Leipzig and at Waterloo. Now, have you thought over the matter of allotting the regiments to the sections of the country where they are raised?

Secretary GARRISON. Regular Army?

Mr. KAHN. Yes, sir.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. How about the volunteers, or the continental army?

## 6 TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

Secretary GARRISON. Of course, it would be raised in sections, so that it does not apply to them.

Mr. KAHN. But do you not think that by recruiting regiments in various sections of the country and allowing the men who reside in those sections to go into the regiments that are recruited in that neighborhood you would have a very much more effective force than you would have under the present system?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I do not know that I want to be committed to the words, "Very much more effective," but I lean to the belief that if, as time went on, we could establish a system of local regiments, so to speak, with local recruiting and a reserve in the neighborhood we probably could build up a very effective system both of recruiting and keeping track of the reserve and other similar military requirements. That, of course, as you said a minute ago, is not a new idea to anyone. It has been recommended by some of the very best military men we have ever had. I have not thought myself of attempting to make any recommendations of that sort at this time, because it requires the expenditure of sums of money to locate posts where there are no posts now. It raises the question of a building program instead of an Army program. It seems to me at the present time the imperative thing is to get some sort of a military system adopted rather than dwell upon things which will in time become a part of the system.

Mr. KAHN. Well, when you are adopting a system, do you not think that is the time to provide for these very things?

Secretary GARRISON. Theoretically, yes; practically, no. I think the essential thing is to get an articulated skeleton that can function. Now, whether or not you get a little bit too much flesh on a leg, an arm or a nose is a matter of detail.

Mr. KAHN. You state that one of the expenses of an army is the cost of transportation.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that cost could be materially reduced?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. At the very inception of the new plan?

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, no; because at the inception of the plan it would be more than offset by the cost of providing regimental stations. The one would more than balance the other, to start with. That will have to be done gradually, Mr. Kahn, if we are ever going to attempt it. I could write it out and you could write it out beautifully on paper, but you would find more difficulties than aids if you started in like that now. You would have to find 49 suitable, eligible places for the establishment of posts and you would have to find all the equipment there, when the essential thing is to get men and matériel. It seems to me that any other course would be a mistake at this time.

Mr. KAHN. Of course, if a plan of that kind had to be worked out and it was absolutely necessary to have military posts and military establishments in every State, probably the plan would be entirely too extensive to be tried at all, would it not?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I can say either yes or no; yet again I think it is a matter which, if we should agree to-day was a desirable thing to be brought about, ought to be attempted gradually. For instance, it may very well be that we could take one locality, and

instead of repairing buildings, build a cantonment near the principal city of that State, and in that way establish a regimental headquarters for the regiment that would be allotted to the State, but to work out a fair and complete plan, fair and equitable to everybody, would be to pay more attention to beauty and ornamentation than to substance, the substance being to get an army or something that will build up an army rather than to get an ideal system of posting that army, and things of that kind.

Mr. KAHN. Well, under your continental army plan you propose to raise 133,000 men a year. Do you propose to carry those men some distance in order to be drilled, or do you propose to have them drilled in the States where they are raised?

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, in the States. I expect to have as a unit the State as far as I can now foresee.

Mr. KAHN. Well, if you can do that in that way with the continental army, why could you not provide accommodations for the men in the Regular Army in the same way?

Secretary GARRISON. Why, because I purpose field training for the continental army as far as my present plan is concerned, and until experience demonstrates how we can do otherwise. Where there are no indoor facilities the continental army shall train in the field, and for that purpose we would simply need field equipment and tents.

Mr. TILSON. You do not mean that you intend to confine the operation of these volunteers to the States in which they are raised? They would have to be gathered in larger groups than the smaller States could afford in order to drill them properly in field maneuvers.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I thought Mr. Kahn had reference to the matter of the initial assembling of the units. Of course, at first there would not be anything higher than company drill. We hope in time to have larger maneuvers, but that would be no part of the initial inauguration of the plan.

Mr. KAHN. Yes; I have only the initial plan in mind.

Secretary GARRISON. That is what I understood.

Mr. KAHN. Because it stands to reason that they would have to have some considerable drilling before they were drilled in large numbers.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; that is what I understood you to mean.

Mr. KAHN. I think you said it is necessary to have a mobile force under your plan of about 50,000 men.

Secretary GARRISON. In the United States Army—that is, in the continental United States.

Mr. KAHN. Upon what basis was that worked out?

Secretary GARRISON. The most prominent factor was that that was sufficient to train the 400,000 citizen soldiers. The organization—officers and men—of a mobile force of 50,000 men in the continental United States as recommended by me is believed by me, upon the advice of my military experts, to be sufficient to train the 133,000 increments a year up to the 400,000 which they would finally aggregate.

Mr. KAHN. Have you worked out any plan as to where these mobile forces are to be stationed particularly?

Secretary GARRISON. No; because my notion now is not to ask for any new buildings or quarters whatever, but to utilize the existing barracks and quarters at the existing posts in the United States that are in fit condition to receive troops, there again my idea being that it is infinitely better to get men and material than to get new posts and buildings and other things of that character.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to ask the Secretary one question.

Mr. KAHN. All right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Then do I understand, Mr. Secretary, that if the continental army scheme could not be adopted it is not necessary to have the 50,000 mobile troops in the United States?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir. I said that is the main factor that fixed the number at 50,000. I do not think that this country ought to have less than 50,000 mobile troops in the continental United States, because of their usefulness in border duty and expeditionary duty in time of peace. But the main factor in deciding on 50,000 troops was to carry out the continental army scheme.

Mr. KAHN. Under your scheme there are three tactical divisions?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. You see, my plan gives you three peace strength divisions: Three divisions of Infantry, the Cavalry division and the auxiliary troops, which would be necessary with the other troops. The War College division works out four—four Infantry divisions, two Cavalry divisions, and so forth, at war strength.

Mr. KAHN. In other words, your plan contemplates a tactical organization?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Is it the purpose to assemble in any part of the country a full division of troops?

Secretary GARRISON. Not at present, because that would require the building of accommodations for a division, and there is no place at present where we could put a division.

Mr. KAHN. No place in the country at all?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. No place where a division of troops could be housed and quartered?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Upon what basis was it worked out that 20,000 Coast Artillery troops would be sufficient for the Coast Artillery Corps?

Secretary GARRISON. I can not answer that, because it was not worked out to be sufficient. It was worked out on this theory, that when Congress created the Coast Artillery Corps as a separate corps it provided for a certain number of companies. After that over-sea requirements necessitated the subtraction of a considerable number of companies therefrom, and it seemed to me that the wise thing to do at this time was to ask Congress to replace in the continental United States the proper number which they had said was sufficient.

Mr. KAHN. What proportion of guns that are now emplaced could be operated under this plan?

Secretary GARRISON. In addition to what we have now?

Mr. KAHN. No. Would 20,000 men be sufficient to handle the guns that we have?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. How many would you have to have to handle the guns that you have?

Secretary GARRISON. I will ask Gen. Weaver.

Gen. WEAVER. Nine hundred and forty officers and 23,000 men.

The CHAIRMAN. You are asking for an increase?

Secretary GARRISON. I am asking for 52 companies.

Gen. WEAVER. Yes; 52 companies.

Secretary GARRISON. That will restore the number who were sent out.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes it, in all, 25,800 men.

Mr. KAHN. I was referring to the continental United States.

The CHAIRMAN. How many would it require for all the guns in the United States?

Secretary GARRISON. Your question, Mr. Chairman, is how many it would require for the entire United States?

The CHAIRMAN. How much would it require for the service of all of the guns in the entire United States?

Secretary GARRISON. It would require about 900 officers and about 23,000 men.

Mr. KAHN. So that even if you increased the force to 20,000—

Secretary GARRISON. (interposing). You are still 5,000 short.

Mr. KAHN. Would you have enough militia in Coast Artillery regiments to man all of the guns?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. In case you get this increase?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. How many would you still be short, taking all the Coast Artillery Militia?

Secretary GARRISON. I think we had better have all of that put in a table and inserted in the record, because what I would give would only be a guess. I will put it all in a table showing those facts.

NOTE.—The following table shows the Regular and Militia Coast Artillery troops required to man the seacoast armament now provided, the existing shortages, and the shortages that will remain if the increase proposed by the War Department is authorized:

	Regular Coast Artillery.		Militia Coast Artillery.	
	Officers.	Enlisted men. <sup>1</sup>	Officers.	Enlisted men.
Required for existing defenses, United States.....	940	23,047	711	17,329
Required for existing defenses, insular and Panama Canal.....	291	6,800	.....	.....
Total required for existing defenses.....	1,231	29,847	711	17,329
Number now authorized by law.....	701	18,929	* 440	* 7,438
Existing shortage.....	530	10,918	271	9,891
Increase proposed by War Department.....	228	5,752	.....	.....
Shortage that will remain if increase proposed by War Department is provided.....	302	5,166	271	9,891

<sup>1</sup> The figures given in this column are exclusive of bands.

\* These figures show the Militia Coast Artillery that is organized and available for service.

Mr. KAHN. All right. I think you said something about the requirement of \$46,000,000 for reserve matériel and fortifications.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. How much would you require for matériel and how much for fortifications?

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Secretary GARRISON. The various supply divisions, under directions determined that to gather sufficient matériel, which can not be readily procured, to furnish an army of 500,000 in the field, would take \$104,000,000, and I have recommended that that be gathered in four installments of \$26,000,000 each. So that for reserve matériel the amount is \$26,000,000.

I constituted a board which, merely for the necessity of having a title, is called the board of review, composed of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, the Chief of Coast Artillery, etc., all the branches which have to do with the coast forts and mobile army, which of course have to defend the coast. The duty of that committee was to give consideration to the coast and harbor defenses of the United States, with the view of determining the necessity for supplementing existing fortifications and constructing new fortifications, and the whole subject matter. After considering reports from the various localities and the district commanders they reached the conclusion that there should be expended in the next four years upon our coast fortifications a total of eighty-odd million dollars, and that is to be raised in four annual increments of \$20,000,000 each. The exact figures are in my report.

Mr. KAHN. Then some of the fortifications would be supplemental to those you have already?

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; the placing of 16-inch guns and things of that character among the existing armament.

Mr. KAHN. Have you figured out about how many men would be required for these new fortifications in addition to what you already require?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Could you figure that out and put it in the record?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

NOTE.—The proposed additional fortifications will require additional regular Coast Artillery troops to the number of 206 officers and 5,435 enlisted men, and Militia Coast Artillery troops to the number of 144 officers and 3,783 enlisted men.

Mr. KAHN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANTHONY. Mr. Secretary, knowing that you have given a good deal of study to this preparedness question, I would like to ask whether this plan of the continental army represents your best views as to what should be done at the present time in order to give us a most efficient military establishment?

Secretary GARRISON. It does, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. How about compulsory military training or service? Do you think that the proposed continental plan would be superior to that from the standpoint of military efficiency?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; nothing would be superior to the obligation of the citizen to render whatever service the nation required of him.

Mr. ANTHONY. Then your opinion would be that the most efficient plans would be that involving training the citizens by law?

Secretary GARRISON. Unquestionably.

Mr. ANTHONY. That is what I wanted to get at. Another question I would like to ask is in regard to the authorship of this continental army plan. Was that evolved by the General Staff of the War Department?

**Secretary GARRISON.** Well, as I told you in my statement the other day, it has been evolved practically by every military student who has ever written on the subject from the American standpoint. Thomas Jefferson in 1805, so far as the word "evolution" applies to it, evolved it, and it is the unquestioned evolution of Gen. Upton's mind, concurred in by Gen. Sherman, and since that time it has been concurred in by military writers, the last being Gen. Carter in his book on the American Army.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Under the law does it not devolve upon the General Staff to consider a plan of this kind and determine upon its practicability?

**Secretary GARRISON.** I can not answer that question. It does not devolve upon them to make a study of this plan—

**Mr. ANTHONY** (interposing). Or of any military plan?

**Secretary GARRISON.** There is devolved upon them the duty, under orders of the Secretary of War, to study and advise him concerning any question of military policy.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Has any military board of the general staff passed upon this plan of the continental army and reported upon it?

**Secretary GARRISON.** Oh, yes. It appears in their recommendation for a military policy. The War College division of the general staff, in their recommendation of September 17, 1915, embodied the continental army scheme as a part of their recommendation.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** Who drew up that plan of the continental army at the department? What board?

**Secretary GARRISON.** Do you mean who drew it up for them?

**Mr. ANTHONY.** I want to place the responsibility.

**Secretary GARRISON.** You will have to ask some of their members. I do not know which of them happened to write it out.

**Mr. ANTHONY.** I thought perhaps there was some board of officers convened for the purpose of drawing up this plan.

**Secretary GARRISON.** I think I can best explain the situation by a brief statement. The General Staff, as you know, is divided into various divisions. There is the Mobile Army Division, of which Gen. Bliss is chief, and he also happens to be the Assistant Chief of Staff. Then there is the Militia Division, of which Gen. Mills is the head; the War College Division, which is the body that sits down at the War College Building, and to which is referred various questions for advice, study, and recommendations. Now, in March of last year when I determined to have this whole subject resurveyed and restudied, I, of course, myself gave it constant attention and consideration with those people with whom I was in immediate touch. Then I referred the matter to the War College, with instruction that they study it and report to me. Their report is embodied in the document entitled, "The Proposed Military Plan for the United States," dated September 17, 1915. The result of my own study, aided by the General Staff that were immediately surrounding me, aided by the reports of various heads of the different divisions of the Army and by officers of the lower grades, is embodied in the report I made to the President. Those are the two reports that have emanated from the War Department. Now, I can not tell you who in the War College Division actually drew up that plan, because the War College Division is composed of a brigadier general, some colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains.

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Mr. ANTHONY. Was any new board made to pass upon this plan?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. What is the general advisory board at the War Department? Is there such a board?

Secretary GARRISON. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ANTHONY. I thought I had heard of it.

Secretary GARRISON. I do not know to whom that term could apply. There is no official body known by that name.

Mr. ANTHONY. The statement was made to me that this plan largely came from general officers on duty at the department, as distinct from what might be called the officers of the General Staff. There is nothing in that?

Secretary GARRISON. Absolutely nothing, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Mr. Secretary, what is the board of review?

Secretary GARRISON. That is the board I have just spoken about, for coast forts.

Mr. ANTHONY. For coast forts only?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. And that board had nothing to do with the formation of the continental army plan?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; nothing whatever.

Mr. ANTHONY. The other day you stated that the general officers on duty at the department would be detailed to give information to the committee here.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Would it be permissible, if the committee desired subordinate officers detailed here, to request them to appear before the committee?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a matter in the jurisdiction of the committee.

Secretary GARRISON. The chairman informed me that he would find out from the members of the committee what officers they wanted to have summoned and that he would give me notice so that I could get them here.

Mr. ANTHONY. My idea was that there were subordinate officers who had information on this matter that the committee might want to hear.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. ANTHONY. In your recommendation provision is made for a substantial increase in commissioned officers?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. And also, with additional organizations which you recommend, there will be an increase of officers?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. Has any thought been given to the division of what is called the linear list in the Army with the idea of equalizing the promotions that will ensue?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. A single list?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. The recommendation which I made on that subject to the chairman was based upon the result of my conference with an, I might say, but certainly with almost all of the general officers on duty here. We spent several hours finding out

how those vacancies could be equitably apportioned among all the branches of the service. Of course, at this conference all the branches of the service and all the departments were represented. At the risk of pleading my own ignorance, and probably justifiable ignorance, all I contributed was the service of a moderator. I simply regulated the sessions. At the end of the discussion the Adjutant General, Brig. Gen. McCain, outlined a scheme of distribution, etc., which scheme was worked over by me and by some other officers who were called in to assist us, and then it was put into shape by the Judge Advocate General. I informed Mr. Hay of these facts and gave him that recommendation, and now again I must confess ignorance, because I do not know whether Mr. Hay put that in his tentative draft or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not put it in directly.

Secretary GARRISON. But your purpose was the same as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. It was only a question of whether the way you worked it out would accomplish it or whether the way I worked it out would do the same thing.

Mr. ANTHONY. I gather that in the creation of any new officers in connection with any new organization the matter of equality of promotion will be taken care of under your recommendation?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. My notion would be to make it absolutely just and equitable to all.

Mr. ANTHONY. Now, in the past, Congress has increased these various branches of the service, some of them abnormally, resulting in abnormal promotions in some branches of the service. For instance, two lieutenants graduated in 1898 at West Point, and one of them went into a division which was boosted by legislation and the other may be only a captain now. Now, has the department ever considered correcting the past blunders of Congress?

Secretary GARRISON. I think they have, and my impression is that in attempting to do so they have put up to the department some of the hardest nuts that anybody ever tried to crack. It is a very hard subject to handle. The Adjutant General and the Judge Advocate General have frequently come to me with various statutes enacted for correcting those abnormal situations, and I have practically contributed only this: That I wanted to see everything done that would produce equality and fairness in the service. It is most difficult for anybody but a trained military mind to understand that question. I would not like to display my wealth of ignorance on it. I can only say that my intention is to see that those matters are equitably adjusted, but it is very difficult to accomplish.

Mr. ANTHONY. As far as you have gone into it, do you think the adoption of what is called the single linear list would cure those defects?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not know enough about it to give you an intelligent answer. At one time I thought there was a sufficient agreement on the part of the officers themselves and that I could safely say yes, but I find that there is considerable disagreement still about it, and I would have to hear a good deal more about it before I could form a judgment that I would want to stand by.

Mr. ANTHONY. In any legislation of this kind the question of equalizing promotions is one of the most important questions connected with it.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANTHONY. In order to maintain a spirit of good feeling in the service?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Mr. Secretary, the present military force of our country is now divided into two classes, as I understand it—the Regular Army and the Organized Militia. Is that true?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; excepting that the Organized Militia is not a part of the Federal military force of the country. You are correct with that qualification.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Mr. Secretary, has there not in the past been more or less friction in the supervision of the militia by the War Department—that is, friction between the Regular Army and the Organized Militia?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I suppose there has been. There has not been any unpleasantness that rose to any particular degree since my time except in one or two instances. I had a very important frictional difference with the governor of South Carolina which resulted in the governor disbanding the entire militia and putting it out of business.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not a fact that the militia has, until a few years ago, been wholly neglected by the Federal Government so far as any encouragement extended to them in the way of pay or anything of that sort that would tend to build up the militia of the country?

Secretary GARRISON. I think in a general way I can say yes. I think there were sporadic attempts at cooperation, but they were not very much encouraged on either side for many years.

Mr. MCKENZIE. It is your judgment that by reasonable encouragement by the Federal Government the Organized Militia of the United States could be increased to 200,000 men?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, my guess would be no better than anybody's else as to that. I could guess yes or no.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Well, in your judgment?

Secretary GARRISON. My notion is no. My notion is that the State militia has just about reached the recruitable strength. I do not believe the pay is going to make much difference in that.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Your plan is to divide the forces of the country into four distinct parts, the Regular Army, the Organized Militia, the continental army, and the cadet corps. Is that true?

Secretary GARRISON. No; the cadet corps you speak of—

Mr. MCKENZIE. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. It would be attached to a portion of the Regular Army and serve with the Regular Army.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I understand; but it is a new feature so far as our military organization is concerned.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; but it is not a separate branch of any sort.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Have you any fear of confusion when that plan is put into effect?

Secretary GARRISON. I have none; no.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not a fact that one of the reasons put forward for the organization of the continental army is the fact that the War Department will have immediate and direct control of that organization?

Secretary GARRISON. Under legislation by Congress?

Mr. MCKENZIE. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCKENZIE. In other words, it would then differ from the Organized Militia in that the War Department would have the power to direct in every instance the movements of the continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. Unity of responsibility, authority, and control are absolutely essential to any military organization.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Now, in your judgment, Mr. Secretary, will there not be a conflict growing up between the Organized Militia and the continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. Over what?

Mr. MCKENZIE. Well, in the matter of getting enlistments and the matter of Federal recognition and appropriation. Will the War Department, under the circumstances, not feel more kindly toward the continental army, which is its own creature, than the Organized Militia?

Secretary GARRISON. Not under my jurisdiction, it would not.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Well, I would not mean to say that. I mean as a general principle.

Secretary GARRISON. Of course, I can only speak for myself. My notion is that if the States have determined how much Organized Militia they desire to maintain within their respective borders they must, of course, conform to the type of organization that the Congress has the right to prescribe. Of course, they could not have Lancers or Zouaves, five or six major generals and five or six brigadier generals. That is all Congress can do with respect to that. After that, my notion is that whatever force the State has by reason of the limited but very effective use that the Federal Government may make of that force, we should do everything that we possibly can for that force. So that my notion would be that we should have no conflict, but, on the contrary, absolute cooperation between the United States and the individual States with respect to whatever force the States propose to keep.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Well, of course, the Government will offer some inducement for young men to enter the continental army, no doubt.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; my own notion has always been that the continental army would appeal primarily to young men between 18 and 20 who probably by no possibility were circumstanced so that they could do the class of service that they would have to do in the National Guard. There are young men going to school or college who would readily have three weeks or a month—I do not think you could make it two months—in the summer time to take this military training, but who could not give 12 months' service in armories.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Unless there are inducements offered to young men to join the Organized Militia of the various States, do you not think that the Organized Militia may dwindle and be injurious to the organization?

Secretary GARRISON. It will dwindle and be injurious if it is true that the Organized Militia is composed of men who are so circumstanced that they can go into the continental army and who prefer Federal service to State service; yes. Those who argue that the State militiamen are in the militia because they want to serve where they are can not argue that they will leave the militia because they

can serve elsewhere. I think that as long as it is demonstrated that there are three classes of men—those who want to and can go into the Regular Army, those who want to and can go into the continental army, and those who want to and can go into the National Guard—we can draw on all those sources and there will be no conflict between the War Department and the National Guard, just as there has been none during my time except, as I told you, in South Carolina.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You are firmly convinced, after considering the question, that it will not injure the Organized Militia, but that the continental army can be recruited alongside of it and with success?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, of course, I am not a prophet. I feel that everything concerning that matter depends upon the spirit in which the National Guard looks upon this whole matter. What I have wished to accomplish from the beginning was to have the fullest possible working together of the National Guard and the War Department, with a view of accomplishing just the result you have in mind. By that I mean that in those instances where the national guardsmen, to a considerable number, wish to and can take the continental army training, and the Nation and States can each function within their respective spheres without the slightest friction if they both act in the proper spirit they can absolutely accomplish the desired results. That is why I have asked Congress to leave to the President the largest discretion, within a fixed limit, that they wish to put into the law, so that we can accomplish just that thing. I do not pretend to be wise enough to know what will be the result, but I do know that there should not be the slightest friction. If those who are interested in the matter of the National Guard will come to me and discuss the matter there will be no more friction. Now, if we have to function arbitrarily it may be that we will have to do something that will create friction, but there need be no necessity for any arbitrary action on the part of anybody, because the National Guard exists for the only purpose for which they were created, that is, to serve the country in time of need. If they say, "We can not get our men to go into the continental army because they are men who have families and are in employment and can not give this service of three weeks," or whatever it may be that you decide upon, I will say to them, "Gentlemen, you realize that as far as your system is concerned I purpose doing everything just as we have done in the past and polish you up to take part in it." I am firmly devoted to that end. It has got to be by accommodation, however. As long as they fear that I am trying, in some way or other, to undermine or hurt them, they will not meet me in the proper spirit. The moment that they see that my purpose is proper they will come to us and I will say to them, "If you all want to come in and can do so, we will take you in, and if some of you want to come in we will take you as you are."

Mr. MCKENZIE. Is it not the opinion of some of our leading military men that this continental army scheme will be a failure and that it will demonstrate one thing: That if we can not raise an army in this country by voluntary enlistment, it will eventually lead to compulsory military training?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, if I have the right to speak for the content of other gentlemen's minds I will say yes. I should think that

would be the conclusion that an intelligent view of the situation would lead to in a great many minds.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I believe that is all.

Mr. GREENE. Mr. Secretary, suppose as a matter of fact, speaking broadly, the ideal military policy would be limited, for the purpose of raising an effective army for use in time of war, to two organizations, the Regular Army and a general Federal volunteer system, whether it is Federal militia or otherwise, rather than three?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not see any trouble, Mr. Greene, with three forces. That does not seem to present any particular trouble.

Mr. GREENE. Well, what I intended to indicate by that was this: Is it not more or less an agreement that the present National Guard is with us, with its organization, largely as a result of history rather than by anything like the logic of the times?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, except this: That I presume that under whatever name you call it, the State, under our theory of government, must have some kind of force in it for military purposes. Whether you call it State police or national militia is a matter of nomenclature.

Mr. GREENE. Well, that is true, unless they intend to apply a name to a thing and then straddle between the difference as to what it means and what it implies.

Secretary GARRISON. If the question is whether the National Guard is an actual Federal force, it is not, but as to whether it could be, it is always possible for it to become a Federal asset.

Mr. GREENE. If we were to start anew with the experience of these 125 years, it is very unlikely that the States would care to undertake the organization and maintenance of 48 little separate armies.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, there is no doubt about that. No one would ever think of having a Federal force consisting of 48 commanders in chief.

Mr. GREENE. So that you must consider some practical way of getting around this condition.

Secretary GARRISON. My idea is not so much to get around, because with the plenary power under the Constitution, you have the absolute right to do the thing directly, and my idea is to do it directly and effectively rather than to do it indirectly and ineffectively.

Mr. GREENE. I understand that. I did not intend to use the word "around" to imply any finessing.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, no. But where you undertake to make the National Guard a Federal force in an indirect way it is getting around it.

Mr. GREENE. What I meant by the use of the words "getting around" was that by exercising your inherent and undeniable power under the Constitution to raise a Federal militia, you are hoping to carry out the policy under which the Federal militia is administered so as to relieve any friction that might exist.

Secretary GARRISON. That is my intention.

Mr. GREENE. If we were to begin again we would only have the two organizations; we would not have the third organization, which is a result of history.

Secretary GARRISON. There is no doubt about that.

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Mr. GREENE. But the third being with us, it is your intention to so shape the second, that is the Federal militia, that the already existing militia shall be as little interfered with as possible?

Secretary GARRISON. That is my idea exactly.

Mr. GREENE. I wanted to ask you one or two other little things, Mr. Secretary. For instance, is it the general military opinion that the apportionment of the various arms of the service to-day in the Regular Army is in proper relative proportion to their needs as concerns the whole organization? That is to say, is the relation between the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, and various other branches of the service on what might be thought to be the most useful basis?

Secretary GARRISON. Of the present existing Army?

Mr. GREENE. Yes, sir.

Secretary GARRISON. I do not think so.

Mr. GREENE. Does your plan contemplate something like a near approach to complete organization?

Secretary GARRISON. It contemplates a practical organization of three arms of the service, Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery.

Mr. GREENE. For instance, to use this as an example, the Cavalry would be the most difficult to train if we were to increase suddenly to a war strength?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREENE. Has it ever been the view of the department that some of the arms of the service are so technical and intensified in training that they should be maintained in time of peace in disproportionate size to the other arms of the service because it would be more difficult to swell them up in time of war?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. It was not recommended by me, however, because when we start on this fundamental policy we had better start with an absolutely settled tactical organization rather than to unbalance it at the start, because the changes which will be made will come as the result of experience. If we find with the continental army that we can, to a fair extent, train Field Artillery and Cavalry, which are the difficult branches of the service, it would throw some light on the question of whether or not we should maintain an unbalanced organization in the Federal Army.

Mr. GREENE. If there was to be some substantial increase in the Regular Army in the way of personnel, would it be as advisable to bring existing organizations up to full war strength or to an increased strength of some number, as to create a new organization complete?

Secretary GARRISON. The ideal thing would be to have every organization at war strength. In my judgment I would rather have full units than skeleton units, but as between taking existing organizations of the Army to-day and filling them to war strength and giving me the additional organizations that I ask for, the whole thing to be on peace strength, I much prefer the latter, because we absolutely need the latter. We need the noncoms. and the company organization in order to have a well-trained army, and that is the reason why I came down on that side of the problem. If you were then to fill the tactical organizations that I have asked for to war strength you would to that extent swell the number of enlisted men in each branch of the service. That could be done any time by a mere line of legislation, if that was considered advisable. I do not think that it is a factor at this time, but the other things are essential.

**Mr. GREENE.** Is it considered practical by military authorities who have, if anything, a considerable overplus of officers in time of peace who may have to depend, of course, on various assignments and details here and there rather than duty on the line, in time of peace, in order to be prepared for any expansion in the Army when the service of trained officers would be almost the first thing to be desired?

**Secretary GARRISON.** I always felt that we needed that kind of a mushroom organization. By that I mean heavy at the top. That is the reason I wanted these additional officers. There is no fear that there would not be ample work to do if this plan is put into effect, because when you consider the need of proper officers for the training of militia, continental army, the duties with schools, colleges, etc., I think all of these extra officers that we can possibly get will be none too many, if enough, for this demand, so that those officers will be constantly occupied either with their troops or on other lines of service.

**Mr. GREENE.** I asked the question because I wanted to bring out additional evidence which is to be considered later, because we are certain to meet the idea on the part of our friends, the public, that an army that seems to have a superabundance of officers in times of stress is top heavy, whereas there may be a definite provision in regard to personnel which might tend to do away with any trouble in time of expansion.

**Secretary GARRISON.** No one who gives study to the matter can come to any other than one conclusion on that subject. In times of stress you are absolutely helpless if you have not the trained officers and personnel to train the raw recruits. Therefore, if you had only a limited amount of money to spend and a limited personnel to equip it would be the part of wisdom to make that personnel consist of officers, rather than to expend any portion of it for the enlisted men, who would be so small a number in the aggregate as to be negligible. In the so-called Swiss system the one part of it that is permanent is the officers corps.

**Mr. GREENE.** There is just one more matter concerning which I desire to ask you a question, Mr. Secretary, and I will not trouble your patience longer. Has the War Department already made, or does it contemplate some systematic system of inquiry for the purpose of developing the coordination of our manufacturing, commercial, industrial, and other facilities in this country by a tentative plan which could be put into execution immediately following the emergency of war?

**Secretary GARRISON.** That matter has been studied, by my direction, for several months, and the different aspects of it are constantly coming up, so that the matter is receiving all the attention we can give to it which in the midst of our multiplicity of duties we are able to give to any one part of our work.

**Mr. GREENE.** You know that one of the arguments that some of our friends of the public present is that this is a country of tremendous potential resources, and it is difficult to convince some of them that not by the wave of a magic wand on the declaration of war will all of those potential resources become available assets, and the question suggests itself whether some plan might not be laid down whereby every man, or every industrial concern, or every trans-

portation company, or any other organization that would be expected to give aid in time of stress, would know what was expected of them in time of emergency, and be prepared to act on the orders of the War Department.

Secretary GARRISON. That has been in my mind. I have tried to set on foot an effort to ascertain that information, so that we might be able to produce that final result. It would be true to say that I have yet no such comprehensive plan worked out as to measure up to the definition of necessity that you have given. Not that I do not think that your definition is absolutely accurate, nor do I think that it is too comprehensive, but it is a great question and will require many months of careful consideration before we can say that we can accomplish the result you suggest. But we are trying to accomplish it.

Mr. GREENE. Would there be any necessity, Mr. Secretary, for legislation in any form on the part of Congress to either supplement your own official action in that respect or to make possible some exercise of authority by the War Department in case of emergency?

Secretary GARRISON. There probably would be, but I am not able now to determine just what would be necessary.

One thing that is interesting along the line about which you have questioned me is that the state of mind you speak of on the part of many people who talk about this subject is necessarily ignorant. They have not the proper factors with which to deal, and it is very startling to find, in the investigations we are making, in how many instances the point of origination is outside of this country, and therefore how effective our potential strength might be with respect to something that is not here. You have to figure on what you would do in the event you have to have it and you could not get it. There are many, many such things, more than you have any idea of until you consider the studies we have been making in the department.

Mr. MORIN. Mr. Secretary, it has been estimated by men belonging to fraternal organizations of the United States that there are approximately 4,000,000 members between the ages of 21 and 35. Many of these organizations have so-called drill teams that meet two or three times a week to perfect themselves in the drill used by the organizations in the initiation work. Many of the officers of these organizations believe that thousands of their members would be willing to be drilled two or three nights every week in the year by a commissioned or noncommissioned officer of the Army, so that in case of war or imminence of war they could immediately respond to the call of the President for volunteers. Do you not believe that it would be worth while to drill these organizations, provided four or five hundred members would consent to join the companies or battalions for drill purposes and for learning military tactics?

Secretary GARRISON. It might be well worth while, if the noncommissioned officers and the commissioned officers were not actually engaged in the imperative duty of training an actual, physical, obligated force. You can not conceive, in the first place, that there is anything in training men except as a means of defense, if the issue of defense is to be met. If you are going to have war, nothing would be so essential as to know how you are going to fight that war. You can not determine that until you have your hand upon something.

If you have not got the munitions of war, they have to be manufactured. If you have not the men, they would have to be procured. We have reached the point when we believe that furnishing men and officers is a requisite for national defense, at the expense of the National Government, and unless you had highly trained officers to do that work, the drilling would not amount to anything. You would be drilling a lot of men who are under no obligation to the National Government, and who are not subject to military discipline. They could not be drilled in anything but close-order drill, which is a minor part of a soldier's education, and the result would be to dissipate that much Federal material, that is, the commissioned and noncommissioned personnel whose service would be devoted to that purpose. The game would not be worth the candle.

Mr. MORIN. I believe, Mr. Secretary, that many thousands of men would receive even a greater amount of instruction during the year than could possibly be given the members of the continental army during the few weeks they would be under military training. Do you not think this would be an inexpensive plan for adding to your proposition of a continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. I think so, but like all inexpensive things, it would be useless. I never got anything that was worth while for nothing, and I do not believe anyone else ever did either. For a man to be of any avail to the National Government in time of war, you must not only have him obligated and have his uniform and his equipment, but there must be something else. These would simply be men who would have gone through a certain number of drills, and who might volunteer. These organizations are scattered all over the country. They have their meetings in little towns and big towns and cities and various other localities.

To contemplate any kind of military system that is to be founded upon your commissioned officers or noncommissioned officers attending two or three nights a week—if you could get them that often; that is a very large order—to give those men close-order drill in an armory, would be to waste your officers and noncommissioned officers, if you can get something else, that is, a man who comes forward and obligates himself to serve his Nation and says, "I will take the training you order me to take." One thing would be playing at the matter and the other thing would be serious business, and certainly war is that, if anything is.

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Secretary, following out a little further the line of questioning opened up by Mr. Greene in regard to the organization of our industries; would it not be possible to go even a little further than he suggested and make up tentative contracts for the production of supplies, or the furnishing of supplies, conditioned, of course, upon the actual outbreak of war? Would it not be possible to go so far as to arrange for the production, say, of so many thousand shrapnel shells?

Secretary GARRISON. That has alway been in contemplation in the studies we have been making.

Mr. TILSON. Then, as another very necessary help in time of trouble, would it not be quite practicable to manufacture and lay aside, ready for instant use, a number of gauges, tools, and fixtures suitable to making material for the purpose of making arms, equipment, ammunition, etc.?

Secretary GARRISON. I think that matter has been given consideration by the Chief of Ordnance, and all I can say is that I have gotten that impression from him. I think that is one of the matters that has been studied by him and under his direction.

Mr. TILSON. Is it not a fact that the orders for war material that have been placed in this country for the allies have been delayed long months in delivery simply by reason of the fact that it was necessary, first, to construct all the tools proper to make the gauges and fixtures that are used on those tools to produce the material before they could begin delivery?

Secretary GARRISON. If you will strike out the word "allies" in your question, I will say yes. I know the manufacture has been delayed for the reasons you have suggested, but I have no way of knowing who were the customers of the manufacturing establishments.

Mr. TILSON. I have a question I will ask you now in regard to the contemplated reserve supply corps, and that is whether there has been any study of this question as to the performance of supply duties in time of war?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not exactly understand your question, Mr. Tilson.

Mr. TILSON. We have a supply corps which supplies our present Army?

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; the Quartermaster Corps.

Mr. TILSON. They furnish all the supplies. Now, we are to expand very much. Is there any provision for not only that expansion, but for the training of an adequate, competent supply corps?

Secretary GARRISON. In the recommendation that was made by the department there is a provision for a reserve corps of officers for every branch of the Army. With respect to the Quartermaster Corps, for instance, the intention and desire is to have men train themselves and equip themselves—I do not mean with personal equipment, but mental equipment and training—to go upon that reserve list, the limit being as many as we can get on it, the idea being to draw upon them in time of war.

Mr. TILSON. In time of maneuvers, in peace times, have not there been difficulties in supplying the few men we have called?

Secretary GARRISON. I assume so, but so far as I am personally concerned there have not been any maneuvers during my régime of that character which come to my mind at the present time.

Mr. TILSON. It has been my own experience and observation in the service, both in militia maneuvers and in those in connection with the Regular Army, that there has been great difficulty; in some instances the system of furnishing supplies has almost broken down.

Secretary GARRISON. I think this: I think there is no one part of the Military Establishment that requires more care to see that it does not break down than the matter of supplies, and that there was demonstrated a most deplorable situation at the time of the Spanish-American War.

In recent years there has been a very marked advance, and when the Quartermaster General is on the stand, if you will take occasion to ask him in regard to the experience we have had in the field during the time I have been in the War Department, I think you will find it has been very good.

We have had a good deal of experience. We have had 20,000 men along the southern border, and the work of the Quartermaster Corps there and in connection with the sending of the expeditionary force to Vera Cruz will give you some fair illustrations. I think the results there show a very high degree of efficiency. If you are going to contemplate the expansion of the Army, you will have to contemplate the expansion of that corps. If this proposed continental army does nothing more than to provide agencies to do those very things, to get those men somewhat acquainted with their duties, you are advancing 90 per cent beyond anything you have had in times of peace.

Mr. TILSON. Would it not be much more difficult to produce an efficient corps for this purpose than to produce an army itself?

Secretary GARRISON. I think so.

Mr. TILSON. In other words, it is the most difficult part of the whole-business, the supplying of the Army with arms, ammunition, equipment and food?

Secretary GARRISON. Of course, without that you have not an army. If a man has not food to give him strength and arms to fight with, he might as well be back home, as far as the Army is concerned.

Mr. TILSON. In regard to transportation, has there been consideration given to the subject of transportation, both of the men of the Army and the equipment?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir. We had made initial studies along these lines, and within a very short time the various railroads of the United States appointed a committee of gentlemen who visited me and with whom I have had conferences, and we are now studying and cooperating with them with a view of working out whatever we can work out by mutual study and cooperation along those lines.

Mr. TILSON. One more question in regard to the railroads. It has been my experience, in the small experience I have had in those things, that railroads have nearly always fallen down in their part of the transportation problem when it comes to the movement of troops. If you go into an adjoining town to attend a parade and take a battalion or a regiment of troops along, probably the train will break down and be several hours late taking them to the town. That is only a minor illustration, but I think such a thing has occurred on a greater scale, with a large number of troops.

Now, in regard to the transportation in the field, by use of wagons, motor trucks, and so forth—I mean the organization of such a system—has there been anything contemplated along that line?

Secretary GARRISON. All those matters have been the subject of general and specific study, and the question of endeavoring, in time of peace, to organize the available material which might be volunteered in time of war, has been taken up—volunteer automobile transportation, or motor-cycle transportation, and things of that character.

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a few questions along one more line before I get through. I want to take up the subject of the utilization of the Organized Militia in your plan for the continental army.

I wish to ask you whether there is any inherent objection, either constitutional or otherwise, to using the so-called Organized Militia intact? In other words, make the Organized Militia a national force, as if there were no Organized Militia in existence, enlisting

them with Federal enlistments but using for the enlistments the same men, who, at the same time, with your personal knowledge, but not necessarily with your official knowledge, are members of the State militia?

Secretary GARRISON. In other words, not require them to free themselves from the State obligation before assuming the Federal obligation; that is what it comes down to.

Mr. TILSON. That is my question, whether there would be any inherent difficulty in their belonging to the Federal volunteer force, and at the same time belonging to the State militia. We have become accustomed to dual citizenship, to being citizens of the United States, as, for instance citizens of New Jersey or of Connecticut. Would there be any inherent difficulty in doing the same thing here?

Secretary GARRISON. In the absence of any aid from any known legal decision on the subject, necessarily we will have to deal with such fundamental principles as we feel we are possessed of. I rather feel, and have always felt that wherever you spell out a Federal power, it is of necessity paramount, so that if a man comes into a status that is Federal in its character that must be paramount. So, I should think there would be no irremedial constitutional difficulties any more than there would be if a member of the National Guard were to enlist to-day in the Regular Army.

I am inclined to think if a member of the National Guard were to enlist to-day in the Regular Army that his status thus produced would be paramount to any previous status in which he had stood to his State authority.

Mr. TILSON. But if it were compatible, for instance, if his duties in the Regular Army kept him in the vicinity of his State regiment, would there be any necessary incompatibility in his remaining a member of the Regular Army and of the State militia?

Secretary GARRISON. It is pretty hard, of course, for a man who has acquired his knowledge of the military arm of the Government by three years association with the establishment to conceive a man who is subject to two commanders in chief. That is a hard thing to do, if I understand the idea in your mind.

Mr. TILSON. My idea is that the Federal authority is so paramount that the other would not really conflict with it, that in dealing with this institution, as Mr. Greene has already pointed out, an institution already in existence, with its history and traditions, and all such things clustering around it, a utilization of this volunteer force, is important.

Secretary GARRISON. Does that not come back to what I said a while ago? I would like to give any aid that I could, if I felt that it was intelligent, to elucidate what you have in mind, because, of course, we have all had the same things in our minds.

What I said a while ago was this: Whether that is possible or not, not from the legal standpoint, but practically, I think would largely depend upon what we found out by getting together with the representatives of the National Guard and seeing whether some sort of workable arrangement could not come out of it. If I attempt to do that without such mutual counsel, I fear I would run on some rock I did not happen to know of, and would be submerged. If we could get together and attempt to work it out theoretically, and then see

how it would work out practically, we might be pleasantly astonished at the result we might achieve.

Mr. TILSON. Do you not understand that the larger part of the Organized Militia, the rank and file of the Organized Militia in this country, have enlisted for the express purpose of being a Federal force rather than primarily being a State force?

Secretary GARRISON. All members of the National Guard who ever disclosed his state of mind to me were unanimous on that point. They did say the men are in there for Federal service; let us show them how to render the Federal service. That is what they want, to be under the direct control of the Federal Government. That is what they are there for.

Mr. TILSON. And the National Guard Association, in their attempt to have a constitutional amendment passed—is not that the purpose which they had? I agree with you it is necessary to do just that thing in order that the militia may become a Federal force.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; that was the ostensible purpose. And in using the word "ostensible" I do not need to use it with any malign significance. That was the ostensible purpose, but instead of doing the thing directly, that was an attempt to go around, and accomplish a purpose indirectly, which could have been accomplished directly by means of direct legislation by Congress.

Mr. TILSON. Can we not go at it directly and start with the premise that what we wish is a national volunteer force? That is the primary need. Having settled that, we proceed to where we can get it. What is the difficulty in taking a force we already have as a National Guard, not taking it out of the National Guard, but bringing it into a National Volunteer force, and letting it at the same time remain a State force?

Secretary GARRISON. As I understand your proposition, Mr. Tilson, it is this, that as far as the face of the record is concerned, the Federal Government would have a Regular Army and national volunteers.

Now, the fact that certain portions of the national volunteers, when they are not engaged under their obligation to the United States, are rendering service to the State in another capacity, would be negligible. Is not that the situation?

Mr. TILSON. Not only be negligible but would be—

Secretary GARRISON (interposing). Negligible as far as the Federal Government is concerned. I mean it would not present any obstacles to the Federal Government.

Mr. TILSON. None whatever.

Secretary GARRISON. That is what you had in your mind.

Mr. TILSON. All their activities for the State would be helpful rather than hurtful.

Secretary GARRISON. I can only say this, at this time, Mr. Tilson, that I would like to have that as one of the things we would try to thrash out in the sort of conference I would like to see brought about between the National Guardsmen and ourselves, in order to see if we can not work out some of these things. I think that was, to some extent, considered in the very excellent report I offered here this morning from the Massachusetts commission, which the chairman very kindly suggested might be made a part of the record of this hearing. I think they went over that and they reached the conclusion that we should have national volunteers, as they said, for

national service exclusively, and I am inclined to think they considered just the thing you have in mind, and could not find any way to do it. I do not think that is conclusive on the legal question, or, perhaps, on the practical question, but I think you will find that they considered that. The report of that commission gives a most interesting view of the whole subject matter about which you are asking.

Mr. TILSON. It seems to me this is the most important phase of the whole plan; that is, how the National Guard is going to be dealt with, because we have to reckon with the members of the National Guard who have been the backbone of what little military spirit and labor there has been in the United States, outside of the Regular Army. They have got to be reckoned with. Not only is it fair that that should be done, but it is imperative to the success of such a plan as you propose here, or of any other plan.

Secretary GARRISON. You realize that is my state of mind, Mr. Tilson, because you have been familiar with my intercourse with them, and you are familiar with how we suggested that in the first meeting we ever had with them.

Mr. TILSON. I realize your attitude, Mr. Secretary, and wish to get your assistance in trying to work out that problem, and if there is any difficulty in the way of solving it, to remove that difficulty.

Secretary GARRISON. That is what we look forward to doing, if we can.

Mr. CRAGO. Mr. Secretary, have we any data or any records to show what percentage of the men who ever had previous military training ever served with the colors during our different wars?

Secretary GARRISON. Have we any records to show, when volunteers came forward, whether they had any military training?

Mr. CRAGO. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. Gen. McCain, do you know anything about that?

Gen. McCAIN. I think we can get that. There is such information in the War Department, partially.

Mr. CRAGO. I am asking that more particularly with reference to the Civil War and to the Spanish-American War. My own experience is that a very, very small percentage of men who have had previous military experience ever enlist in time of war. I am asking that question to get at the point whether we are trying here to legislate for a permanent force which we will always have at our command, or to follow out that fiction so many of our people have in regard to the spreading of military instruction among our citizenship.

Secretary GARRISON. You get my point. My notion is that this opportunity will have been utterly lost if we do not seize it, and by legislation place at the disposal of the Nation an ascertained number of men, under a distinct definite command, for a specific purpose.

Mr. CRAGO. I agree with that. I think a great deal of the money that is spent with the idea of scattering this military instruction is wasted, because my own experience has been that the men who go into the Army or into the National Guard and get their training there, and then get out, when it comes to actual service for the country do not go back unless they get some position of some kind.

Secretary GARRISON. It is not only that. That is the thing I had in mind when I was talking about the unwisdom of building a first line

on a two-year enlistment and a six-year reserve. I had this in mind. Nothing ever succeeds in a self-governing country that runs counter to the general popular sentiment. If a man has been out of the Army for three of four years necessarily he would be 24 or 25 years of age, if he had served two of three years and been out three or four years, and was just getting fixed in some more or less important place in the community, perhaps having been married in the meantime and had a child or two. In a case of that kind, the public sentiment would support him if he said, "Here are younger men who are not going to war, and I am a family man. I am willing to go, but it seems to me this other much more available material ought to go first." That is what they are finding in England to-day, that the single young men are not coming forward.

Mr. CRAGO. It is not possible for us to give the young men the intensive training which they should have in order to be good soldiers.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes. What I am coming to is this, between a scheme founded upon the Regular Army turning out into the community after two years' service reserves obligated for six more years, as a first-line force, and a Regular Army of whatever numbers you choose, plus Federal volunteers of 400,000 men, instantly available by call, uniformed, rifles in their hands, obligated to serve, I prefer the latter, because in the case of the other you are figuring in a vacuum, and I do not believe in figuring on something you do not know anything about and which you can not put down on paper.

Mr. CRAGO. In answer to a question by Mr. McKenzie as to the effect the continental army would have on the National Guard, by way of the War Department lending more encouragement to the one or the other, you answered not under your jurisdiction. Do you not think we should adopt a military policy which should be so strong that neither the Secretary of War nor any group of officers or men should have any power or particular influence?

Secretary GARRISON. That would be an ideal thing to do with respect to any branch of the Government service. What I wanted to imply was this: I was taking a roundabout way to indicate my own frame of mind, which was based on—

Mr. CRAGO. I think we ought to have a policy so strong as to make such a thing as I have suggested impossible.

Secretary GARRISON. I do not think you need fear that, and I do not say that you do. No one is so well-advised and so filled with a feeling of responsibility as the higher officers of the Army in the War Department, who have these immense burdens on their shoulders. If you give them an opportunity to render any branch of their military establishment more effective you need have no fear that they would not avail themselves of that opportunity. The idea that the Regular Army is antipathetic to the National Guard is unfounded, so far as I know.

Mr. CRAGO. That is usually the case. It is usually the exceptional officer who has any feeling to the contrary.

Secretary GARRISON. Legislation can never take care of the personal equation. You can not affect human nature by legislation. Occasionally, some official in any department of the Government may do something which is unwise.

This is what I have in mind. If this Congress, after going over this whole matter should adopt this present recommendation, and we

should have the Organized Militia, with this increased amount of money to aid us in furnishing the men and material, and help them to get along, and the Federal volunteers appealing probably very largely to another class of men, who would not go into either of the others, and the Regular Army, I do not think there need be the slightest apprehension that the War Department will favor one more than the other. There will be no conflict between them.

Mr. CRAGO. That is what I wanted to get at by the next question I had intended asking you. The National Guard in the different States really is a national force, although I think in some cases strike duty has kept them back a good deal in their development in that direction. But that was the primary intention.

Referring to our own State of Pennsylvania, it would be absolutely silly for us, if we did not have any Federal use for them, to have every single military company housed in its own armory at the expense of the State, if it was merely for the policing of the State.

We have gotten away from that in Pennsylvania. We are getting in the National Guard there those who are the bone and sinew of the National Guard, the very young men you will be wanting for this continental army you have planned for; that is, the kind of men who can take a few weeks off each summer. Do you not think if this inducement making that the only requirement, namely, the intensive training, is offered to the young men, especially in our State, it will deprive the guard of the very class of men they are getting to-day, and that they must have?

Secretary GARRISON. Only to the extent that these men want to become Federal soldiers, with the character of training that is finally, by regulation, I hope, and not by legislative enactment, to be imparted to the Federal force; to the extent we can adapt their experience, we have no trouble. If a man says, "I want to go into the Regular Army," and another man says, "I want to go into the Federal force," and another says, "I want to get the training that the National Guard gives," we will have no trouble.

Mr. CRAGO. You eliminate the man who would rather go into this force and get his training in the Federal Army, and there is little left that we want.

Secretary GARRISON. If you have men of three separate conditions of mind, you have no difficulty. You come to a man who says, "I can go either into the National Guard or into the continental army." Of course, if his choice is determined by the character of training, to that extent it is a matter over which we would have no control. To the extent that it would be controlled by whether he wanted to be a Federal soldier or whether he wanted to have some State obligation over him, we would not have any control.

Mr. CRAGO. But you have all this expenditure of money and effort on the part of the officers of a State to build up a force that will be sapped of its real strength.

Secretary GARRISON. I have always felt concerning that—and I think you are absolutely accurate—that the State of Pennsylvania, as a State, would not have provided and maintained any such military force unless it was for the Federal aspect. Anybody who has studied the matter impartially, I think, will realize that it is a pity that the citizens of a State who are willing to put themselves in this Federal

relation do not have the opportunity to do so directly, instead of in this roundabout way that never can produce particularly satisfactory results.

Now, if the National Guardsmen will come to us in the spirit that their own statements always show they claim to be in, of wishing to make themselves an efficient Federal force, every one of these difficulties you have in your mind can be cleared up, to the manifest advantage of everybody.

I can not sit down here now and say I want provision made along a certain line. If you will take the report of the Massachusetts commission you will find they have come to this conclusion, that if the State of Massachusetts were to be relieved of the burdens of maintaining these armories and accessories, giving them to the Federal Government by revocable license, with the obligation on the part of the Federal Government to maintain them at whatever expense is incident thereto, the State of Massachusetts would be in the best position it could be in and their guardsmen would be in their best possible position.

For me to initially propose that would raise up a host of arguments that I am trying to get something away from somebody, and that is not what I am trying to do.

Mr. CRAGO. Could not some plan be devised in this bill by which the States would have the right to fill their quota from the National Guard—in other words, that these organizations be taken over in such a way that they could be utilized as a part of the continental army during the period of training, being absolutely under the control of the Federal Government, and the pay bill made in such a way that they must do that in order to participate in it, and at the same time have those organizations known, for instance, as the Pennsylvania National Guard?

Secretary GARRISON. Of course, nomenclature does not make any difference. I never cared a cent about what you called anything. If you keep the Federal obligation pure and unadulterated—

Mr. CRAGO. Would the State obligation adulterate it?

Secretary GARRISON. Have you the same general idea as Col. Tilson?

Mr. CRAGO. Something along the same line.

Secretary GARRISON. I have always felt we can only reach a sane, worthy conclusion on that by getting a conference with the men of the National Guard who want to accomplish a worthy purpose, with a view of seeing whether we can not work that out. My idea is to do it if it can be done.

Mr. CRAGO. There is an element there that goes beyond the men of the National Guard. That is the element of the organization. There are organizations there which have been built up, and they have history and traditions back of them, and it does not make any difference what the personnel does or does not do, those organizations are going on a certain line. If we take care of those organizations in this army that is proposed, can we take care of the organizations as such?

Secretary GARRISON. I have told them at our conferences that if any way could be worked out, I was perfectly willing to do it.

Mr. CRAGO. That is what the people seem to want.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. TILSON. As a practical matter, Mr. Secretary, do you not think it would be better to call this army which you propose something else than the continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not.

Mr. TILSON. If you call them the national volunteers, or Federal volunteers, you would be better off than to start out by calling it the continental army.

Secretary GARRISON. Continental army is purely—

Mr. TILSON (interposing). It is only a name.

Secretary GARRISON. It is only a matter of nomenclature.

Mr. HULL. Is not this true, that the proper facilities for manufacturing equipment, as far as possible, by the Government should be the foundation of any plan?

Secretary GARRISON. You mean manufactured by the Government?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. HULL. It should be done by the Government.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, no. I did not understand your question. If you are going to start off and have Government plants available—

Mr. HULL. I said as far as possible.

Secretary GARRISON. If you will let me fill in the words "as far as possible," I should say yes.

Mr. HULL. What is the difference in cost at the present time between manufacturing in your arsenals and in the private plants?

Secretary GARRISON. Of what particular thing?

Mr. HULL. Well, general equipment.

Secretary GARRISON. I can not answer that. You will have Gen. Crozier and Gen. Aleshire before you and I could suggest that you ask them about that. I would have no personal knowledge about it. Whatever I might say about it would be taken from their reports to me.

Mr. HULL. How are the present arsenals located in relation to easy defense?

Secretary GARRISON. You mean as to whether they are near the seaboard?

Mr. HULL. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. I will get you a map and put the places on it. The Frankford Arsenal is near Philadelphia, the Watertown Arsenal is in Massachusetts, and the Watervliet Arsenal in New York State. If you will ask Gen. Crozier those questions when he comes before you, he can give you that with absolute accuracy.

The CHAIRMAN. That exhausts the list of members of the committee on the first call, and I will now call the members over again, in accordance with their rank. Mr. Dent, have you any further questions?

Mr. DENT. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fields, have you any further questions?

Mr. FIELDS. Yes. Mr. Secretary, an increase in the volunteer force would necessitate an equal percentage of increase in the officers, would it not?

Secretary GARRISON. For the volunteers?

Mr. FIELDS. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; whenever you raise a certain number of men, you have to have officers for them.

Mr. FIELDS. And in the increase of officers, West Point is the first source of supply.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. FIELDS. What per cent of that increase would West Point supply?

Secretary GARRISON. It would depend on what the increase was.

Mr. FIELDS. In the event your plan should be adopted?

Secretary GARRISON. A very small per cent.

Mr. FIELDS. Then what would be your next source of supply?

Secretary GARRISON. Immediately, now, those officers on the reserve list. For some time past, under legislation and department regulations, we have been adding to the lists of the reserve officers for different branches or arms of the service. We would draw upon them, and then when we exhausted those lists we would have to draw upon men who have served in the Regular Army. There are a certain number who have served in the Regular Army and who have resigned. If they would come back we would utilize them. Then we would have men who have served in the National Guard who would qualify, and then, eventually, my notion is that the source of supply would have to come from the military schools and colleges that would have been educating men under our supervision, under courses which we would lay down, and in which institutions we would have officers present to participate in the training of those men.

Mr. FIELDS. With the present reserve and the present output of these institutions, to which you have referred, could you then supply the demand for increase of officers?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I think you could.

Mr. FIELDS. You think the educational institutions that are teaching military tactics to-day are sufficient to keep up with the increase, or would it be necessary to induce more institutions to take up military training?

Secretary GARRISON. I think there is an indication that there are so many that would take it up, if we could make it worth while, that we would have no trouble.

Mr. FIELDS. This is the point: Have you a definite plan, or what is your plan, to induce other institutions to take it up— institutions that have not yet taken it up?

Secretary GARRISON. There are two bills I spoke of the other day that these gentlemen who are at the head of the various institutions tell me they think will produce that result. Those bills are to be sent to the committee. The main thing is for us not only to standardize the courses, but to send them practical efficient officers to work with them—a thing we have never been able to do except to a very limited extent. It is perfectly astonishing how many of these institutions stand ready to do this thing with a little practical encouragement.

Mr. FIELDS. Is that contemplated because it is necessary to have them do it?

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes. If you are ever going to try to keep an army of 450,000 men of the first line, Regulars and Federal Volunteers, you would have to have a steady flow of officers from some such a source.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Secretary, along the line on which Mr. Hull interrogated you, would it not be a great saving to the Government if all the guns and the munitions were manufactured by the Government itself?

Secretary GARRISON. I can only answer that, Mr. Quin, when you have put down on the expense side of your ledger the items which would of necessity have to go there. If your question is whether or not we can manufacture a gun, or as many guns as we are capable of manufacturing to-day, cheaper than we can buy them, the answer might be yes. But that is not the answer to your question, as I understood it. If you are going to expand the manufacturing establishments of the United States Government sufficient to supply everything it would need in the event of war, then you have to put different items on the expense side of the ledger, because after you have the reserve material laid by, you would have to figure on depreciation and make an allowance for the time the buildings were standing idle until war broke out.

Mr. QUIN. Do you not think it would be the thing for the Government to do?

Secretary GARRISON. Personally, no.

Mr. QUIN. How many manufactoryes has the Government now in operation?

Secretary GARRISON. Gen. Crozier can answer those questions better than I can.

Gen. CROZIER. There are three; one for the manufacture of artillery and two for the manufacture of small arms.

Mr. QUIN. One other question in regard to the officers. How many inactive officers have you now that could perform such duties as the training of troops, such as you have mentioned?

Secretary GARRISON. You mean men on the retired list?

Mr. QUIN. Yes, sir.

Secretary GARRISON. I could not answer that question until I went over the list with a view of ascertaining how many would be available for that purpose. I have no special memory in regard to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not order them to duty except upon their own consent, so that you really have not anybody.

Secretary GARRISON. That is the reason I have not gone over it.

Mr. QUIN. Could there not be legislation that would make that come within the bounds of your authority?

Secretary GARRISON. Absolutely.

Mr. QUIN. Do you not favor the passage of a law requiring the officers on the retired list to render service?

Secretary GARRISON. I would favor legislation which would enable me to call upon officers efficient to do any kind of duty. A great deal is bound up in the word efficient. I would not want to take men who were not efficient.

Mr. QUIN. Is it not true that there are a lot of our retired Army officers who are capable of doing duty, but who are drawing large salaries as civilians?

Secretary GARRISON. Capable for what?

Mr. QUIN. For such purposes as you have indicated.

Secretary GARRISON. I told you, Mr. Quin, I had not gone over that by reason of the fact that there is no legislation which would allow me to order them to do it at all.

Mr. QUIN. One of the members of the committee asked you why it was that very few, if any, of those who had military training in our

late war of 1861-1865, and in the Spanish-American War, did not join the colors and go to war.

Secretary GARRISON. He did not ask me that, he asserted it.

Mr. QUIN. He asserted what is a real fact?

Secretary GARRISON. He asserted it to be a fact.

Mr. QUIN. Is it not a fact that most of those gentlemen are drawing pensions?

Mr. CRAGO. What I meant was what proportion of men who had had previous training prior to the Civil War went into the Civil War, and what proportion of men who had had previous military training prior to the Spanish-American War went into the Spanish-American War. I did not mean what proportion of men who were in the Civil War went into the Spanish-American War.

Mr. QUIN. It was a lack of patriotism on the part of these trained men, was it not?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not know anything about that, sir. I only concurred with his memory that when you raise volunteers you do not find many men there who have served before. You generally find fresh material.

Mr. QUIN. Has there ever been any trouble about getting volunteers?

Secretary GARRISON. It was necessary to resort to the draft in the Civil War. They never filled the President's call in the Spanish-American War. I guess there has always been difficulty.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Secretary, I gather from your report and your testimony before this committee that your principal objection to our past and present military policy in time of peace is the lack of control which the Federal Government can exercise in time of peace.

Secretary GARRISON. Authority and control; yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Of course, the Constitution authorizes Congress to prescribe the discipline for the State militia.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. Under what authority would it not be possible for Congress to enact a law requiring and specifying particularly the character of the discipline throughout the 48 States of the Union, and make that uniform?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. Would not that produce an efficient military force for the purposes authorized by the Constitution?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; it would not do it any more than if you gentlemen were to attempt to prescribe the discipline by which the 48 States should run the post offices.

Mr. GORDON. That is what Congress does now?

Secretary GARRISON. No. . Every post office in the United States is subject to the authority of Congress and the Postmaster General. If each State were to attempt to run its own postal service you would have the most heterogeneous system that was ever devised by the brain of man. You would have no central authority.

Mr. GORDON. You could have 48 different regiments in your Army.

Secretary GARRISON. But all subject to the orders of one commander in chief.

Mr. GORDON. These would be subject to the orders of one commander when they were called out in accordance with the Constitution.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes.

Mr. GORDON. And the Constitution itself provides that the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy and also provides that he shall be Commander in Chief of the State militia when called into the Federal service, under the Constitution.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. GORDON. Now, the Constitution authorizes the calling out of the State militia for suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions. That is a pretty broad power, and your proposed Federal continentals would not be subject to that limitation, and that is one reason why you favor such an organization, if I understand your report.

Secretary GARRISON. That reason does not weigh particularly in my mind.

Mr. GORDON. Do you not think it would have great weight in the minds of men who would be expected to enlist?

Secretary GARRISON. What, Mr. Gordon?

Mr. GORDON. That they would not be protected by the limitation of the Federal Constitution; that their services could not be commanded by the Federal Government except to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

Secretary GARRISON. I do not think it would have that effect.

Mr. GORDON. And would not that of itself have a tendency to discourage enlistments?

Secretary GARRISON. It might. It may be that we will demonstrate that we can only get this kind of service if we require it as we require money by taxes; I do not; that is one of the things that is "on the laps of the gods."

Mr. GORDON. Is it not one of the strongest arguments now in favor of enlistment in the national militia—which is referred to as the national guard—that their service can only be commanded for the purposes specified in the Constitution?

Secretary GARRISON. I fear so. I fear that that is one reason why, when they have been at times sought to be utilized otherwise, they have balked.

Mr. GORDON. Well, they have a right to balk, have they not?

Secretary GARRISON. Certainly; that is just the trouble. When the governor of South Carolina did not like the fact that I did not do certain things according to his notion, he disbanded the State militia, and there was not any militia in the State; and I had no authority over the matter.

Mr. GORDON. You say in your report that there is no danger of militarism; and you base that statement, I infer, upon our past history, as well as upon present conditions?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I base it upon my own mental functioning; I can not tell you just what has entered into it. Personally I do not think there is any more danger of militarism in the United States of America than there is danger of this country becoming a monarchy.

Mr. GORDON. Well, you have, I think, correctly defined militarism to be the subordination of the civil authorities to the military

authority. You say that has been unknown in the history of this country?

Secretary GARRISON. I never have said so; but I am willing to say so.

Mr. GORDON. Well, you know that during the Civil War a great many men were tried and executed right in this city upon the sentences of military courts, in violation of the Constitution, do you not?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not.

Mr. GORDON. What do you say then about the execution of Mrs. Surratt in violation of law, upon the sentence of a military tribunal?

Secretary GARRISON. I say that my wealth of ignorance on that subject is so dense that I could only shed darkness upon it. [Laughter.]

Mr. GORDON. You are familiar, as a lawyer and a former judge, with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Milliken case, are you not?

Secretary GARRISON. I wish I was; but I am not.

Mr. GORDON. Well, I will state, for your information, that the decision of the Supreme Court in that case was that no person not in the Army or Navy could be tried except by a jury; and of course military tribunals have not the functions of a jury. Now, persons who were not in the military or naval service of the United States were, in fact, tried, sentenced, and executed during the Civil War by military tribunals, and my understanding of the Milliken case was that the court determined that that was unlawful.

Secretary GARRISON. You can lay down general principles and enact all the laws you please, Mr. Gordon, but until you can make human nature perfect, illegal things will be attempted, and I do not doubt will be done in this country, as well as in every other country on the face of the earth.

Mr. GORDON. And for that reason, do you not think that we should adhere closely to the limitations contained in the Federal Constitution, for the purpose of protecting the body of the people against those very weaknesses of human nature you have adverted to?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. GORDON. And those constitutional restraints would be removed with reference to this Federal continental army, would they not?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; not if you function the continental army as I think you should.

Mr. GORDON. Well, what would prevent the President of the United States from sending these continental armies on an expedition of conquest or invasion into a neighboring country?

Secretary GARRISON. What would prevent him?

Mr. GORDON. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. In the first place, his own common sense; in the second place, the law; and in the third place, the fact that, unless Congress declared war, I do not believe any President would ever try to wage war.

Mr. GORDON. Well, but you know that that has been done, do you not?

Secretary GARRISON. No.

Mr. ANTHONY. It was done last year, was it not? [Laughter.]

Mr. GORDON. It was done, Mr. Secretary, when the Federal forces of the United States invaded the United States of Colombia, was it not?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not remember the occasion.

Mr. GORDON. The occasion was the seizure of the Panama Canal Strip.

Secretary GARRISON. Well, that was done by Roosevelt, was it not?

Mr. GORDON. Yes; he had to be President, however, to do it; and he received the second largest number of votes at the last election, although he was at the head of an independent party at that time.

Secretary GARRISON. I would prefer not to go into questions of recent political history.

Mr. GORDON. Well, I do not ask you to do so; but I am speaking now of the potential possibilities of a large military force in this country. The present President of the United States and his immediate predecessor have both determined that the United States ought to pay punitive and exemplary damages for that raid that Roosevelt made into the United States of Colombia; that is military history, is it not?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not remember the details of it.

Mr. GORDON. Well, they have negotiated a treaty by which we would agree to pay to the United States of Colombia \$25,000,000 for that strip; and we are already under contract to pay \$250,000 yearly rental for that strip; is not that correct?

Secretary GARRISON. I am going to let the Senate wrestle with that question.

Mr. GORDON. Well, I do not want to embarrass you in the least.

Secretary GARRISON. You are not embarrassing me.

Mr. GORDON. I do not want to embarrass you, Mr. Secretary, but I ask these questions as to recent history as having a bearing upon these matters.

Secretary GARRISON. I appreciate your spirit about it, but I simply do not know these things to which you refer, and I do not want to get into a political controversy, I think we ought to keep politics out.

Mr. GORDON. I fully agree with you on that proposition.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shallenberger, have you any questions?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Yes. Mr. Secretary, I was interested in your remarks in regard to the matter of increased enlistments in the National Guard. I thought you observed that you did not think the pay would have any appreciable effect in increasing enlistments?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you think that applies to the Regular Army, or to the continental army, also?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I think that if you increased the amount of compensation that we give the enlisted men in the Regular Army you would probably get more men—certainly, if you competed actively in the labor market and made it as attractive financially to a man to be in the Army as it would be to be a carpenter or plumber, for example, at \$5 a day—or whatever they get—in that case, as a mere matter of political economy, you could get more men under those conditions.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. If that were not true we could easily solve any question as to the money by simply reducing the compensation of the present forces—if compensation did not effect the rate.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I suppose you could. But what I had in mind about the National Guard is this: That the very best officers of the guard have expressed to me this view: That they have pretty much exhausted the military material, so to speak, available in their immediate communities where they have to recruit; and that they did not urge the militia pay bill on the basis, or in the hope, of getting more recruits. Many of them could not handle more recruits; they have not the facilities for doing so; their facilities are taxed now to the utmost. But they say that the great benefit from that measure would be to enable them to get a hold over the men. As it is at present, they have not any hold over the men. I have talked to many of these militia officers on that subject; and they are very earnest, hard-working young men; they do a lot of study and work. And they say: "The difficulty we have is that these fellows who enlist are careless; they do not take their duties seriously; they do not take care of their equipment, etc." One of these officers said to me: "I have to go into my company room every night after a drill and see that the men's coats are put away, and their hats, and this thing and that thing is put in its place." He said: "At present you have no hold over those men; they do not fear any punishment by a court-martial; they feel no sort of responsibility with respect to the thing. But we feel that if one of those fellows had \$5 coming to him at the end of a month, and knew that he would not get that \$5 unless he lived up to the rules, we would have some hold over him."

That is what the militia officers tell me that you would get out of this militia pay. And that is what these gentlemen on the committee who have been in the National Guard also tell me: Col. Greene, Col. Tilson, and Col. Crago; they tell me the same thing.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I understood you also to observe that you thought an ideal military system would be compulsory universal military service of all the men of the Nation of proper age?

Secretary GARRISON. No; I did not mean to enlist them all, but to have them of any practical value you would have to train them; and you should be able to train any number that you thought it desirable to train.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you mean in time of war?

Secretary GARRISON. In time of peace.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. In time of peace or war, and not depend on voluntary service at all?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I think that in a democracy the more universal you make any service to the central thing that we must look up to if we are going to have civilization and government, the better it will be for all.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you think the compulsory military service prevalent in Europe to-day is the best thing for this country, then?

Secretary GARRISON. If by "the best thing for this country" you mean if it leads to war, I say no. But if you mean that every citizen should be under the same obligation as every other citizen concerning his duties to the Government, I say yes. I do not see why Jones, for instance, should be made to suffer from performing his

duties and Smith be permitted to escape performing his—any more in one thing than in another.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Have you given any thought to the question of whether or not the entrusting that power in the hands of the ruling power of any nation might not possibly lead to war in itself?

Secretary GARRISON. I can not conceive it.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You can not conceive it?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You think it has not had any effect upon the bringing of the wars in Europe at the present time?

Secretary GARRISON. I do not think so. I think, when you take the whole history of human conflict, you will find that it arises out of racial antipathies, racial ambitions; things which are so deep-rooted in the minds of the people that the immediate cause of a war is so far from the source that we make great mistakes in attributing a war to the immediate cause. Just as the blowing up of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor might be, by many people, esteemed to be the cause of the Spanish-American War, whereas any attentive student knows that that was a mere scratch on the surface; and, in the same way, the assault on Fort Sumter was a mere scratch on the surface of the causes that led to the Civil War. Those causes went back, as we all now know, to the foundation of the Government. The question of whether our Government was one from which the individual entities could, upon their own volition, retire, had to be settled before this Republic was safely launched on its permanent career. We had to know that thing; and if it had not arisen over the slavery issue it would have arisen over the taxation issue or some other issue. It happened to come forward on the slavery issue. Yet, many people still think, perhaps, that some particular event was what brought it on. It was not so at all. The question had slumbered in the mass, and it had to be settled.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Do you think the people of Germany, for instance, or the people of England, or of Russia, or France—the great mass of the people—desired this war in Europe?

Secretary GARRISON. You can not tell. You can only tell about anything of that kind by results; but I do not think any of those nations would be waging the war to-day if the people did not believe in it.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. You do not think they would?

Secretary GARRISON. No, sir; I do not believe, even in the most autocratic government on earth to-day, in view of the democratic spirit that has spread throughout the civilized world, that any government could wage a war unless it was with the substantial consent of a vast majority of their own people.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Well, is it not a fact that this war was begun by all those nations without the action of the representatives of the people in their congresses?

Secretary GARRISON. That I do not know.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER (continuing). As, for instance, the German Reichstag, or the Parliament of Great Britain?

Secretary GARRISON. That I do not know.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. And that the war was not only begun, but was being fiercely fought, before the people realized that it was upon them?

Secretary GARRISON. That may or may not be true. I do not pretend to have any historical knowledge of how they got their supplies, or how they got their armies into the field.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. But I gathered that you had the idea that the people of those nations favored this war, or it would not have come about?

Secretary GARRISON. No. I said that I did not believe any nation that was at war was at variance with, or in opposition to, the fundamental sentiments of their people. You see there are, in every community, subcurrents of thought that find expression in the action of all of you gentlemen, without your being able to put your finger on the exact thing that led you to believe the majority of the people wanted a certain thing. You do not take a poll to determine the sentiment of the majority of the people on any of the great bills which you spend your time in enacting into law. These things rumble along under the surface a long time, and finally they acquire headway and come to an apex, and the crest comes, and then we pass on to something else. It has been called by all kinds of names; it has been called "mob consciousness." But you will probably find that almost all great wars have been brought on by causes that reach very far back, and are so subtle that I do not think anybody has ever given a true expression to the causes of the present war in Europe. We all know that it was not really brought on because the Austrian crown prince was killed in Servia.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other questions, Mr. Shallenberger?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The only other questions I have are one or two to follow up the line of thought the Secretary suggests. I think it becomes very important to consider whether or not the Nation's governors or rulers can themselves bring about or produce war when we contemplate that from the failure of the continental army is to follow the idea of compulsory universal military service. Do you think, for instance, that the Nation as a whole was behind the idea of landing the troops in Mexico—landing the Army of the United States in Mexico and backing it up with the Navy?

Secretary GARRISON. I am not in either the diplomatic service or the executive department that has to do with that; my participation in that was entirely mechanical.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Might not that action have led to war very easily, without Congress having declared its will upon the subject? We might have been required to back up the action taken by the Government in that matter.

Secretary GARRISON. I presume it might. I presume that there is no agency ever created by the mind of man that, in its functioning, may not bring on all the consequences that power and authority may always bring on.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The possession of power and authority leads sometimes to abuses and misuses of it, of course?

Secretary GARRISON. Absolutely. You can not have a thing that is strong enough to take care of itself, without running the risk that it is strong enough to hurt something else.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Did I gather from your reply to a question by one of the members of the committee that your idea was that if this continental army should fail, the next move would be to ask from Congress a law providing for universal military service?

Secretary GARRISON. No; I did not say that. What I said was this: That if the Congress devises the very best opportunity for the citizens to voluntarily render sufficient service for the security of the Nation, and that does not result in a successful appeal to the citizens for that purpose, then it is up to the Congress either to have no form of prepared security or to get it in the only other way that would then be possible, namely, by requiring it. That is what I said.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Caldwell, have you any questions?

Mr. CALDWELL. Mr. Secretary, is there any branch of the Army forces now that is schooled in the building of roads?

I find in reading of the present European conflict descriptions of the wonderful roads that are being built behind the armies.

Secretary GARRISON. Well, the engineers are constantly building roads, of course.

Mr. CALDWELL. How large a force in the present Army is devoted to the construction of roads?

Secretary GARRISON. If you mean how large a force is constantly engaged on the construction of roads, I should say none of it. But all the Engineer Corps are competent to be instantly engaged in that work, if necessary.

Mr. CALDWELL. Is there anything in the law now that would permit the forces of the United States Army to be engaged in that kind of work?

Secretary GARRISON. We are constantly engaged in such work, wherever it is within our own jurisdiction.

Mr. CALDWELL. Another thing I wanted to ask: Have you any plan for using men who have once been regulars in the continental army? That is, take a man who had joined the Regular Army and served out his term; would you suggest offering him any extra inducement for joining the continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. No; I would not offer any extra inducements whatever; I would make a common ground of appeal to all citizens.

Mr. CALDWELL. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wise, have you anything to ask?

Mr. WISE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Olney?

Mr. OLNEY. Just one or two questions. I would like to ask the Secretary if he approves of the suggested plan of certain eminent officers concerning the construction of concrete bases at certain vulnerable or important points along the seacoast for coast defense?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I can not answer that in the way you put it, because I have no official knowledge that any officers such as you speak of have approved it. That plan was suggested to us by the gentlemen whose names appeared in the newspapers in connection with it, and whose names I do not recall to memory just now. The question was studied by the Ordnance Department, and I would prefer to have you interrogate Gen. Crozier, the Chief of Ordnance, on the subject, because he can speak with authority upon it, and I can only tell you what my memory carries of the subject.

▲ I remember it, his statement was that they were studying the of placing large mobile guns on railroads carriages, to be put

wherever the road would take them for strategic purpose, and fire the guns, if possible, from the car, without the necessity of having any cement or other bases. There was nothing whatever that was new in the gentleman's idea—they embodied that in a published statement—excepting some locking device that locked the gun to this permanently built cement base, and that was merely an idea an not a specific device. In other words, he said, "Here is your gun, and here is your base. Now, we lower this platform of the car and lock this in by the device to the cement foundation." And he was asked, "What is your locking device," and he replied, "I have not any; we want you to devise that; we have not devised it; we only have an idea that that would be a good thing, if you can do it."

Now, that is all I recall, in a crude way, on that subject, but if you will ask Gen. Crozier he can tell you more about it.

Mr. OLNEY. As I understand you, while you advocate voluntary enlistment for the continental army, you do favor compulsory military service; but it might be considered unconstitutional to devise a scheme of that kind for the public schools—do you know whether that would be considered unconstitutional?

Secretary GARRISON. No; I have no doubt that Congress has ample authority to require military service, just as it has to require taxes, or anything else that is necessary for the support and defense of the Government. But we could not at the present time, without a Constitutional amendment, specifically deal with the public schools, because the Constitution gives the Federal Government no control over those whatever. You could require universal military service; and those who were going to public schools would be just as subject to it as those who did not.

Mr. KAHN. The country has required universal military service by the draft laws.

Secretary GARRISON. Oh, yes; initially, the first law on that subject was the act of 1792 or 1795. Do you remember, Maj. Connor?

Maj. CONNOR. The first act was in 1792, and it was made permanent in 1795.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, in 1795, and for many years afterwards, there was compulsory military service.

Mr. GREENE. Does not the Constitution provide for that, the provision for national defense being one of the first purposes recited for forming the Constitution at all?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; and not only that, but that power is to be read into the formation of any government. Government without force is nothing; the very moment you define government, you must give it the right to compel obedience to its laws; and you can only compel obedience when you have the necessary force to punish disobedience.

Mr. NICHOLLS. It may be a little aside from the main question, Mr. Secretary, but I had an idea of introducing an amendment to the present law into the bill, and I wanted to ask you about it. I think that the suggestion of the gentleman (Mr. Caldwell) about road building is very vital.

As I understand it now, the Engineer Corps is formed from a certain number of the graduates of the Military Academy having a certain standing in their classes; that is where we get the members of

the Corps of Engineers; and all needed in addition to those have to come from civil life?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLLS. I would like to propose an amendment to the bill, so that officers of other services will also be eligible for appointment to the Engineering Corps; and I would like to know whether that would meet with your approval?

Secretary GARRISON. I should prefer not to pass upon that until I have had an opportunity to think about it.

Mr. NICHOLLS. I would be glad if you would give the committee your views about that after you have had an opportunity to consider it; because I do not see why officers in other branches of the service should not have an opportunity to become engineers if they wish to do so.

Secretary GARRISON. That question has been up before; and I would desire to refresh my memory as to it before expressing an opinion; some of these questions of policy are as novel to me as they are to you; and I can only form an opinion upon them after getting the necessary information from those who know about those aspects of the matter.

Mr. NICHOLLS. Well, if you will furnish me with that information, I should be glad to have it in drafting an amendment.

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; I will do so.

(The statement, subsequently furnished by Secretary Garrison, is as follows:)

In compliance with Mr. Nicholls' request, I submit herewith a statement on the subject, received from the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, dated January 17, 1916:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,  
Washington, January 17, 1916.

[Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.]

Subject: Hearing before House Military Committee as to transfers to the Corps of Engineers.

1. This memorandum is submitted in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War issued through the Chief of Staff on January 11, requiring that the Chief of Engineers should submit remarks and recommendations upon the questions raised during the hearing of the Secretary before the House Military Committee on proposed Army legislation in so far as it relates to amendments which would authorize the transfer to the Corps of Engineers of officers from other branches of the service.

2. This matter was given consideration some two years ago in connection with questions raised by Senator Tillman, of South Carolina, and at that time I concurred in the proposition that existing law should be amended so as to authorize the transfer of officers from other branches of the service to the Corps of Engineers upon passing a satisfactory professional examination.

3. After careful consideration I am perfectly willing and would be pleased to see the laws relating to the appointment of second lieutenants in the Corps of Engineers so modified as to authorize lieutenants of other branches of the Army, who are graduates of approved technical schools, without endangering their existing commissions, to take at the same time the same examination for appointment to the Corps of Engineers as is taken by civilian candidates, and so as to waive for such lieutenants the requirement that, in order to be eligible to take the examination for a commission in the Corps of Engineers, a candidate must have established eligibility for appointment as junior engineer in the Engineer Department at large.

4. My reasons for putting the matter in this way are briefly as follows:

5. If officers of other branches of the service were permitted to pass a noncompetitive professional examination and were then given preference over civilian candidates, the latter would naturally be discouraged from taking the examinations at all. On the contrary, every effort ought to be made to encourage capable young civilian

engineers to become candidates for commissions. This can only be done by convincing them that their success or failure will be determined by examinations in which all are on equal footing.

6. Following the provision made in 1911 for admission of young engineers from civil life, it was very difficult to get well-qualified young men interested because of an apparent feeling that the examinations would be made so severe as to discriminate against all civilian candidates. Recently, however, young engineers have begun to see that the examinations, while hard enough to insure first-class men, are absolutely fair and not subject to prejudice or influence of any sort, so that a considerable number of excellent candidates have presented themselves or indicated intention of doing so.

7. This situation now offers very good prospects in future of getting first-class men from civil life. It would be very undesirable, and certainly unwelcome to the civil engineering profession of this country, to break up the present system which is just getting into working order merely in order to give preference to transfers from other branches of the service of men who, if capable, are needed in their own branches.

As stated above, I have no objection whatever to the transfer to the Corps of Engineers of officers from other branches of the service who pass a satisfactory examination; but, for the reasons given, I believe that they should take such examination on essentially the same basis as other candidates.

DAN C. KINGMAN,  
*Chief of Engineers, United States Army.*

Mr. KAHN. In your plan for the continental army, have you thought out just how you are going to place those forces, with reference to the various branches of the service?

Secretary GARRISON. Do you mean the number that I would like to use in each arm of the service?

Mr. KAHN. Yes.

Secretary GARRISON. No. My notion was to do this thing: If, for instance, in the open country of the South, like Texas, and all down there, where you can get such fine weather, and where there are plenty of horses available, you would have a superabundance, if not a totality, of cavalry. In those sections of the country that would be nearer the training centers for artillery, we would try to do something of the same kind that we are doing now, with respect to the training of the Organized Militia. You see, we establish at a place like Tobyhanna, Pa., a large artillery maneuvering ground. We send to that in the summer time, just as early as the weather will permit, a full equipment for field artillery, and to that we send from time to time, the field artillery of the Organized Militia of the adjacent States; and they go right there and work with the officers and men and "non-coms" and the equipment of the Regular Army, which is very much better than sending the units to the separate States. And in the continental army, those things would all be worked out by experience.

Mr. KAHN. Well, in connection with that, the suggestion made by Col. Tillott seems to me very important: Heretofore, in our wars, we have had great difficulty in moving supplies of all kinds, ammunition and food supplies, and so on. In fact, I think Mr. Huidekoper speaks of the terrible mess we made in the Spanish-American War in sending our troops to Cuba.

Do you think it possible to work out a volunteer supply corps, that could come into the service in case of hostilities, and that could handle our supplies? Do you think your department could work out, just as you are trying to work that out—this continental army scheme?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, you see, in the continental army we would get its proportion of men to go into the supply departments—

Mr. KAHN (interposing). Yes; but the men in the supply corps do not really have to have any military training, do they?

Secretary GARRISON. A certain amount of it.

Mr. KAHN. Well, a comparatively small amount; they want to be husky stevedores, who can handle things.

Secretary GARRISON. That is not where you break down; it is not a question of your breaking down with the body, but breaking down with the brain.

Mr. KAHN. I know; but if you have the men that have been trained to that, does it not materially increase the efficiency of your force?

Secretary GARRISON. Certainly.

Mr. KAHN. And is it not possible to get a reserve force of that kind?

Secretary GARRISON. We hope so. We have plans made for all that.

Mr. KAHN. Your plan is made for that?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Anthony?

Mr. ANTHONY. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Greene?

Mr. GREENE. I would like to ask the Secretary if, in the comparison of the possible service that the National Guard could render with that of the continental army, consideration has been had of the fact that continental army service would expire at the end of three years, and consequently be less than that of the personnel of what has been hitherto a more or less permanent institution, in which men have served for periods ranging from 3 to 5 years, or even to 10 or 15 years or more?

Secretary GARRISON. Do you mean the officers or the enlisted men?

Mr. GREENE. Either.

Secretary GARRISON. With respect to the enlisted men, I have given it no consideration, because I have felt that if they came in now and gave their three years of service with the colors in the continental army, it would probably suit everybody's convenience that they should give no further service.

With respect to the officers, if you will take the memorandum I made at the time I was having my conferences with the general officers of the National Guard, you will see that I told them I thought that we ought to try to work out some equitable plan concerning the commissioned personnel, keeping in mind the necessity, which several members of this committee have adverted to, of training as many officers as possible and yet trying to equitably continue as part of the commissioned personnel the officers of the National Guard who should come over. That is one of the things that we should try to have carefully worked out.

Mr. GREENE. One of the objections of the present National Guard to the proposed system is that they have constantly coming up from the ranks of enlisted men, what might be termed "cadets," looking for a commission. Now, if a man in the National Guard service entered the continental army service, would that service which he

had rendered in the ranks in the National Guard enable him to get a commission more easily in the continental army?

Secretary GARRISON. Probably not. But I have always thought that that was one of the things that we would have to deal with by experiment and after experience, so as to devise some way by which those who had that aspiration for a commission would be put in the way of gratifying it; because I have always felt that we should add from time to time such useful adjuncts as we could to the bare skeleton of military training—something like our service schools at Leavenworth, for instance. If in each one of these units, for example, the officers engaged in that State, for one reason or another, were made part of a service school which, by various means, would impart skill and knowledge to those who had the aspiration to be officers in the continental army, that could be taken advantage of, you see, by those who had gained their first experience in the enlisted forces.

Mr. GREENE. Well, if I may, without prolonging this discussion too much, I would like to make this suggestion: The scheme of the continental army, as I understand it, is a rough-and-ready way of furnishing the greatest number of men possible, in the shortest possible time, with the preliminary training that would fit them to join the colors in an emergency—to fit as large a number for being soldiers as could be done within a certain time. Whereas the National Guard, it seems to me, is maintained in an entirely different atmosphere. Apart from a few who go in from a spirit of adventure, or as a pastime, there is a great body of men who have very decidedly, not only inherent military talent, but a warm martial spirit; and they like to continue in the service, not so much, after a reasonable ambition is satisfied by some fair rank, with the idea of gaining a particular elevation in that respect, as for the enjoyment of the service itself.

Now, would men who had attained such practical usefulness and knowledge and standard of efficiency as to make them captains and majors and lieutenant colonels and colonels—would they derive afterwards the same amount of satisfaction in merely being continued along the line with their rank, receiving instruction somewhere, and supervising instruction of other men, as they would if they were still, as they used to be, in the National Guard service, actually rendering service in the field, on the height, or in the saddle with men under arms?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I think that would give rise to a desire to take whatever number of such men there were and utilize their services in some more permanent way than their three years' tenure in the continental army, as at present proposed, would give them; and I felt that that was one of the things that we would work out when we found that we had to work it out. I do not think you could work it out now; you would not have enough data—at least, I have not.

Mr. GREENE. Then you would agree that that would be one of the problems that must be solved in endeavoring to obtain coordination and harmony between the National Guard plan and your continental army plan?

Secretary GARRISON. Yes; and if you will examine the memorandum I have prepared for the officers of the National Guard, you will find that I have asked them to cooperate more in working that out.

Mr. MORIN. Have you any plan in your mind by which the National Guard would be relieved from the local obligation of being called out in case of strikes or disturbances in their communities?

Secretary GARRISON. Not while it remains a National Guard, in the present legal acceptation. You can not deprive the commander in chief of the military force of a State, that is, the governor, of the right to use the militia for whatever purposes he may legally use it for. As long as it remains the Organized Militia of the State, the governor must always have the right to use it for whatever purposes he may properly use it for.

Mr. TILSON. Just one question: Suppose we had eliminated all the difficulties and problems between the national volunteer force and the Organized Militia, and the Organized Militia were ready to come over and become a part of the national force, what would you say as to the training of these men? You have suggested two months, which I understand from you is only a tentative suggestion. What would you say as to arrangements being made so that it would be possible for the ordinary man to get away from his employment for a shorter period, consecutively, and then serve evenings and Saturday afternoons; what do you think of the possibility of making an arrangement of that sort, so that it would be possible for a man to hold employment and at the same time become a member of this national organization?

Secretary GARRISON. I have always felt that that was where we would come out. I have always felt, in other words, that the eventual training of these men would start off upon such a basis as we might reasonably hope to get the men for; later, by experimenting and experience—by what I have said in my statement to you gentlemen—trying one thing here and another thing there, in the latitude that I hope you would allow the President and the department, we would learn a very great deal that you can not speculate about in advance: The main purpose of all of us being to get the men first; to get the most training that we can consistently with retaining the men, second; all of us being guided by the common sense of the situation, and trying to give them as much military training as we can, with the greatest amount of time that you can expect them to give to it. So that the whole matter would be one of accommodation, endeavoring to accomplish the main purpose we all have in mind, with the fixed facts before us which can not be disregarded in any practical scheme.

Mr. TILSON. Just one more question: Assuming that the National Guard were federalized, beginning with the most efficient Organized Militia that we have—I have in mind, for example, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and other States that I happen to know about—beginning with that as a minimum, the training that these men at present have as a minimum, and perhaps enlarging that somewhat to start with, do you not think it would be possible after a while to build up a system without immediately imposing so long a time of service at the beginning as to run the risk of breaking it down?

Secretary GARRISON. Well, I should undoubtedly start out in the spirit to do the very thing that you suggested—to endeavor, as I say, to get a practical working system, which is necessary, if you are going to get any results whatever.

Mr. TILSON. Beginning with an amount of training perhaps only slightly in excess of what those men have now and then gradually working up from that?

Secretary GARRISON. I think that a great deal of this will come out in experience; that you can not speculate about it successfully in advance.


Mr. TILSON. In other words, you are not building a force for tomorrow, or next year, or five years from now; but what you are trying for is to build a permanent system that in years to come will work out an effective force?

Secretary GARRISON. My idea is this, to start right, to have a real military system in this country rather than the haphazard and utterly odd-ends way that they have always treated this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very much obliged to you, and I will ask you to have Gen. Scott and Gen. Bliss to come before the committee next Monday at half-past 10.

Secretary GARRISON. All right. I want to thank the committee for their courtesy and attention during my examination.

(Thereupon, at 1.10 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Monday, January 10, 1916, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)



TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

*U.S. Congress* HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

ON THE BILL

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

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STATEMENTS OF

MISS JANE ADDAMS                    COL. O. C. HULVEY  
THOMAS FELL                        COL. L. R. GIGNILLIAT  
COL. J. C. WOODWARD

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
JANUARY 13, 1916



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## TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

*Thursday, January 13, 1916.*

The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. James Hay (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will hear first this morning from Miss Jane Addams.

### STATEMENT OF MISS JANE ADDAMS, OF CHICAGO, ILL., REPRESENTING THE WOMAN'S PEACE PARTY.

Miss ADDAMS. Mr. Chairman, I am speaking this morning as president of the Woman's Peace Party, and while I realize that it is more or less absurd for women to appear before the Committee on Military Affairs in connection with a bill concerning the Army, I also realize that the general policies of the United States are very largely determined by committees of this sort, and that women in time of war, as in peace, are very much affected by the national policies of the country. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we are glad to avail ourselves of your kind permission to come before you this morning representing women all over the United States, for our society has branches in almost every State in the Union. And I speak not only for the members of our organization, but for many women in all parts of the country, who feel that the talk so general throughout the country, urging a very marked increase of the Navy and the Army, is simply the result of what is happening in Europe; that the sentiment of the United States is unconsciously affected by the conditions on the other side of the Atlantic.

Our war contagion is a good deal like the case of a man living in the middle of Kansas who, hearing that there were a great many burglaries in New York City, thereupon immediately armed himself against the advent of burglars, although there were none in Kansas. His panic would be purely subjective and the result of what he read was happening elsewhere.

Mr. Chairman, there are two lines of presentation I would like to put forward in support of our contention. The first is that among many experienced people in England and in Germany and in other countries there is the belief that one of the results of this war will be a proportional reduction of armaments. Even before the war Germany and England were beginning to consider the increases in their navies in relation to maintaining a certain proportion. If such a thing as that could be done before the war started, when the finances of all the nations were in a good condition, it certainly would be easier to do such a thing after the war, when most of the nations now engaged in war are going to be bankrupt and we hope more or less con-

vinced of the folly of attempting to settle any international difficulties through warfare.

It seems to the Woman's Peace Party, therefore, that the United States ought to wait until after the war is over before it adopts a new policy, for if there is a chance for pushing the matter of proportional disarmament the United States would be the natural nation to suggest it.

We are further away from the likelihood of war than any other nation; our traditions are against a large standing Army, and if the United States were at least to postpone this proposed policy of military expansion, we could go in for such an international program with clean hands. We could do that very easily if we had not previously increased our own Army and Navy, but if we had adopted that policy of increasing the Army and Navy which is being urged, it would be difficult for us to say to the countries of Europe, "We would like to take up with you the reasonableness of proportional disarmament."

Gentlemen of the committee, we suggest that you at least postpone this plan for a large increase of the Army and Navy until the war is over. If we proceed at this time to adopt this proposed policy of increase in the Army and Navy, the result will be that other nations will feel that they must copy us. We have heard already that Japan is discussing an increase in her navy because we are discussing an increase in ours. There is no doubt that the South American republics and other countries will feel that if the United States is going to set the pace for an increase in the Army and Navy that they, too, must follow. Such a policy, it goes without saying, increases the burdens of taxation for every country.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, at the close of this war we will have arrived at a turning point in the world's history. The nations must decide whether the world is going through another lengthy series of years of armed peace, or whether the world is going to make a sharp turn as a result of the lessons learned in this war, and evolve some kind of agreement for international adjudication.

At this particular moment, therefore, the Woman's Peace Party feels that it would be a great mistake if the United States did not take advantage of the opportunity which presents itself to turn the world, not toward a continuation of the policy of armed peace, but toward the beginning of an era of disarmament and the cessation of warfare.

I live in the city of Chicago in a section occupied by working people, many of whom are immigrants. I believe the diversity of immigrants is a source of great strength to this country in regard to keeping peace and averting war. We do not fear the so-called hyphenated Americans in that section of the city of Chicago. Immigrants, simply because they represent all the nations, and simply because they are a cosmopolitan population, have already achieved an international understanding. I lived among the Greeks and Bulgarians and other Balkan nationalities during both Balkan wars, and there was no serious trouble among them; they lived altogether as law-abiding citizens.

Many of the immigrants have come to America, of course, for economic reasons, but also, deep down in their hearts, they have come to America because they want to get away from military service;

fathers and sons who dread the militarism of the European nations. They have come believing in the doctrine that in America the Government rests upon the consent of the governed and does not have to be backed up by military force, and they are utterly bewildered by all this sudden talk of the citizens arming and training for war. It upsets their notion of what America is and what they thought, before they came to this country, America was going to be.

It seems to us that many American citizens have come to their present viewpoint in a moment of panic, resulting from the state of affairs in Europe, and that if we increase our military preparation at this time of war contagion, it is quite likely the Nation will live to regret it.

There are other aspects of the situation, Mr. Chairman, which I should like to present to the committee. Not only that we are not now in danger of being attacked, but that the lessons of the European war are not yet learned. We know that the great battleships called dreadnaughts have not proven to be of much use. In such a case, it would seem to be foolish to go ahead and spend a lot of money in building dreadnaughts, as is being urged. If there should be a prolonged naval battle between the fleets of England and Germany it is possible that they would both be destroyed; if they destroyed each other, that would relieve us of the necessity of spending our money for ships, as the United States would automatically be raised from the third naval power to the first. At any rate, no harm could come to us immediately from an exhausted Europe, and it seems a great pity that we can not wait until the time when something is going to happen before we start to prepare for a hypothetical enemy who does not exist now and who may never exist.

I do not like to say that men are more emotional than women, but whenever I go to a national political convention and hear men cheering for a candidate for 1 hour and 15 minutes, it seems to me that perhaps men are somewhat emotional. I think the same thing is true in regard to this war; men feel the responsibility of defending the country and they feel that it is "up to them" to protect the women and children, and therefore they are much more likely to catch this war spirit and respond to this panic. They think they must prepare to defend the country, even when there is no enemy to prepare against, because men in Europe have been called upon to defend their countries.

Women are not quite so easily excited. They go on performing their daily tasks, in spite of hypothetical enemies, and they are not so easily alarmed. I venture to say this in face of the fact that some women are organizing themselves into defense leagues. A woman in the midst of household duties, occupied with the great affairs of birth and death, does not so quickly have her apprehensions aroused because possibly sometime, somewhere, somebody might attack the shores of the American Republic.

In response to the statement that the preparation urged is for defense and not for attack, I can only say that every war is a defensive war. The world has reached a point in its development where no nation can make an aggressive war, because the people will not back up the Government in making an aggressive war.

When we were in Germany, people on every hand said to us, "Don't forget that Russia started this war; Russia mobilized and

therefore it was necessary for Germany to defend herself against Russia and her allies." We heard in France, of course, that France is fighting for self-defense, and you hear in England that England is fighting in self-defense.

When a proposition is made in this country to increase the military forces it must of necessity be based upon the ground of self-defense. When the preparedness people say they are arming the country for defense, they are arming it under the only plea under which it could be armed. Preparedness for defense is the only possible reason men can adduce which would be accepted by the people of the country; the plea of self-defense is the only plea which the country would receive and act upon.

There is one other thing the Woman's Peace Party would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, and that is a commission appointed by Congress to investigate the present expenditure for the Army and Navy, to see whether the money is absolutely efficiently expended; that this commission have six months for its investigation and that during that time the members have the power to call before them anyone whom they deem necessary in order that they may make an intelligent analysis of present expenditures, an amount, by the way, which is by no means trifling. Thirty per cent of the entire Federal income goes into the upkeep of the Army and Navy at the present time. We suggest that this proposed commission have power to bring before it the people who are asking most loudly for this increase in the Army and Navy. Let the commission find out what their motives are for this agitation. Doubtless many of these people would come with clean hands; doubtless some of them are inspired by self-interest. Let this commission find out in addition whether the Army and Navy are in good condition, and whether it is really an increase in the Army and Navy which is needed, because merely increasing the amount of money spent and the number of vessels and the number of men does not make an Army or a Navy more effective, if it is not being efficiently managed.

If the commission has six months in which to make its investigation, possibly before the end of that time this panic which exists in the country to-day will have subsided. Indeed, it seems to be subsiding, even now. The papers are a little less vociferous about the necessity for the increase in the Army and Navy than they were six weeks ago. Let us have six months in which to soberly take up this matter before the nation decides whether it is necessary to abandon its traditional policy and to embark upon a period of great military expansion.

I think these are the suggestions which we desire to present to you this morning. I beg you, gentlemen, to believe that I am speaking not for myself alone, not even for the large membership of the Woman's Peace Party alone, but I am speaking for those women all over the country who can not understand what has so suddenly turned public opinion in the direction of an increase for the Army and Navy, when even our hypothetical enemies are across the ocean, and nobody knows really that we have any enemies. These women can not understand why the Government should want to "prepare" before there is need to contemplate any war.

Perhaps our attitude indicates a survival of the old difference between the woman surrounded by a group of helpless children, who

in case of supposed danger wants to move a little more slowly than the man who rushes out as soon as the bushes begin to move, quite convinced that an enemy is in ambush.

I think there is something of that antithesis in this situation, the conservation, calmer element of the community versus those who are quickly paralyzed with fear and rush into danger before they are quite sure that the danger is there. I am saying this in regard to men in general, and I want to assure you, of course, that I am not addressing myself to the gentlemen of this committee whom, I am sure, are exceptions to any such unbalanced tendency. I shall be glad to answer any questions which any members of the committee may desire to ask.

Mr. GORDON. Miss Addams, did you read the interview with ex-President Roosevelt in the newspapers recently?

Miss ADDAMS. No.

Mr. GORDON. In substance he charges that this administration has disgraced the Nation by its failure to enforce the rights of American citizens in Europe and in Mexico. In substance he charges the President with the responsibility for this because of his alleged failure to take up and push this preparedness program with sufficient vigor. As I understand it, you supported Mr. Roosevelt in the last presidential campaign?

Miss ADDAMS. Yes; I did, but we had nothing about preparedness in our platform. I am a Progressive because the Progressive Party has a program of what seems to me to be a very remarkable political expression of social justice.

Mr. GORDON. But as you understand it, a great many other citizens supported Mr. Roosevelt—

Miss ADDAMS (interposing). He was not talking as he is now.

Mr. GORDON. But he was the same Roosevelt.

Miss ADDAMS. But he was talking minimum wages, the protection of children and women in industry, and things of that sort.

Mr. GORDON. He talks as the political exigencies require. But I want to call your attention to his attitude as reflecting the sentiment of a more or less large number of people in the United States. Do you think he is saying these things purely for the purpose of discrediting the administration in power, or does he mean what he says?

Miss ADDAMS. I think he means it; it is in line with his general policies—so-called "big stick."

Mr. GORDON. The very policy he enforced when he was President?

Miss ADDAMS. I do not think so.

Mr. GORDON. Do you remember the circumstances of his going to Panama and invading the territory of the United States of Colombia?

Miss ADDAMS. That is past history.

Mr. GORDON. Yes; but it is history.

Miss ADDAMS. Let us say that as President he did that. I think there have been thousands of people ready to protest against it, as there are certainly thousands of people protesting against similar action now. There are people of a certain type of mind, such as Col. Roosevelt, who are ready for a challenge and who think that the only way to defend the national honor is to fight for it. I do not think that type represents a large body of people.

Mr. QUIN. Miss Addams, in line with what you stated a few moments ago in regard to the newspapers pushing this campaign for

an increased Army and Navy, do you think that the makers of munitions of war have something to do with this unseen force that is causing this newspaper talk and these newspaper editorials favoring great preparations for war?

Miss ADDAMS. I think there are all sorts of motives. Doubtless many of the editors are convinced that the protection of the Nation lies in the direction of an increased Army and Navy, but I do not think that the bulk of the people are convinced of that fact. I hear a great deal of criticism in Chicago among people of all classes against this newspaper tendency to rush us into a position which we are not ready to take. I think the newspapers are distinctly misleading; they are not interpreting public sentiment but are trying to make it for motives of their own.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Miss Addams, I listened with a great deal of interest to your address to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and I recall a very significant point you made in that address, that in democratic England, as you stated it, the people felt they had not had enough to do either in regard to the matter of terms of peace or in regard to the international agreements in connection with the war, that the Cabinet ministers were the ones who did all that and that sometimes those things were concealed even from some members of the Cabinet who did not have to do directly with foreign affairs. You referred to the proposition in regard to terms of peace. Did you find, in your visit to the European countries that the people in the various countries had the same feeling in regard to questions connected with the war, that they were not consulted in regard to them?

Miss ADDAMS. They had; it was very strong. Even in Germany, where they are accustomed to having the Government take a strong hand in matters of that kind, we were told that many people felt that the Government officials ought to have let the people know more about what was going on.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. The great mass of the people felt they were not given much voice in the matter?

Miss ADDAMS. Yes; in England we met members of the League of Democratic Control, one of whose purposes is the prevention of any such thing as that occurring in the future.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. In your visits abroad, I understand you met the prime ministers of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, and perhaps also of England, and other distinguished men of that class, and, of course, men of other classes. In your general consideration of the conditions you found there in Europe, did you find an opinion that the fact that every country was armed and the men were trained for war, and that the people were not given a voice in regard to it, but that the rulers of those nations had it in their power to bring war on—that that general armed condition had anything to do with the war in Europe?

Miss ADDAMS. The officials in power were naturally not saying that in time of war, although the people everywhere were. The minister of foreign affairs of Russia, Sazanoff, had said three months before the war, that when every country in Europe was so armed as it was at that time, that if any one country mobilized, war would be inevitable. It may be said in regard to this that when Russia mobilized everybody else followed.

In every country where we had any real discussion with the representatives of the people—and we saw also members of Parliament in England, members of the Chamber of Deputies in France, and members of the Reichstag in Germany—they said the essential danger had been this great preparation for war which all the countries had made, that the strain had become intolerable, that the situation itself made war almost inevitable.

Mr. KAHN. Miss Addams, did you see a cable dispatch in yesterday's newspapers giving what purported to have been a part of a speech made by a French senator in regard to the question of preparedness.

Miss ADDAMS. No, I did not see that.

Mr. KAHN. Let me read it to you. It says:

REGRET FOR UNPREPAREDNESS—"FRENCH CABINETS," SAYS SENATOR, "TOO BUSY CURING HUMANITY'S ILLS."

PARIS, January 11.

The 1916 session of Parliament opened this afternoon in the Chamber of Deputies, with Baron de Mackay, dean of the chamber, presiding. Paul Deschanel was reelected president of the chamber. A stirring address was delivered in the Senate, where the veteran Senator Latappy, who presided, attributed France's state of unpreparedness for a German invasion to a long series of ministerial catastrophes, which with every change of ministry had the effect of interrupting the work of national defense and neglecting that supreme work owing to "their being hypnotized by a too ardent desire to cure the sufferings and ills of humanity." If France had had at the beginning of the war only half the armament she has at the present time, he said, the Germans would never have entered France.

Miss ADDAMS. I think that is a very fair sample of the kind of statement the leader of every party in every parliament is obliged to indulge in when his country is engaged in a war. It is the only way to keep up the enthusiasm for war. France has had a hereditary enemy in Germany ever since 1872. That is an entirely different situation from the one which confronts us. One danger of the present situation arises from bringing over into America analogies which do not hold here.

Mr. KAHN. Did you hear Lady Barlow make her statement in regard to the suddenness of the present war?

Miss ADDAMS. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not concede that a condition of that kind may confront this country?

Miss ADDAMS. No, because our situation is so very different. I think the wireless would tell us when an expedition was started to this country; it would require a good many days to get here.

Mr. KAHN. Take, for instance, the Russian-Japanese War; they had cable and telegraphic communication, but Port Arthur and Chemulpo were not far from Japan, and yet Japan struck at both Port Arthur and Chemulpo without giving Russia any chance to defend them.

Miss ADDAMS. We are not quite as sleepy as Russia.

Mr. KAHN. The Russians themselves would not admit that they are sleepy.

Miss ADDAMS. I am afraid they would have to admit they are sleepy along the Siberian coast.

Mr. KAHN. You would not find many Russians who would admit that. Mark you, I have a great deal of respect for what you have said, and while I hope we may never have any war, I do believe that

this country ought to be prepared. How far it ought to be prepared is a question. How far we ought to go is a matter for discussion. I do not believe in an enormous standing army, or in anything of that kind, but how far this country ought to go in the matter of preparedness is a question.

Miss ADDAMS. May I go back to the French Chamber of Deputies? I talked with a number of members of the French Chamber of Deputies, and while I am not at liberty to quote them by name I will refer to one who has a traditional interest and understanding of America. They were fervently hoping that America would keep its head and not become infected with the militaristic spirit. They said if the United States comes in, the militarists will have the field. They will have control over the leading nations of the earth and there is no telling for how many generations they will keep that control.

Mr. KAHN. I do not think there is any danger of the United States being drawn into the war. You are familiar with world history?

Miss ADDAMS. Modestly.

Mr. KAHN. You know there were wars long before there were munition makers, and very big wars?

Miss ADDAMS. I suppose there were arrow makers in the very beginning.

Mr. KAHN. Each man made his own arrows in those days, as I understand.

Miss ADDAMS. I think we would have to get an anthropologist to give us the exact information on that subject.

Mr. KAHN. The Romans had their wars and the doors of the Temple of Janus were seldom closed, and there was no munition trust there that we have ever heard of.

Miss ADDAMS. I did not claim that that was the only reason for war, nor even the chief reason.

Mr. KAHN. You heard Mr. Gordon refer to Col. Roosevelt's grabbing the United States of Colombia at Panama? If Roosevelt recognized the Republic of Panama and kept our pledge to keep transit across the Isthmus of Panama clear, was that any worse than the invasion of Mexico and the assault on Haiti or Nicaragua by the present administration?

Miss ADDAMS. Far be it from me to offer to defend Col. Roosevelt's policies; that would be the last thing he would care to have me do. It might have been much better, however, if the Panama Canal and its concession had been internationalized from the beginning. The United States would then be in a position to push the complete neutralization of all trade routes. There is a proposition, to make a beginning, that we will throw in the Panama Canal, and England will throw in the Suez Canal, and Germany will throw in the Kiel Canal, in just such a scheme. It might be that if the United States had done that sort of thing at the start of the Panama Canal we would be in some position of leadership now.

Mr. KAHN. I think if the whole world would come together and agree to disarm, and do away with armies and navies almost entirely, the world would be much better off.

Miss ADDAMS. We do not press that at this moment; all we ask is that there be no increase in the Army and Navy at this moment.

Mr. ANTHONY. Miss Addams, I take it you are opposed to what is known as the program of the military alarmists?

Miss ADDAMS. We are opposed to any large increase in the expenditures for the Army and Navy.

Mr. ANTHONY. But you are not opposed to the maintenance of the Navy in a reasonable degree of proper preparedness?

Miss ADDAMS. We should like to keep it as it is now, or rather increasing no more rapidly than it has been doing, and to have it made absolutely effective.

Mr. ANTHONY. You want our Army and Navy kept up to date?

Miss ADDAMS. Certainly, until we see what Europe is going to do in regard to "armed peace"; then we may take a chance and reduce our armament proportionately with other countries.

Mr. ANTHONY. You do not believe that the time has arrived to disarm?

Miss ADDAMS. No; we are desirous that a commission be appointed to find out how nearly the present Army and Navy are efficient.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you believe this country should afford protection to its citizens abroad or on the high seas?

Miss ADDAMS. One of the things we are advocating before the Committee on Foreign Relations is a program of substitution for military increase. We believe that the citizens of this country who seek concessions in unsettled or backward countries, as for example Mexico, under conditions which would not stand the scrutiny of American courts, should not be able to claim the military and naval protection of this Nation. If this principle had been adopted the South African war, for instance, would not have been waged.

Mr. ANTHONY. How about the case of an American citizen who worked for wages in a foreign country, for instance, in a country like Mexico?

Miss ADDAMS. I think that same principle might be extended to citizens living in a disordered country, if they have been guilty of any acts that are illegal according to the laws of this country, or if, in taking up employment there, they incur, for any reason, excessive and unreasonable risks, those facts should be considered before protection is granted them.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think there is any obligation on the part of the Government of the United States to maintain peace and order in a territory of a neighboring country where peace and order are lacking?

Miss ADDAMS. I do not want to get into a discussion of the Mexican policy.

Mr. ANTHONY. Do you think any duty of that kind devolves upon this great strong Government to carry light into dark places?

Miss ADDAMS. I think it is always easy for the strong to see a duty to the weak when the proposed action is of advantage to the strong. I think that is something to be guarded against in all national undertakings.

Mr. ANTHONY. You do not believe that should be avoided?

Miss ADDAMS. I think we should wait until the moment has arrived and we are quite sure that we are disinterested.

Mr. ANTHONY. When would you consider that the moment had arrived?

Miss ADDAMS. I should say it had not arrived yet. I admire the President for keeping peace with Mexico. [Applause.]

Mr. MCKENZIE. Miss Addams, what do you think of the advisability of introducing military training into our public schools?

Miss ADDAMS. I think it is outrageous and that it is very much to be deplored. May I refer, in that connection, to an experience of ours at Hull House. We had a troop of Boy Scouts there, although instead of guns they had staves. The Russians, the Italians, and other immigrants who lived about us came to us and said, "We did not come to America for this; this is what we came to America to get away from," and we gave up the drilling because it gave the impression that we were standing for the sort of thing which is against American traditions. I think to get in the minds of the boys of the high schools, and even the children in the grade schools, that they are exercising with the ultimate intent of war, when they might be exercising in games for their mutual benefit and good will, is a very grave mistake.

Mr. MCKENZIE. You think that the physical advantage to the pupils could be obtained without arousing a military spirit in them?

Miss ADDAMS. It could be obtained in many ways without having a military drill. At the present time in Europe, the soldiers are digging trenches. You might set the children to digging.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Evidently, from the experience of the European armies, a man who had had experience on a section would make a good soldier.

Miss ADDAMS. We are told that the men in the muddy trenches have very little marching to do; that the rifle is becoming more or less obsolete as it is being replaced by machine guns; that the old-fashioned military drill is not being called into play very much.

Mr. GREENE. As a student of history, Miss Addams, you recognize the fact that the doctrine of physical force has played a tremendous part in the evolution of civilization.

Miss ADDAMS. Certainly.

Mr. GREENE. And that one of the peculiarly difficult factors in the study of the evolution of civilization as produced through the doctrine of physical force, is the question as to when and how and why this physical force may be exerted by somebody?

Miss ADDAMS. Yes; but somebody has to begin to utilize his moral energy and his wits. The experiment will have to be made some time; of course, war has persisted but society may get rid of it as it has gotten rid of other things, the black plague, for instance. The black plague in the ninth century changed the whole face of Europe quite as much as wars are doing now. Certain old diseases have been done away with; any civilized nation to-day would be ashamed to be devastated by the black plague or cholera, and I think it is but a short step from that to the point when nations will be ashamed of war. In fact, from a certain point of view they are ashamed of it now in Europe.

The people say that the diplomats are indicted by this war, that they ought to have kept peace, that something is wrong with those in charge of international relations when such a war can happen. Just when European nations are getting ready to give up their expensive preparation for war and consider substitutes, the United States gets panicky and proceeds to get ready for it; we are late in the day. In this matter of preparedness we are attaching ourselves to an outgrown creed, instead of seizing our chance and leading the

advance guard in another direction. It is as an American citizen that I speak, Mr. Chairman, and in regard to a national policy. I do not know anything about the position of military experts, of course; that is to be considered after the Nation has determined upon its general policy.

Mr. GREENE. You would not, of course, want to leave the impression with the committee that you placed diseases on the same plane, as attributable to the same causation as the motives and elements which inspire human intelligence to make or not to make war?

Miss ADDAMS. Not at all; you spoke of war having been inevitable and I made the illustration that certain diseases, at one time considered inevitable, are now obsolete. Of course, I think war a very different thing from a disease. There becomes attached to it the very highest possible human motives of heroism and patriotism. A people united as one is an imposing spectacle, but we can get these virtues in other ways, and war is too high a price to pay for them.

Mr. TILSON. As I understand, Miss Addams, your plan would be to have our Army and Navy remain as they are at present until after the war in Europe has come to a close?

Miss ADDAMS. What we ask is to have a six months' investigation by a commission, so that the present Army and Navy may be put upon the most efficient basis possible, and we urge no increase so long as the war lasts; we contend that at present we can not look at the question calmly.

Mr. TILSON. It is not your contention that we should stop and go back at all from our present position?

Miss ADDAMS. Not at all; that is, perhaps too much to ask of human nature; it would certainly be unwise to urge it at the present moment.

Mr. TILSON. Suppose it should be found after an investigation such as you propose that such preparation we have is not suitable for any sort of defense; in other words, that it would not be well balanced, that our defensive scheme as at present organized is not calculated to work out well?

Miss ADDAMS. That would be impossible to tell until we knew whom our hypothetical enemies were, whether we were adequately defended against them or not.

Mr. TILSON. But all history tells us that wars do come and the last war, the greatest of all time, came when we thought we had arrived at the place where wars were a thing of the past, and where we thought we had gotten beyond that. Just at that time the greatest war of all history is precipitated. What assurance have we—what assurance have the members of this committee, charged with formulating plans for the defense of the country so far as the land forces are concerned, if we go on and do nothing until a war should develop? What position are we in if we have not attempted to move forward at all, if we simply remain where we were when we took up the responsibility?

Miss ADDAMS. I think the first thing would be to find out as nearly as possible what is the cause of the present war. All sorts of causes have been assigned, but I think the consensus of opinion is gradually centering upon the very existence of large standing armies. The war was precipitated by the general staff in Germany, certainly far more than by the civil government; the latter contended that the diffi-

culties might have been adjudicated. Certainly the lesson of this war is not that large preparation prevents war.

Mr. TILSON. If everybody followed strictly the laws of health and hygiene, I suppose we would not need hospitals, and yet you would not advocate that we stop building hospitals for that reason.

Miss ADDAMS. But I would not go out on an open prairie where there are no people who are ill and build a hospital. I should wait until there were sick people to move into a new hospital.

Mr. TILSON. But if we waited until an enemy's army was upon our shores it would then be too late to prepare.

Miss ADDAMS. No; but I should wait until I could see whom our enemies are, and I would use every possible means to overcome the enmity of other nations. If, for instance, trouble is anticipated because of the treatment of the Japanese people in this country, a law could be enacted, as recommended by the American Bar Association, which places all aliens under the protection of the Federal Government, so that one State could not precipitate war because of its unfair legislation. There are a number of possible causes of war which could be anticipated and averted. A wise woman will not resort to corporal punishment with her child until she has exhausted every other resource.

Mr. TILSON. But you will admit if war should come, provoked or unprovoked, that the consequences to the people of the country would be very much more serious in case of a lack of proper preparation?

Miss ADDAMS. I think we can not tell at this moment what the preparation should be. For instance, there is the whole coast of Belgium which is in the hands of Germany, and also the coast of Germany itself, with the enormous British fleet within 200 miles of it; that coast has not been attacked because it is protected by mines and submarines. We can not say now what our protection should be. In the meantime the United States has a splendid opportunity to take the lead for proportionate disarmament; if instead of doing that we increase our Army and Navy, we will go back into the old method. It is certainly premature to decide on that now. No doubt you are feeling in your constituencies a war contagion and panic, but I feel sure your constituencies will thank you later if you withstand such a panic.

Mr. TILSON. Has anyone proposed a scheme for a great enlargement of the Army and Navy. Has any responsible governmental official proposed an immense increase of the Army or the Navy?

Miss ADDAMS. I supposed there was a proposition for a five years' plan before Congress, which would provide for a very large increase. I have been told that if the five-year programme were carried out, we would have an increase 40 times greater than Germany had in the five years preceding the present war, and yet the other nations of Europe considered Germany to be a menace under those conditions.

Mr. TILSON. Is it not a fact so far as the naval program is concerned, to simply carry out the program which was formulated under Mr. Roosevelt, when he was President, and that there is no proposition which is a new plan of navy building; that we are simply carrying out a plan which was formulated some years ago?

Miss ADDAMS. But it was not carried out.

Mr. TILSON. It has not been carried out.

Miss ADDAMS. I think we should be very grateful it has not been carried out.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, for your courtesy in hearing me this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very glad indeed to have had you appear before us, Miss Addams.

Do any gentlemen representing these associated colleges wish to be heard?

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS FELL, PRESIDENT ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.**

Dr. FELL. What I shall say is somewhat incidental to what has already been said. Of course I feel heartily in sympathy with the high words laid before you by Col. Nichols.

St. John's College, of course, is one of the oldest colleges in the country. It dates from 1796, but we had no Regular Army system until 1884, when an Army officer was designated there. From that period up to the present time, we have had that system, and we have now, I suppose, something like 50 Army officers. And we probably would have had more from among our graduates if there had been an opportunity for them to enter the Army. We have now three men waiting for vacancies in the Army in order to enter. They have been held over for three years. One distinguished man, marked out last June, has not yet had an opportunity of offering himself to enter the Army because there have been no vacancies from civil life. So that shows you in a measure that you must not take the number of graduates, we will say, from our schools now serving in the Army as indicating what could be done if we had the opportunity of putting them there.

Let us take another view. I am thoroughly in accord with what Gen. Nichols has said, that we are not suppliants, that we have not come here to ask you for money, but we have seen the McKellar bill which indicates that there is a disposition on the part of some members of this committee, or members of the House, to designate certain sums of money for the education of young men. We feel as Col. Jones has said that if you are not satisfied with the output that comes from our schools at the present time and you want a larger output, you can get a larger output of officers from these schools by granting us scholarships which Col. Jones put on the basis of \$400, which is, relatively, on a much more economical basis than if you were to enlarge West Point, or, as has been suggested, put another West Point down on the Pacific coast.

I merely throw these suggestions out in a general way, that I think if there is a disposition on the part of this committee to do that to foster these schools, to help us to increase our output, if you think that the output is very material, it is worth your consideration on an economic basis whether some such system could not be satisfactorily carried out.

Mr. DENT. I think there has been some confusion as to the number of young men attending these institutions that are graduated each year.

**STATEMENT OF COL. O. C. HULVEY, COLUMBIA MILITARY ACADEMY, TENN.**

Col. HULVEY. As secretary of this association I have the records. I do not have them here, but relying on my memory, and I think it is accurate, in 1915 there were 33,000 young men in attendance at the schools which have Army officers detailed, and the number of graduates for 1915 will be 5,200.

Mr. DENT. Will that be the average number?

Col. HULVEY. That has been the average for the last five or six years.

Mr. KAHN. That, of course, includes all the schools, the 100 schools.

Col. HULVEY. Yes, sir.

**STATEMENT OF COL. L. R. GIGNILLIAT, SUPERINTENDENT CULVER MILITARY ACADEMY, INDIANA.**

Mr. GIGNILLIAT. I am superintendent of the Culver Military Academy, Indiana. The institution which I represent falls within the class of preparatory schools—the strictly military preparatory school.

The question that I wish to raise pertains to the age of the young men at the time of graduation. There are a number of these young men who are well trained after four years in a strictly military school, but who are too young at the time of graduation for admission to the reserve army or the Regular Army. The training of those young men, however, would hold over until they had reached the required age. The mere fact that a young man has received the prescribed military training is not *prima facie* evidence that he is competent to be a commissioned officer. He may lack the qualities of leadership. It seems to me, therefore, that any one plan that is under consideration will probably be insufficient of itself to provide the number of efficient reserve officers that will be required, and that it will be desirable to have a very large number of available men in order that there may be a process of selection, of picking and choosing. In that connection might be considered the suggestion which I think has already been made of a probationary commission in the regular service, taking the graduates of the military colleges and honor military schools and commissioning them temporarily in the United States Army for a period of six months or a year. This would furnish an excellent opportunity to disclose the timber of these young men to see if they had the stuff in them—the quality of leadership—and it would also test the quality of training they have had, and thus afford a test of the work which the school that produced them is doing. From the men so commissioned could be selected certain men who might be required to fill vacancies permanently in the regular service, and also men who could be called upon or commissioned and who the Government would be assured would render satisfactory service in the continental army or in connection with volunteer troops.

The young men who graduate from these preparatory institutions, the Culver Military Academy, for instance, will average between 18 and 19 years of age. Out of a graduating class this year of 142 there are 74 who are 19 years of age or over. If the minimum age for a commission is 21 years, it would require two years before the majority of

these men reached the required age, and if changes took place in that time in the methods of instructing, these men could be sent to some summer camp where they could brush up and be available. I simply present that thought because under the regulations that have existed in the past the young men graduating from strictly military preparatory schools, though thoroughly trained, have been too young to avail themselves of the opportunity for a commission in the Army. Formerly there was no distinction between colleges and preparatory schools. On the basis of merit a certain number were designated each year as "distinguished institutions," at one time four and again six, and it was permissible for these establishments to recommend a graduate for commission in the Regular Army. The Culver Military Academy has been fortunate enough to be included for a number of years in that group of distinguished institutions, yet has seldom had a man 21 years of age at graduation that it could conscientiously recommend, because naturally the fact that a man was 21 years of age before he graduated from a secondary school in itself would be *prima facie* evidence that he was not the type of young man to be recommended. Therefore, the age of these graduates of the strictly military institutions should be considered in any plan that may be proposed and provision made for commissioning them when they come of age, especially since among the preparatory schools we find some that in completeness of equipment and in scope of instruction approximate the United States Military Academy at West Point.

**STATEMENT OF COL. J. C. WOODWARD, PRESIDENT GEORGIA MILITARY ACADEMY.**

Col. Woodward. As the president of this association for two years, I have felt this day, that this body of patriotic schoolmen from almost all the States in the Union feel a profound thankfulness for the privilege of having their work considered at the hands of this distinguished body, out of whose committee work doubtless grow the formulation of plans this year which will settle for 100 years much of the policy of this country, and probably the destiny of the American people.

I have brought one thought that I should like to leave with you gentlemen. It has been my privilege and opportunity for 16 to 20 years to ride on the street cars which have been occupied by the Federal soldiers of Fort McPherson. I believe I am well within the bounds of truth, as has been demonstrated by your own experience, when I say that the uniform of the American soldier has been a thing to be laughed at on our street cars and a thing rather to be shunned and moved away from in our street cars. The uniform that ought to be the badge of honor for any American citizen has been a thing held somewhat in disrespect. These young men in these institutions, from almost every hamlet and city in the Union learn the lesson of respect for the uniform, for the Army, for that branch of the service. These young men become the fostering influence in every community from which they come of those principles that ultimately may constitute the salvation of the Nation, for finally, if necessity should compel us to that measure we must stand upon the measure of our arms in order to take care of ourselves as a Nation.

These young men carry back the military history of their country in plain unvarnished terms to their neighbor boys. They discuss these questions around their firesides, and in that respect they become the most patriotic message bearers of what this country has stood for, its weakness, and its strength, perhaps, and therefore the only means at this time. They represent the only machinery of this time for taking hold in an educational way of the American mind and building that mind up to that point of preparedness which we must sooner or later come to.

In conclusion, therefore, let me again thank you, in the name of the association, for the kindness and for the patience and for the interest which you have manifested by letting this committee appear before you in this respect.

Mr. KAHN. I should like to ask the colonel a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kahn.

Mr. KAHN. You say your schools tend to foster a spirit of patriotism among those who have not had the privilege of entering the schools?

Col. WOODWARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do your boys—your graduates—teach the others the history of the United States?

Col. WOODWARD. I think so, sir.

Mr. KAHN. Do you not think that a great injury has been done to the country by many of the school histories in which they fail to tell the growing American boys the truth of what has happened in many of our contests with foreign powers?

Col. WOODWARD. I think it is perfectly plain, sir, to the American mind to-day that our children have been very unfortunately taught in matters of that kind. They have been led to believe that in every case we licked the other side.

Mr. KAHN. And never got licked ourselves at all?

Col. WOODWARD. No, sir.


The CHAIRMAN. We have won in the final result.

Mr. KAHN. We have been fortunate, but at a terrific cost. If we had been measurably prepared in our past wars, do you not think that the country would have escaped with a great deal less indebtedness than we had to carry by reason of our wars and our lack of preparedness?


Col. WOODWARD. Very true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Colonel.

(Thereupon, at 11.45 a. m., the committee adjourned until Monday, January 24, at 10 o'clock a. m.)











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